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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the growth and development of the computer
manufacturing industry since the late 1950s, and documents the changing
location pattern of firms. It examines how changes in the nature of the
production process, which has been radically affected by technological
changes and increasing demand, have influenced location decisions.
Changes over time in the manufacturing process alter the firm's input
requirements and make new geogrpahic areas attractive for expanding
production. The resulting shifts in industrial activity will
significantly affect the economic health of regions.
There is considerable debate in the literature about the
determinants of industrial location and the causes and consequences of
regional growth. This thesis analyzes and test three theories,
neoclassical, product cycle, and structural economic theory.
The methodology used in the thesis combines quantitative and
qualitative analysis. Published Census data provide information on
aggregate location and employment trends in the computer manufacturing
industry. However, these data do not provide information on what
product is manufactured in a specific site, the process by which the
goods are manufactured, including the degree of automation, or the
reasons companies chose particular locations. In order to obtain this
type of data, I interviewed executives and prepared case studies on ten
mainframe and minicomputer companies. The analysis of these data form
the basis of the thesis.
The analysis shows that the history of the computer industry can be
divided into three periods. The first period, from the 1950s to the
mid-1960s saw the birth of the computer industry. During the second
period, stretching from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the industry
developed and computers became widely used commercially. The third
period, which began in the mid-1970s and continues today, has been a
3period of explosive growth as newer and smaller computers have been
developed for use at home and in small businesses. These three periods
have been characterized by substantial differences in the design of
computers, the manufacturing process, labor demand, and location of
manufacturing plants, as the thesis discusses in detail.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Bennett Harrison
Professor of Political Economy and Planning
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The post-World War II period has been one in which substantial
changes have occurred among the regions in the United States. During
the 1950s and 1960s there was tremendous economic growth in the entire
country and all regions benefited. However, even during these years,
the expansion of employment and growth of population in the South and
West exceeded that in the North. Until the late 1960s the rapid
growth in the South and West was viewed as being essentially positive.
The less industrialized South was finally beginning to "catch up" with
the more industrialized North. However, with the general slowdown of
economic growth in the 1970s, it appears that the growth in the South
and West is taking place at the expense of development in the North.
This perception is causing concern, and often alarm among residents of
the Northeast. The magnitude as well as the implications of this
differential regional growth have caused considerable academic and
public debate. The struggle between the North and the South for jobs
and population has been termed by some, the second war between the
states.
Overall regional changes in population, employment, and income
since 1950 have been relatively well documented. Population has been
growing more quickly in the South and West than in the North due to
both higher fertility and in-migration. Employment growth rates of
all industries in the South and West exceed those of the North.
Services have been expanding more rapidly than manufacturing in all
areas of the country. In the North, manufacturing employment has
actually declined. The South and West (excluding the Pacific region)
have historically had lower per capita incomes than in the North. The
trend since 1930, and particularly since 1950 has been to narrow
regional differentials.
These analyses of aggregate trends give us a general picture of
the regional changes that have been occurring. They do not, however,
provide enough detail to allow us to understand the causes of the
observed shifts. To do this, we need detailed industry studies. At
this level, we can examine the factors that influence why an industry
chooses to locate in a certain area and how these factors, and thus
location decisions, change over time. This will allow us to
understand what makes certain regions more attractive than others and
therefore why jobs are being created more rapidly in these areas. The
analysis will contribute to a richer understanding of the process of
regional economic growth.
This thesis examines the growth and development of the computer
manufacturing industry since the 1950s, and documents the changing
location patterns of firms. I am particularly interested in
understanding how changes in the nature of the production process,
which has been radically affected by technological changes and
increasing demand, have influenced location decisions. Changes
overtime in the manufacturing process alter the firm's input
requirements and make new geographic areas attractive for expanding
production. The resulting shifts in industrial activity significantly
affect the economic health of different regions.
There is considerable debate in the literature about the
determinants of industrial location and the causes and consequences of
regional growth. Neoclassical economists argue that firms locate in a
way to minimize production costs. Regions grow and decline due to
exogenous shifts in the demand and supply for products, labor, and
capital. These shifts, which affect wages and the prices of products,
alter production costs, and thus can affect location decisions.
Neoclassical theory is essentially ahistorical. Exogenous changes
in demand and supply move the model forward, in an automatic and
mechanistic manner. Events such as technological advances and changes
in the competitive environment occur outside the model and there is no
attempt to explain the causes of these changes. Other theories are
more truly long run in that changes are an integral part of the model
and the historical adjustment provides a more satisfactory explanation
than the simple automatic process of neoclassical theory. These other
theories hypothesize that factors besides wages and prices affect
location decisions, and often lead to different decisions than those
based solely on cost minimization.
Product cycle theorists argue, for example, that technological
changes drive all manufactured products through a regular pattern of
development that alters the manufacturing process and affects plant
location. Actual events and people drive the model through different
stages. Product cycle theory offers an explanation of historical
development that is absent in neoclassical theory.
Structural or institutional theory is not one single body of
theory like neoclassical or product cycle theory. Institutional
economists argue that it is important to understand how structural
features of the economy, including characteristics of specific
industries, social characteristics, and historical factors affect, in
this case, the development of the computer industry. Among the
specific factors structual theory considers important in location
decisions are the competitive situation in the industry under study,
characteristics of the labor market, including the degree of
unionization, and the historical development of the industry.
Theorists argue that these structural features have substantial
effects on the location decisions of firms.
This thesis analyzes these competing theories of industrial
location using the computer industry as a case study. The computer
manufacturing industry is an ideal case to use in studying the process
of location and regional growth. The industry as we know it today is
a post-World War II phenomenon. In these years, technological change
has been occurring constantly. Combined with increasing product
demand, this has meant that the industry has experienced substantial
and rapid growth, which is projected to continue for some time in the
future. The spatial distribution of the industry is also changing.
The industry originally developed in the older industrialized areas of
the Northeast and in California. Within the last ten years production
has diversified geographically into the less developed regions of the
United States, the South and the West, and into the less developed
areas of the world, particularly Asia.
The fact that growth in the computer industry has been rapid and
relatively recent also means that the changes and the causes of these
changes are still fresh in people's minds. This makes the industry
somewhat easier to study than some other industries. The industry is
also useful to study as its growth has had, and will continue to have
profound affects on our society. The applications of computer
technology are constantly increasing, thus having enormous affects on
other industries. For example, robots are being developed to do
assembly line work, reducing the need for production workers.
Numerical control devices in other manufacturing situations are
reducing the skill level required to produce goods. The computer
revolution is not only affecting manufacturing industries, but is also
significantly affecting trade and service delivery. Computer
technologies, including word processing machines, are reducing
secretarial and clerical jobs. Understanding more about the location
decision making patterns of computer manufacturing companies may
provide insights into other industries as well.
There are three central research issues addressed by this thesis:
where computer companies locate their manufacturing plants; why they
choose these locations; and how the locations and criteria have
changed over time.
The first task is to examine where computer firms are located
today and how this has changed since the 1950s. California and
Massachusetts are two centers of computer manufacturing activity in
the United States. How concentrated is the computer industry in these
and other centers today? Is there more or less geographic
concentration today than there was in the past? Public perception is
that computer companies have been expanding their facilities in the
South and Southwest. How true is this and how significant is the new
activity in these areas?
There has been much discussion about computer and other
electronics companies moving manufacturing activity to foreign
countries, notably Asia. How much manufacturing actually occurs
off-shore? When did computer companies first begin producing in
foreign countries? Computer firms are in most areas of the world
today. What countries did they locate in initially and what countries
are attractive today?
The second stage in the analysis is to examine why companies chose
the specific locations that they did. I am particularly interested in
examining how the manufacturing process affects location and how as
the manufacturing process has changed, the locations that companies
find attractive have changed. There are a number of issues concerning
the manufacturing process that we need to examine.
First, we need to understand the nature of the product itself.
What is a computer made of? What kind of components are manufactured?
Understanding this will allow us to understand what kinds of inputs
are needed for manufacturing. We also need to examine what computer
companies manufacture themselves and what components they buy from
other companies as this also affects what kind of manufacturing
activity occurs in computer companies.
Another issue is how companies organize production. Does each
plant produce a complete product, from initial design through
manufacture? Or, is the manufacturing process divided so that
different plants each produce a part of the final product? How
production is organized will partly determine the company's demand for
different types of labor in different locations.
Several factors are important in describing the actual
manufacturing process. One is the degree of task specialization or
the division of labor. Does each worker have one task to perform, or
is each worker involved in several phases of the manufacture? The
degree of automation in production is related, though not necessarily
analogous to the degree of specialization. The trend to automated
production is often accomplished by an increase in the division of
labor. We need to examine how much of the actual production is done
by machines, and how this has changed over time.
Once we understand the process involved in manufacturing
computers, and particularly the labor force requirements, we can
examine how this affects plant location decisions. One issue is
whether companies locate plants to attract certain kinds of labor. We
therefore need to examine how important labor requirements are in
determining location.
There are undoubtedly many areas of the U.S. where computer
companies would find the kind of labor they need. What other
characteristics of an area are important in attracting firms? The
wage rate is likely to be an important variable. But do companies
choose locations simply to minimize labor costs? Are low wage rates
the primary reason companies expand manufacturing facilities
off-shore? Some would argue that many companies choose locations in
order to avoid union and other organized work activity. Is this
assumption true or false?
There is much debate about how important government taxes,
incentives, and attitudes are in attracting companies. States and
cities in the U.S. compete for'high tech firms by offering various
packages of tax breaks and other financial incentives. They also
strive to maintain a positive "business climate." How do these
monetary and nonmonetary characteristics affect the location decisions
of computer companies? Foreign governments also compete for firms by
offering various types of tax incentives. Is this strategy
successful?
There are a number of other factors that have been cited as
affecting location decisions, such as the presence of universities
with superior electrical engineering and computer science departments.
Is this an important factor? "Agglomeration economies" are generated
when a number of firms producing the same or related products locate
in the same area. This makes the area attractive to firms in the same
industry looking for a new location. How do agglomeration economies
affect location decisions?
The thesis examines these various factors that are likely to
affect location decisions and analyzes the actual importance of each
factor. The important location criteria will change over time,
particularly as the manufacturing process changes. Different
companies will also have different experiences. The anlaysis will
provide a framework within which to understand the location decisions
of computer companies and how they have changed over time.
The thesis has seven chapters. The introduction serves as Chapter
1. Chapter 2 discusses and critiques the three theoretical
perspectives that deal with plant location and regional growth,
neoclassical theory, product cycle theory, and structural economic
theory. The conclusions from this analysis lay the framework for the
rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 also contains a discussion of the
methodology used in the thesis, which includes a combination of
quantitative data and qualitative data from a study of ten large
computer companies.
Chapter 3 presents Census and other published data on the location
of computer companies, for several periods between 1967 and 1982. The
data are restricted to U.S. locations and the chapter examines what
areas of the country have the largest concentrations of computer
manufacturing activity and how the growth over the 15 years affected
the degree of concentration.
Published data are useful, but not sufficient for the entire
analysis because no information is available on what is manufactured
in different plants, how it is manufactured, and why plants are
located where they are. To obtain this type of information I prepared
case studies on the largest computer companies in the industry, and
Chapters 4 through 6 report the results of this analysis.
Chapter 4 examines the process by which computers are manufactured
and the type and mix of labor demanded. There have been significant
changes over time and the chapter characterizes the important features
of each period. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the specific factors that
affect location decisions in the U.S. and abroad, respectively. These
chapters examine, for example, how changes in the manufacturing
process and government actions, affected location decisions. Finally,
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Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the analysis, some public policy
implications, and topics for future research.
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Chapter 2
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
There are three theoretical perspectives that address the issues
of industrial location and regional economic growth: neoclassical
theory; product cycle theory; and structural economic theory. The
approaches and assumptions of these theories are quite different as
are the explanations each offers. The first section of this chapter
discusses and criticizes these three theoretical perspectives.
The second section of the chapter discusses the methodology used
in this thesis, which combines quantitative and qualitative analyses.
Quantitative Census data provide information on the location patterns
of computer manufacturing companies. Qualitative information from
case studies of 10 computer companies answer questions about how
products are manufactured and why firms choose particular locations.
Theoretical Perspectives
Neoclassical Theories
Two separate bodies of neoclassical economic theory address the
issue of firm location and its effects on regional growth and decline.
These two strands of theory are interrelated only to the extent that
they are based on similar, neoclassical assumptions. In contrast, in
product cycle theory and structural economic theory, discussed in the
following sections, the theory of location and growth are intimately
related.
Location Theory. There are many variants of the traditional
location model, each dropping one assumption or another. I do not
intend to develop each variation, but instead to discuss the basic
model and the assumptions that are common to all models.
The theory assumes that firms attempt to maximize profits and
behave in a rational, optimizing manner. The market structure is one
of perfect competition, which means that there are a large number of
small firms, none of which is large enough to affect the prices of
outputs or inputs by its actions. Firms are assumed to operate in a
world of perfect information, where there is no uncertainty about the
present markets and also no undertainty about the future. Production
functions are given and fixed.
Each firm will have a fixed demand for labor, machinery, natural
resources, and any other inputs necessary for production. The prices
of these inputs are given to the firm. The firm will thus choose a
location that, given these conditions, will maximize profit (or
equivalently, minimize costs, if demand is spatially invariant).
The distribution of the factors of production varies across the
country. Some areas are rich in natural resources, others have a high
concentration of skilled labor. Since firms producing different goods
require different inputs, and in varying proportions, we would expect
that different areas of the country would be attractive to various
types of firms. Thus, for example, we have a lot of steel plants near
coal producing centers and fish processing plants in coastal areas.
In sum, according to neoclassical theory, the location decision of
a firm is made in isolation of everything except the costs and
revenues of production. We have small, autonomous, undifferentiated
firms, reacting in a mechanistic manner to exogenous changes in the
prices of inputs and outputs.
The major criticisms of the neoclassical location model arise from
the basic assumptions upon which it rests. The theory assumes a
perfectly competitive market, where no firm is large enough to
influence prices. This assumption is obviously violated in reality.
Many industries are characterized by monopolistic or oligopolistic
market structures. In the computer manufacturing industry, for
example, IBM dominates the mainframe market and in the market for
minicomputers, Digital Equipment Corporation, Data General, and
Hewlett Packard are dominant forces. The existence of monopoly or
oligopoly means that the individual firm has more power that it would
under a situation of perfect competition. The firm can affect the
price of its product and of its inputs, and can thus, make higher than
average profits. As a result, location and production decisions will
not yield the socially optimal solution we would get in a perfectly
competitive situation.
Neoclassical models also assume firms behave in a rational and
profit-maximizing manner. There are a number of ways in which this
set of assumptions are violated. There are other factors besides the
costs of inputs that afect location. An example of this is the
owner's or manager's preference to locate near home or in an area with
cultural amenities. Another example is the set of agglomeration
economies that lead one to expect firms to locate near each other or
near urban areas that provide necessary services. These economies are
difficult to measure and are thus not well caputured in a cost
calculus. The existence of these factors that affect location,
independent of the direct costs of production, means that the location
decision will not necessarily be profit maximizing.
Orthodox location theory also assumes that firms have fairly
complete information about the alternative locations that are
available. The firm does not need to know the exact costs of locating
in different areas, but it must at least know the probability
distribution of costs in different areas. Studies of how companies
make location decisions show that when firms choose a location, they
actually only consider a small number of sites. In addition, the
information a firm has about distant locations is not as complete as
the information about nearby locations. The location decision is
likely to be sub-optimal when information is not perfect.
Neoclassical theory also has a very limited notion about
production functions. It does not deal explicitly with changes over
time in the production process, and particularly has little theory
concerning the origins of technological change. It assumes a
homogeneity of inputs (e.g. labor) that is incorrect. The production
process is also assumed to be capable of incremental (as opposed to
discrete) changes in the capital and labor used, as prices and wages
change. The production function is essentially determined
exogenously, thus assuming that the firm has little control over the
manner in which goods are produced.
Besides the above criticisms of the basic assumptions of orthodox
theory, there are numerous phenomena and factors that neoclassical
theory is not set up to deal with explicitly. These factors often
have profound effects on the locaton decision. For example, much of
today's manufacturing output is produced by a complicated, spatially
dispersed process, occurring in multi-plant firms, located in
different areas of the country or the world. Ownership patterns are
also complex, with large conglomerates owning a number of companies
producing very different goods. Thus, the location of any plant is
not a simple, independent profit-maximizing decision for that one
plant, but involves the plant's situation in the entire company or
conglomerate.
Regional Growth Theories. Orthodox theories of regional growth
can be broadly classified into two groups. According to
demand-induced theories, increases in demand for a region's products
cause the region to grow. Supply driven models hypothesize that
changes in the region's inputs of labor, capital, and natural
resources provide the stimulus for growth.
The basic differences between the two general types of models can
be summarized by considering a region's output, labor, and capital
markets (Wheaton 1979). There are essentially two mechanisms by which
the region's output and employment will grow. One, if the demand for
the region's products increases, this will increase demand for labor
and capital within the region (the exact amount and proportion
depending on the production function), leading to an increase in
regional employment and income. Two, the supply of a region's inputs
may increase, for example due to an in-migration of labor. The
increased supply will lead to decreased wages (assuming wages are
flexible in the downward direction) and an increased employment. this
will lead to an increase in the output of the region and increase
income. The various orthodox theories of regional growth emphasize
either the supply or demand side. The theories are not, however,
mutually exclusive.
One of the more well-known demand side models is export base
theory. According to the theory, a region's outputs can be divided
into two classes, goods exported out of the region and goods used
locally, within the region. Regions grow when demand for the goods it
exports increase. This increase works its way through the entire
economy, having a multiplier effect on regional income. The theory
says nothing about what causes changes in demand, except that the
changes are assumed to be exogenous to the region.
Trade theory analyzes why and how regions trade with one another,
which increases the demand for each region's products. A region
exports the goods for which it has a price advantage relative to other
regions. The relative price advantage is a function of the region's
factor endowments. For example, regions with an abundant supply of
labor relative to land will export goods that are relatively
labor-intensive. Trade thus leads to a regional product
specialization and an increase in total production.
Supply induced growth theories emphasize the role that changes in
a region's inputs play in explaining growth or decline. The migration
of labor and the mobility of capital are the two important supply-side
changes. In-migrations lead to growth and out-migrations lead to
regional decline. Little is said, however, about the causes of
observed mobility.
The above discussion of regional growth theories is only cursory.
There are numerous permutations on these theories as well as other
models of regional development. The discussion does, however, present
the basics of orthodox theories of regional growth.
Each of the theories discussed can be criticized on various
specifics of the model. Export base theory is criticized as being too
restrictive since it relies totally on exogenous changes in demand to
explain growth. The predictions of trade theory have not held up
under some empirical tests. One crucial assumption of supply induced
growth theories is that factors of production are free to move.
Obviously, barriers to such mobility, particularly labor mobility,
exist.
There are, however, more general and more damaging criticisms that
can be levelled at the entire body of orthodox growth theories. All
the models are driven by exogenous changes in demand and supply, which
work through prices and wages to affect regional growth and decline.
The response to change is automatic and thus very mechanistic. The
explanation is independent of human behavior. The regional system is
like a "black box." There is no sense of what causes the changes or
exactly how the components of the system work together and create
change.
Orthodox regional growth theories suffer from the same problems as
location theory, discussed in the previous section. Regional growth
or decline occurs as a result of the location decisions of many,
small, perfectly competitive, profit-maximizing firms. Thus, growth
theories rest on the same assumptions as location theory. The same
criticisms of the orthodox location model can also be levelled against
these growth theories.
The fact that the assumptions of perfect competition and profit
maximization are violated has additional implications for regional
growth theories. The existence of monopolistic or oligopolistic
firms, particularly those with multiple plants, in different areas of
the country, allows firms to use and perpetuate existing regional
inequalities. Firms are thus able to make higher profits than would
be possible if the market was perfectly competitive. Regional
inequalities last longer than they would if the assumptions of
traditional models were not violated (Massey 1979 and Markusen 1983).
The flexibility of wages and prices is central to all the orthodox
models of growth. There is a substantial amount of evidence that
suggests that wages, in particular, do not decrease very easily.
Under conditions of monopsony, they will not increase readily. To the
extent that wages and prices are not flexible, shifts in supply and
demand in a region's input and output markets will not generate the
employment and income effects predicted by the theory.
Orthodox regional growth theories can also be criticized on a
number of other grounds. One, they are ahistorical and thus don't
consider how the past distribution of resources and inequality affects
the present. Two, mechanisms of growth are limited to autonomous
shifts in demand and supply. This framework ignores factors such as
macro-economic events, except to the degree that they can be captured
by changes in demand to supply. Orthodox theories do not deal
explicitly with some of the changes that are occurring in the
industrial structure, such as the relative shift from manufacturing to
service production or the radical routinization and automation of
production. Three, orthodox models assume that equilibrium solutions
exist and are the "natural tendency" of the economic system. Many
critics suggest, however, that a continued state of disequilibrium is
the more likely scenario. Four, traditional models are all
essentially non-spatial in that they don't seriously consider regional
characteristics and the effect that separation in space has upon
economic activities.
Product Cycle Theory2
Product cycle theory hypothesizes that all manufactured products
go through a regular pattern of development, beginning with the
initial innovation stage. Production will be organized in different
ways at different stages in the cycle. This has implications for the
location of production facilities and for the growth of different
regions and countries, as will be shown below.
The product cycle model is driven by technological change.
Changes in the technology by which goods are produced define the
different stages in the cycle. This is very different from the
neoclassical models of location and regional growth, in which prices
and wages are the driving force.
The assumptions of product cycle theory are also quite different
from neoclassical theory. Product cycle theory assumes that the
information flow across national boundaries is restricted, or more
specifically, that the flow decreases with distance. The theory also
assumes that products undergo predictable changes in the way they are
produced and marketed. There are economies of scale in production and
demand and tastes vary in different countries. Neoclassical theory,
on the other hand, assumes perfect information, stable production
functions, generally constant returns to scale, and similarity of
demand.
There are three stages in a product's life cycle, the new product
stage, growth stage, and the standardized stage. The new product
stage begins when a scientific advance is applied to the development
of a new product. Production will be characterized by rapid changes
in technology as the product is built and tested. Thus, effective
communication between research and manufacturing personnel is
necessary. Highly skilled labor is also needed at this stage.
Production is not very capital-intensive and there will be relatively
few firms in the market place. Demand is not high and is relatively
price inelastic.
The theoreticians who developed product cycle theory were
interested in understanding the observed spread of production from
advanced (particularly the U.S.) to less developed countries and the
resulting trade patterns. They hypothesized that access to scientific
knowledge is the same in all advanced countries, but that the
opportunities for entreprenneurs are not identical. Opportunities
depend on the demand for a product. Entrepreneurs are best able to
respond to the demand for new products that occurs in their own
country, since in the initial stage, rapid and effective communication
between the entrepreneur and the market is crucial.3
Many of the innovations used in manufacturing industries were
developed in the United States. This occurred because incomes were
relatively high and labor was relatively scarce in the United States.
This gave U.S. entrepreneurs an advantage in the production of
manufacturing machines. Europe, being relatively well-endowed with
labor could afford to employ skilled artisans in producing goods. The
United States could not afford to do this.
In the new product stage, production facilities are located in the
country where demand is high. This occurs for three reasons. One,
flexibility is necessary because production techniques change
constantly. Two, production cost differentials are not as important
as they will be at a later stage since the price elasticity of demand
is low. Three, rapid communication between design and manufacturing
personnel is necessary.
Initially, production will be mainly for U.S. markets, but at some
point demand develops in other countries. At the first stage in the
product cycle, foreign demand will be met by exports from the United
States. Foreign countries will not set up their own production
facilities because their own demand is relatively low, they have
little information about the U.S. market, and there are technical
barriers involved in establishing manufacturing facilities.
The second stage of the product cycle is the growth stage, in
which production is more standardized than in the early stage. The
need for flexibility declines which means that it is technically
possible to employ mass production methods and thus to take advantage
of economies of scale. Demand has increased since the early stage.
The price elasticity of demand also increases, which implies that
production costs are more important than initially.
At this second stage, there is a concern with finding low cost
locations for production facilities. This essentially means finding
areas where labor costs will be relatively low. Thus, at this stage,
we would expect firms to seek low cost areas within the United States.
Since foreign demand has increased, we would also expect firms to
establish subsidiary opration in these foreign countries. We might
also see some foreign owned production plants at this stage.
The final stage of the cycle occurs when production has become
standardized. Production techniques will be stable and
capital-intensive. The labor required will be low skilled. Assembly
line production is apt to characterize this stage. Demand is high and
relatively price elastic. Therefore, price competition will be
important. Competition may also take the form of product
differentiation or may involve substantial advertising.
The United States loses its monopoly power at this stage. In an
attempt to maintain its position, U.S. firms will seek out lower cost
areas and establish plants in the less developed countries. European
manufacturers will produce for domestic and foreign markets. The U.S.
may even begin importing the good, for home use.
Traditional trade theory would not predict that the less developed
countries would be locations for capital-intensive, standardized
manufacturing plants. Instead, classical theory would expect these
countries to export only labor-intensive goods. This discrepency
occurs because the theory ignores market considerations, ignores the
fact that knowledge is not free, does not have an adequate theory of
the sources of innovation, and assumes that competition occurs among
small, atomistic producers.
There have been numerous studies that attempted to test the
validity of the product cycle model. These authors argue that the
theory has generally been supported (Vernon 1971, Wells 1972, Norton
and Rees 1979, Thomas 1981).
Product cycle theory provides one way of dealing with some of the
criticisms of the neoclassical model of firm location and regional
growth. Product cycle theory does not assume perfect competition
exists. On the contrary, in the new product stage, producers are
assumed to have monopolistic or oligopolistic power. Product cycle
theory also makes the more realistic assumptions that knowledge is
imperfect, that the production function changes over time and that
tastes and therefore demand vary over space. Product cycle is a
behavioral model, where people and not prices are the prime actors.
It is also long-run and dynamic in contrast to neoclassical theory
that is short-run and static. Finally, product cycle theory is
spatial, in that distance is important and regions are different in
ways that affect the outcome of the model.
There are, however, substantial criticisms that can be made of
product cycle theory as a model of location and regional growth. The
main criticism is that product cycle theory is too technologically
deterministic. The changes that products go through in the course of
their life cycle are all a result of regular, mechanical, and
predictable changes in the product and the techniques of production.
This assumption can be challenged on a number of grounds.
Standardization of the production process occurs, according to
product cycle theory, when the pace of technological innovation has
slowed down, permitting a stabilizing and routinization of production.
Greenbaum (1979) and Kraft (1977), among others, argue that the
pressures for standardization and increasing the division of labor are
not a technological imperative, but occur because production managers
are concerned about extending their control over the workforce and
with increasing profits. Greenbaum, in a study of computer
programmers argued that multi-skilled programmers created problems
within the status hierarchy of firms and disrupted rules. In
addition, managers did not have the skills and training to understand
the programmers' jobs, and thus could not exercise complete authority
over the work of the programmers. Kraft, also studying programmers,
argued that the skill level required of computer programmers has
decreased substantially over time. He argues that this transformation
was not the result of technological imperatives, but occurred because
managers, concerned about profits, deliberately worked to change the
nature of programming.
According to the product cycle theory, technological change is
essentially product standardization. In the early stage of a
product's life cycle, changes occur in the design of the product as
the "bugs" are worked out and as consumers make their preferences
known. After this stage, there are no major innovations to the
product design and automated equipment is employed in the production
process as the product becomes mass produced. This is too simple a
notion of technology and technological change. First, the product
cycle view does not pay enough attention to the distinction between
technological changes in the design of the product and technolgoical
changes in the manufacturing process. These are clearly different
concepts and are not necessarily related. However, product cycle
theory combines them and calls it product standardization. Second,
the assumption that innovation in product design ceases relatively
early in the product's life is unrealistic. The electronics industry,
for example, is one that is characterized by constant and profound
technological change.
Government action or intervention is another factor, apart from
technology, that can influence the development of a product. Saxenian
(1980), studying the growth of the semi-conductor industry in
California argued that government actions affected the development of
the industry in a number of significant ways. One, the defense
department was initially the largest purchaser of semi-conductors.
The government was willing to buy from new companies, which encouraged
the development of many small firms from the beginning of the
industry's development. Two, because of the threat of anti-trust
activity, innovation spread more rapidly in the industry than it would
have under other circumstances.
As a result of these government actions, the growth of the
semi-conductor industry diverged from the predictions of product cycle
theory. The industry structure was not initially monopolistic or
oligopolistic as product cycle theory predicted. Competitive
pressures were also intense from the beginning, which meant keeping
production costs low was important, and thus semi-conductor companies
had off-shore production facilities from early in the industry's
history. Product cycle theory would not predict foreign production to
occur at such an early point in the product life cycle, when
technological changes were still occurring at a rapid rate.
According to product cycle theory, technological changes will
effect the competitive environment in the industry by affecting the
structure of the industry, particularly the number of firms in the
market. It seems likely, however, that competitive pressures in the
industry will have more of an autonomous effect that product cycle
theory hypothesizes. In addition, competitive pressures are likely to
affect how goods are manufactured, and the technology used in
production by affecting how important it is to minimize production
costs. In sum, product cycle theory assumes technological changes
cause changes in the competitive environment. It seems just as
likely, however, that changes in the competitive environment will
cause technological changes.
It is difficult to use product cycle theory to describe regional
growth, since different industries and products will be in different
stages of their life cycle at any give time. There has been too much
movement among regions, particularly from North to South in the last
twenty years, to use product cycle theory as the sole explanation.
Changes in the supply side, particularly the migration of labor are
certainly important factors. There are also some characteristics of
regions, other that their labor costs, that make them attractive for
new firms. If labor costs were the sole determining force, we would
expect to see more employment growth in New England, a relatively low
wage area. Labor militancy is one factor that explains the attraction
of the South over New England. Factors such as this, are not
considered by the technologically determined product cycle theory.
They need to be taken into account.
Structural Economic Theory
There is no body of structural or radical theory of industrial
location and regional development comparable to that of orthodox
theory. Structural analyses in general, consider how industrial
characteristics, social factors, and historical development, have
affected industrial location and regional growth. The explanation is
historically specific and considers, for example, how specific events
of the time influence development. The explanation is also industry
specific in that characteristics of the industry under study, such as
the competitive environment and structure of the labor market play
important roles.
There has been some work, beginning in the late 1950's, on uneven
development theories of regional growth. It has, however, only been
in the last few years that analysts have begun to explore structural
explanations for industrial location. Theories of uneven regional
development (Myrdal 1957, Fox 1978, Walker 1978, Perry and Watkins
1977) stress that the process of growth and development is not
equilibrating. They predict divergent growth based on the hypothesis
that a growing area is likely to continue growing. Uneven development
is thus the norm.
There has been little work attempting to explain why regional
growth is divergent. None of it is very satisfactory. Agglomeration
economies offer one reason for continuing growth in a given
metropolitan area or region. They cannot, however, be used to to
explain why growth shifts to another area. Marxian analysts place the
regional development issue in the broader context of capitalist
development and the continuing struggle between the capitalists and
workers. The explanation is not well developed and is really only
applicable in explaining long-run, macro-level changes. It remains
too general and too abstract to be of much use in understanding the
specifics of regional growth.
In relatively recent work Massey (1979), Massey and Meegan (1979),
and Storper (1981) have applied a structuralist analysis to the issue
of industrial location. The basic model they present is a causal
chain where economic forces at the national and international level
necessitate changes in the firm's production and labor process, which
in turn implies changes in capital investment and often a locational
shift.
Labor plays the central role in this structural model. Changes in
the labor process are used to raise productivity and afford better
control over the workers. As a direct result of these changes, the
investment patterns of industries are affected.
The implications for regional development depend on the exact
nature of the various changes. For example, Massey and Meegan in
their study of the British electronics industry in the late 1960s,
argued that shifts in locational preferences of companies in the
industry aided the less developed areas over the more developed ones.
The low-wage, low-skill labor in the less developed areas attracted
the new plant construction that occurred at the time. Geographic
inequities persist in this model (as in the uneven growth models),
though their form and nature will change. Massey argues that the old
inequities in the United Kingdom, between the development areas (those
assisted by regional policies) and the non-development areas are
disappearing. They are being replaced, however, with inequities
between metropolitan areas and the rest of the country.
This model is quite different from the product cycle model, which
assumed technological changes were exogenous to the system. According
to the structuralist view, the demands of competition, the need to
control labor, and the need to increase productivity create pressures
for technological change.
The structuralist analysis is explicitly historical and the
results from one industry are not to be generalized to all industries
or even all firms within the industry. According to Massey and
Meegan, the findings concerning any case are a function of the
characteristics of the industrial sector, the competitive situation in
the sector, and the form that competition takes.
The weak link in the structural model is the first one, that
hypothesizes that macro-economic fluctuations drive the model. This
concept is not well defined and as a result does not provide a
satisfactory explanation. Storper argued that the fluctuations were
caused by the "cyclical instability of capitalist accumulation," a
vague concept. Massey and Meegan argued that pressures to raise the
profit rate and increase the competitiveness of the British
electronics industry led to company mergers and changes in production.
But, this doesn't really offer a satisfactory explanation, since one
could aruge that there have always been pressures for firms to
increase profits.
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) examine another structural feature
of the modern economy, the structure of the modern corporation or
conglomerate and the importance of increased capital mobility. They
argue that corporations are becoming larger and more powerful than
ever before. There has been an increase in mergers and aquisitions,
which has centralized control and increased the concentration of
production in the hands of fewer and fewer companies. Thus,
production decisions are no longer in the hands of a single firm, but
instead are often made by a large conglomerate that wants to maximize
its return over all the different businesses that it owns. This
implies that the corporation may take capital out of one business,
even if it is earning a respectable profit, and transfer it to another
business that is making a higher return. This concentration of power
leads to what they call a "hypermobility" of capital or an increase in
the rate of turnover of capital. Companies can then play one group of
workers, or governments, off against another, increasing profits at
the expense of the workers.
Conclusions and Hypotheses
The critical review, presented above, of neoclassical, product
cycle, and structural economic theory, suggests hypotheses to be
tested in this thesis.
One task will be to test how well the predictions of product cycle
theory describe the growth and development of the computer
manufacturing industry. The theory points to a number of issues that
need to be analyzed. I need to examine the process by which computers
are produced and how this has changed over time. Product cycle theory
has specific predictions about the degree of capital-intensity vs.
labor-intensity at different stages in a product's life cycle. The
mix of labor demanded also changes over the cycle. I will also
examine how the structure of the industry changes over time,
particularly the number of firms in the market. Product cycle theory
also hypothesizes that the level and price-elasticity of demand vary
over the life cycle. The theory has clear implications for the
location of manufacturing facilities. The desirability of low wage
locations in the U.S. and abroad changes over the cycle. In the
thesis, I will explore how the manufacturing process, industry
structure, demand, and location decisions have changed as the computer
industry has grown.
According to product cycle theory, changes in technology drive the
model through the different states. I argued that this notion was too
simple, and that the theory was too technologically deterministic. A
second task of this thesis will be to examine the role of
technological change in the development of the industry. I need to
document what major technolgoical changes have occurred in the design
of computers and in the method of manufacturing them, and when the
changes occurred. Structural economic theory argues that the
competitive environment and the state of labor relations create
pressures for technological change. Therefore, I will examine how the
nature of competition and labor relations have changed over time and
whether the timing of the changes is related to the timing of
technological changes.
The different theories have different hypotheses about what
factors are important in influencing location decisions. The third
task of the thesis will be to evaluate what factors have influenced
the location of computer manufacturing plants and how the importance
of different factors has changed over time.
According to neoclassical theory, firms locate to minimize
production costs. Since labor is the dominant input in manufacturing
computers, this suggests firms should locate in areas with the lowest
labor costs. I will examine how important wage differentials are in
affecting location decisions. Taxes are another cost of production
and thus according to neoclassical theory, firms will locate in areas
with low tax rates.
Labor costs are also an important determinant of location in
product cycle theory, during certain stages of the cycle. According
to the theory, the mix of labor demanded changes over the cycle.
Therefore, at certain stages firms will locate to minimize labor costs
and the ideal location will change over time as the mix of labor
demanded changes.
Structural economic theory argues that the state of
labor-management relations and the "business climate" influence
location decisions. I will examine whether and how these factors have
influenced the location of computer manufacturing plants. Sturctural
analyses of location are also historically specific, which means it is
important to examine the development of the industry, including where
and how it originated and to examine how these factors have influenced
later development.
Methodology
The methodology used in this thesis combines quantitative and
qualitative data analyses, as no one source provides complete
information. The quantitative data provide information on the
location patterns of computer firms and how these patterns have
changed since the 1960s. The qualitative data provide detailed
information on what products are made in different locations, how they
are made, and why companies chose the various locations that they did.
These data come from case studies of 10 computer manufacturing
companies.
Quantitative Data
There were two sources of data available to me that provided
information on the location of computer manufacturing companies, the
Census of Manufacturers and a data set created by Roger Schmenner
based on Dun and Bradstreet data.4
The Census of Manufacturers survey is conducted by the Census
Bureau approximately every 5 years. Information is available by state
on the number of plants and number of workers employed by firms in the
electronic computing equipment industry (SIC 3573), as well as in
other industries. Complete data are available for 1967, 1972, and
1977, and preliminary data are available for 1982.
Roger Schmenner collected information on the location of Fortune
500 manufacturing companies. He graciously made an extract of the
computer manufacturing companies available to me. The data, which are
based on Dun and Bradstreet records, provide information on location
and employment for all plants of these large companies. The data are
available for a point in the early 1970s and one in the late 1970s, so
we can see how location and employment patterns changed during the
1970s.
Using these two data sources I can examine in what states and
regions in the U.S. (data are available for domestic plants only)
computer companies have chosen to build facilities. I can examine how
patterns changed between the late 1960s and early 1980s, and whether
the states in which the industry developed continue to grow rapidly
or whether other states are becoming more attractive to computer
companies. These data also allow me to analyze how geographically
concentrated the industry is and whether the degree of concentration
has increased or decreased over time. These data provide the baseline
for the thesis. It is the patterns documented here that I am
attempting to explain in the rest of the thesis.
These quantitative data are important, but they are limited in the
information they provide. There is no information on what products or
components are manufactured in different plants. No data are
available on how goods are manufactured, including the kinds of people
involved and the degree of automation in production. Published data
do not tell us why companies choose a particular location and what
factors make an area attractive. This type of data is not available
in any published sources. The only way to obtain the information is
to collect it.
Qualitative Data
To obtain information on location decision making and the
manufacturing process, I prepared case studies on 10 mainframe and
minicomputer manufacturers. The companies I selected were IBM,
Burroughs, NCR, Sperry, Honeywell, Digital Equipment Corporation
(DEC), Data General, Hewlett Packard, Prime and Amdahl.
I restricted my sample to companies that manufactured mainframe
and minicomputers partly for reasons of comparability. Most of the
companies I studied also currently manufacture smaller machines, such
as personal computers, though many did not when I began my study. I
did not examine any companies that only made personal computers. This
sector of the industry was very new when I began my study and the
companies that manfuactured these small machines had no history, and
thus no changes in location and manufacturing process to observe.
The companies I studied manufactured most of the mainframe and
minicomputers sold in the world. My sample included all the large
firms in the industry, as well as two relatively small companies,
Prime and Amdahl. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the share of the mainframe
and minicomputer markets held by the 10 firms in my sample. These
firms had virtually all the mainframe market, over 95 percent. They
held approximately 75 percent of the minicomputer market.
I prepared the case studies from various sources of information,
including interviews with executives, tours of manufacturing plants,
and secondary sources which included companies' annual reports,
newspaper articles, press releases, trade journal articles, and books.
Table 2.1
WORLDWIDE MARKET SHARE OF SAMPLE COMPANIES:
MAINFRAME COMPUTERS, 1982
Company
IBM
Honeywell
Burroughs
Sperry
NCR
DEC
Amdahl
Total
Number Installed
66,175
18,082
9,650
8,915
6,363
1,587
800
Sample Companies 111,572 96.4
All U.S. Companies 115,693 100.0
SOURCE: International Data Corporation. Processor
Data Book: 1983. Framingham, MA: 1983, p. 24.
Percent
of Total
57.2
15.6
8.3
7.7
5.5
1.4
0.7
Table 2.2
WORLDWIDE MARKET SHARE OF SAMPLE COMPANIES:
MINICOMPUTERS, 1982
Company
DEC
Data General
Hewlett Packard
IBM
Honeywell
Sperry
Prime
Total
Number Installed
423,630
117,675
78,136
37,656
24,476
14,120
8,473
Sample Companies 704,166 74.8
All U.S. Companies 941,400 100.0
SOURCE: International Data Corporation. Processor
Data Book: 1983. Framingham, MA: 1983, p. 95.
Percent
of Total
45.0
12.5
8.3
4.0
2.6
1.5
0.9
The individuals I interviewed were high-level executives in their
companies, usually vice-presidents or directors of departments, though
the exact job titles varied somewhat by company. The executives were
generally either involved in manufacturing or in the real estate
department. I interviewed the vice-president of manufacturing in 4
companies, and the director of manufacturing in 2 companies. In 3
companies I interviewed the director of the land acquisition or
facilities department, which were part of the real estate office. I
also interviewed a Director of Strategic Planning and a Director of
Market Development.
I was given a tour of a manufacturing plant in some, though no all
of the companies. Not all companies had a manufacturing plant in the
same area as the executive offices. The tours were conducted by an
individual familiar with the plant, such as the manager of
manufacturing, a facilities engineer, or a public relations
specialist.
In the interviews and tours I collected information on the
manufacturing process, including what components of the computer
system the company manufactured, how manufacturing was done, and the
type of labor involved. I also gathered data on plant location,
including what product or products were manufactured in each plant and
why the company chose a given site.
The interview guide that I used is presented in Table 2.3. This
lists the topic or issues I covered in the interviews. No interview
followed this exact format as the executives often had their own way
of organizing their story. Some companies also had a particular
Table 2.3
INTERVIEW GUIDE
Introduction
Fellow at JC
Research on location of manufacturing plants in computer industry;
effects of technological change and changes in the production
process; how this affects, for example, off-shore production,
labor costs.
I'd like to talk to you about how certain of your products are
manufactured, where different plants are located, and why you
chose specific locations.
Do you mind if I tape record?
First, though, can you tell me a little about your job?
Responsibilities, role in the corporation.
Manufacturing Topics
1) What parts of the computer system do you make and what parts do
you buy from other manufacturers? How has this changed over time?
(Make certain undestand this. Check information I have.)
2) For each component (e.g. fabricating ICs and boards) and product
(e.g. CPUs and peripherals), the company manufactures, describe
the manufacturing process.
Probe: How automated is production?
What aspects are automated?
How is it done? Assembly line? Bays? Something else?
What kind of labor skill are required?
Get a rough percent: Engineers/scientists
Technicians
Other skilled
Unskilled
Get estimate of Material-Labor-Burden
3) If product manufactured in more than one place, is process same in
all plants? (e.g. U.S. versus foreign plants)
4) How interrelated are the actual manufacture and the research and
development activities?
Where are the R&D facilities located?
Table 2.3 (Continued)
INTERVIEW GUIDE
5) Compare production of (this product) to production of (product
that preceeded it).
Was this (old) product manufactured in a similar manner to the
current product?
If no. Describe differences.
Location Topics
For each site, U.S. and foreign:
6) When was plant opened?
7) What does plant manufacture? Has plant always manufactured this
product? What did it used to make?
8) Why did you locate in this particular area?
Probe: Taxes
Labor availability
Labor cost--ask about pay differentials in different
locations
University
Presence of other companies in area
9) Are there other plants that used to be in operation that are now
closed? What did the plants manufacture? When? Why were the
plants closed?
10) Do you anticipate expanding your location outside of the areas you
are already in? When? Why?
11) Do you anticipate any technological changes that will alter the
production process, or do you plan to add any new product lines
that will affect current location patterns?
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aspect of its history that I wanted to cover. The interviews
generally lasted 1 1/2-2 hours.
Notes
1. For an overview of these theories, see Richardson (1978) and
Heilbrun (1974).
2. See Vernon (1966, 1971) and Wells (1972) for a more detailed
discussion of these theories. Product cycle theory was developed
as an alternative to conventional international trade theory that
involved the comparative advantage of different nations in the
production of different types of goods. The conventional theory
predicted results that proved to be erroneous in certain cases.
In the early 1950s, Leontief examined international trade data and
found that the United States tended to export relatively
labor-intensive goods. This presented a paradox for conventional
theory, which hypothesized that since the U.S. was relatively well
endowed with capital relative to labor, that it would tend to
export capital-intensive goods. Practioners at business schools
looked for an alternative theory to explain the observed events
and developed the product cycle theory.
3. This discussion assumes that information is not free and that
distance creates problems for the transmission of knowledge. This
is very different from the neoclassical model which assumes
complete information if available to everyone.
4. See Appendix for a more detailed description of the data sets.
Chapter 3
LOCATION PATTERNS OF COMPUTER
MANUFACTURING PLANTS
This chapter describes where computer manufacturing plants and
employment are located and how this has changed since the late 1960s.
The chapter also examines the location patterns of large companies to
analyze whether the patterns of large and small companies differ. We
know the computer industry is growing rapidly. Is it expanding in the
areas it originated? Are companies branching out into new areas? Are
new areas growing at the expense of the original areas? These are
some of the questions this chapter will address.
This chapter lays the foundation for the rest of the dissertation
by describing the location and growth patterns of computer
manufacturing plants. In the following chapters I will analyze why
companies have located in certain areas and what features of an area
are particularly attractive. I will also examine why location
patterns have changed over time and how these changes are related to
changes in the process of manufacturing computers.
The data I have used in this analysis cover the location of
manufacturing plants during several periods since the late 1960s. I
can analyze how growth has varied over different time periods and for
different geographic areas. Thus, the data will allow me to discern
growth trends and to then predict which areas have the strongest
growth potential.
Data Sources. There are two data sets that provide sufficient
detail for this analysis. The first is the Census of Manufacturers,
collected and published by the Bureau of the Census. This is a
comprehensive survey of all manufacturing establishments. The Census
collects information on the number of establishments (individual
plants), the number of establishments with 20 or more workers,
employment, costs of inputs and value of outputs. Consistent
information is available by state for the years 1967, 1972, 1977, and
1982 (preliminary data). The Census bureau did conduct surveys prior
to 1967. However, the industrial classification system was quite
different prior to 1967 and computer firms were included with firms
manufacturing calculating and accounting machines. Thus, it is not
possible to get a clear and consistent picture of the computer
industry prior to 1967. In addition, since the computer industry was
relatively small in the 1950s and early 1960s, little will be lost
beginning the analysis in 1967.
There is one limitation to the Census numbers that must be kept in
mind. Establishments performing what the Census defined as subsidiary
activities are not listed separately by industry, but are summed
across all industries in the state. Subsidiary activities are
non-manufacturing activities and include, for example, research and
development and corporate management and accounting functions. In
most multi-plant companies, these subsidiary activities are performed
for all manufacturing plants and in a central office that is
physically separate from the plants. In these cases, the Census does
not report the central offices separately by industry. Employment in
the industry also excludes personnel in the central offices. Thus,
the employment reported by the Census for the coomptuer industry is
not total employemnt, but employment in manufacturing plants. This
will casue some bias comparing employment across states as some states
have more headquarters or central office facilities than other states.
The second source of data provides information on the location of
large manufacturing companies. These data were collected by Roger
Schmenner as part of a research project studying the location
decisions of large multi-plant firms.1 Most of the firms in
Schmenner's study were on the Fortune 500 in 1978, the year his
research began. The data provide information on the plant's location
and employment at two points in time, in the early and late 1970s.
The industy I examined in both data sources was the electronic
computing equipment industry and includes firms that manufacture
electronic computers, peripheral equipment and major logical
components of computers. The Appendix provides more information on
the industry classification and details on the two data sources.
Census of Manufacturers
It is common knowledge that the computer manufacturing industry is
growing extremely rapidly. In 1967 there were only 134 companies
engaged in manufacturing computers. By 1982, the number of companies
exceed 1,500 as Table 3.1 shows. During the 15 years, the number of
individual manufacturing plants grew from somewhat under 200 to almost
1,800. The number of employees more than tripled, from about 100,000
to over 300,000. Over the period there was a proliferation of small
firms, an indication that the industry is in a period of innovation
and growth. The number of small firms, defined as those with less
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Table 3.1
THE ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Number of Companies 1,566 808 518 134
Number of Establishments 1,774 931 601 178
Number of Establishments 869 434 354 140
with 20+ Employees
Number of Establishments 905 497 247 38
with Less Than 20 Employees
Employment 339,600 192,600 144,600 98,900
than 20 employees, grew from about 40 to 900 between 1967 and 1982.
In 1967, only 21 percent of all establishments employed less than 20
workers. By 1977, just over half of all plants were small by this
definition.
Growth was not constant throughout the period, as Table 3.2 shows.
Growth between 1967 and 1972 was substantial. The rate of growth
slowed during the 1972-1977 period. However, by all measures, the
1977-1982 period was one of phenomenal growth. For example, there
were 423 new manufacturing plants established between 1967 and 1972,
330 new plants during 1972-1977, and 843 new plants between 1977 and
1982. In percentage terms, growth was lowest in the 1972-1977 period.
The trends in employment growth followed a similar pattern.
Employment grew by about 45,000 between 1967 and 1972, by 49,000 from
1972-1977, and by 147,000 between 1977 and 1982. These changes
represented growth rates of 46 percent, 34 percent, and 76 percent,
respectively.
How are manufacturing plants and employment distributed among the
regions and states? The next section examines the distribution of the
industry in 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982, in order to understand what
regions of the country have the largest share of the industry and what
regions are growing the fastest. The following section exames the
distribution and growth in the different states.
Regional Distribution of Plants and Employment
Computer manufacturing plants are not spread evenly across the
country as Table 3.3 shows. In 1982, the Pacific region had by far
the most plants, over 700, or 41 percent of all the establishments in
Table 3.2
GROWTH OF THE ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1967-1982
1967 1967-1982 1967-1972 1972-1977 1977-1982
Actual Percentage Actual Percentage Actual Percentage Actual Percentage
Change Change Change Change Change Change Change Change
Number of Companies 134 1,432 106.9 384 286.6 290 56.0 758 93.8
Number of Establishments 178 1,596 896.6 423 237.6 330 54.9 843 90.5
Number of Establishments 140 729 520.7 214 152.9 80 22.6 435 100.2
with 204 Employees
Number of Establishments 38 867 2281.6 209 550.0 250 101.2 408 82.1
with Less Than 20 Employees
Employment 98,900 240,700 243.4 45,355 45.9 49,371 34.2 147,000 76.3
Table 3.3
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY REGION: 1967-1982
Region Est
New England
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
U.S. Totala
Note: a. U.S. total
1982
Number of
ablishments
213
197
110
113
162
15
107
110
714
1741
equals sum
Share
(2) Rank
12.3 2
11.3 3
6.3 6
6.5 5
9.3 4
0.9 9
6.1 8
6.3 6
41.0 1
100.0
of regions.
1977
Number of
Establishments
112
114
62
64
84
9
49
50
335
909
Share
(2)
12.3
15.8
6.8
7.0
9.2
1.0
5.4
5.5
36.9
100.0
Rank
3
2
6
5
4
9
8
7
1
1972
Number of
Establishments
81
120
45
42
57
8
34
37
178
602
Share
(2)
13.5
19.9
7.5
7.0
9.5
1.3
5.6
6.1
29.6
100.0
1967
Number of
Rank Establishments
3 25
2 42
5 16
6 12
4 15
9 0
8 7
7 11
1 49
177
Share
(%)
14.1
23.7
9.0
6.8
8.5
0.0
4.0
6.2
27.7
100.0
Rank
3
2
4
6
5
9
8
7
1
the country. New England and the Mid-Atlantic were the next largest
regions, with 12 percent and 11 percent of the plants respectively.
Thus, the industry is fairly geographically concentrated as the three
largest regions had two-thirds of all manufacturing plants. The
remaining third of the plants were distributed among the other
regions, with the South Atlantic having 9 percent, the largest share,
down to the East South Central with only 1 percent.
The number of computer manufacturing firms grew in all regions
between 1967 and 1982. However, the growth was not evenly distributed
among the regions. The actual growth was largest in the Pacific, New
England, and Mid-Atlantic, the regions with the highest concentration
of plants. Approximately 65 percent of the new plants that opened
between 1967 and 1982 were in these three regions. Forty-three
percent of these new plants were in the Pacific region, alone.
From Table 3.3 we can also tell which regions grew at a faster or
slower rate than the average for the United States. If a region's
percentage share of plants increased between two years, this implies
that the region grew at a faster than average rate. Conversely, a
declining percentage share indicates slower than average growth.
The West South Central was the fastest growing region between 1967
and 1982 in terms of the number of computer manufacturing
establishments. The Pacific ranked second, followed by the South
Atlantic, Mountain, and West North Central. These five regions all
grew at above average rates during the period. All the other regions
experienced slower than average growth.
The fastest growing regions were generally not the regions with
the most firms. The West South Central, the fastest growing, ranked
8th among the regions in number of firms. The South Atlantic, West
North Central, and Mountain regions ranked 5th, 6th, and 7th,
respectively in 1967. The Pacific was the only region that was both
large and fast growing. New England and the Mid-Atlantic, the two
other regions with the most establishments grew at slower than average
rates over the 15 year period.
However, because actual growth was concentrated in the large
regions, there were few changes in the percentage distribution of
plants among the regions between 1967 and 1982. Only two regions, the
Mid-Atlantic and Pacific, experienced significant changes in their
share of establishments. Growth in the Pacific region was very rapid.
In 1967, 28 percent of all computer manufacturing plants were located
in the Pacific. By 1982, the region had 41 percent of the total. The
opposite trend occurred in the Mid-Atlantic. The Mid-Atlantic had 42
plants in 1967, only slightly fewer than the Pacific. The number of
plants in the region grew between 1967 and 1982, but much slower than
average. As a result, the Mid-Atlantic's share of plants dropped from
24 percent in 1967 to 11 percent in 1982.
Growth slowed overall during 1972-1977. The number of new plants
added during this period was less than during 1967-1972 in all regions
except the Pacific. However, growth picked up between 1977 and 1982.
In fact, for all regions except the Mid-Atlantic and North Central,
the actual increase during 1977-1982 exceeded the growth during
1967-1977.
The regional distribution of establishments with 20 or more
workers is similar to the distribution of all establishments, as Table
3.4 shows. New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and Pacific regions had the
largest concentration of plants with 20 or more workers, 68 percent in
1982.
There are, however, several interesting differences comparing the
growth of all establishments and the growth of those with 20 or more
workers. New England had a larger share of large plants than of small
plants (15 percent vs. 12 percent in 1982). In addition, its share of
large plants increased between 1972 and 1982, indicating faster than
average growth. The West South Central, which experienced rapid
growth in all establishments, grew at about the average rate in
establishments with 20 or more workers between 1967 and 1982. This
suggests that New England experienced a relatively rapid growth of
large establishments and that small establishments grew relatively
rapidly in the West South Central. This is an indication of a more
mature stage in New England and a more entreprenurial one in the West
South Central.
Table 3.5 shows the regional distribution of employment in
computer manufacturing plants. The figures include only personnel
working in the manufacturing facility, and exclude, for example,
research and development personnel, sales and service personnel, and
administrators if they work in a facility that is physically separate
from the manufacturing plant. Complete employment data are available
for 1967, 1972, and 1977. However, because the 1982 data are
preliminary, some state data are not available and thus region totals
cannot be computed for five of the nine regions. (Table 3.7 presents
Table 3.4
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS WITH 20 OR MORE EMPLOYEES,
MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY REGION: 1967-1982
Region Est
New England
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
U.S. Totala
Note: a. U.S. total
1982
Number of
ablishments
129
93
42
60
77
6
40
55
359
861
equals sum
Share
(2) Rank
15.0 2
10.8 3
4.9 7
7.0 5
8.9 4
0.7 9
4.6 8
6.4 6
41.7 1
100.0
of regions.
1977
Number of
Establishments
62
75
18
31
37
7
18
22
158
428
ShareShare
(2)
14.5
17.5
4.2
7.2
8.6
1.6
4.2
5.1
36.9
100.0
Rank
3
2
1972
Number of
Establishments
47
71
20
30
29
5
11
25
117
355
Share
(M)
13.2
20.0
5.6
8.5;
8.2
1.4
3.1
7.0
33.0
100.0
Rank
3
2
7
4
5
9
8
6
1
1967
Number of
Establishments
19
38
11
11
11
0
6
9
34
139
Share
(%)
13.7
27.3
7.9
7.9
7.9
0.0
4.3
6.5
24.5
100.0
Rank
3
1
4
4
4
9
8
7
2
Table 3.5
EMPLOYMENT IN FIRMS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY REGION: 1967-1982
New England
Mid-Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
U.S. Totala
1982
Share
Number (%)
NA
36,300 10.7
6,500 1.9
38,700 20.0
NA
3,500 1.0
NA
NA
NA
339,600
Number
27,751
28,000
5,950
27,225
15,775
2,500
12,200
13,225
61,000
193,626
1977
Share
(%)
14.3
14.5
3.1
14.1
8.1
1.3
6.3
6.8
31.5
100.0
Rank
1972
Share
Number (%) Rank
17,500 12.1 4
27,000 18.7 2
6,600 4.6 8
20,300 14.1 3
9,700 6.7 6
1,750 1.2 9
7,320 5.1 7
12,485 8.7 5
41,600 28.8 1
144,255 100.0
Notes: a. U.S. total equals sum of regions, except in 1982 when it is the actual total.
b. The maximum employment in the Pacific is 24,240 or 24.5%. The minimum in the Mounain is
7,150 or 7.2% See Endnote 2 for details of calculations.
c. Since employment figures for New England and the Mountain regions are estimated, the rankings
for these three regions might be interchanged.
1967
Share
(%)
8.4
26.1
4.3
19.0
8.6
0.0
1.8
31.7
100.0
Number
8,350
25,800
4,300
18,800
8,500
0
1,750
31,400b
b
98,900
Rank
5c
1
7
3
4 H
9
8
6c
2
the available state figures.)
The distribution of employment was fairly similar to the
distribution of establishments. The Pacific employed over 61,000 or
32 percent of all workers in 1977 which was about 5 percentage points
less than its share of establishments. Thus, the average size of
plants in the Pacific is lower than average, an indication that the
region may be more "entreprenurial" than other regions. New England
and the Mid-Atlantic each employed about 28,000 or 14 percent. These
three regions thus had 60 percent of the industry's employment.
The share of plants and employment were somewhat different in the
East and West North Central regions. The West North Central had 14
percent of the employment in 1977, but only 7 percent of the plants,
implying that the average plant size was larger than in other regions.
The East North Central, in contrast, had smaller than average plants.
The average plant size declined over time, suggesting a slowing of
growth.
Employment grew consistently in most regions during the entire 15
year period. However, growth was not even and there were changes in
the regional distribution of employment during the period. The
Pacific, New England, and West South Central were the fastest growing
regions. The Pacific was a large and important region in the computer
industry in all periods and increased its employment share from 25
percent to 32 percent.2 The West South Central, in contrast, had
almost no employment in 1967 and still had only a small share of the
total by 1977. The rapid employment growth in New England caused the
region to move from being the 5th largest region with 8.4 percent of
total employment in 1967 to the 3rd largest with a 14.3 percent share
in 1977.3
Employment in the Mid-Atlantic and the East North Central grew
slowly and their employment shares declined. The Mid-Atlantic
actually had the highest level of employment in 1967, 26 percent.
However, by 1982 its employment share had dropped to 11 percent.
There has been essentially no growth in the East North Central since
1972 and as a result it is one of the smallest regions in terms of
employment in the computer industry.
Growth in the other regions, the West North Central, South
Atlantic, East South Central, and Mountain regions was about average,
though there were fluctuations in different periods. Employment
growth in the West North Central accelerated in 1977-1982, though
future trends are uncertain for this region as well as for the South
Atlantic, East South Central, and Mountain.
The conclusion from this regional analysis is that the computer
industry is quite geographically concentrated in three regions, the
Pacific, New England, and Mid-Atlantic. Growth between 1967 and 1982
was unevenly distributed across the regions. Actual growth was the
highest in the large regions and as a result, the ~industry remained
concentrated in these areas throughout the period.
Growth rates were high in the Pacific and New England. The West
South Central and Mountain regions also grew at a relatively rapid
rate, though actual levels of activity remained low. Growth rates in
the Mid-Atlantic and East North Central were low. If these trends
continue, we will see a continuing decline in the importance of the
Mid-Atlantic and an increase in the importance of the West South
Central and Mountain regions.
Distribution of Plants and Employment by State
This section addresses two questions. What are the important
states in the computer manufacturing industry? How concentrated are
plants and employment in these large states? We found in the previous
section that three regions had about two-thirds of the activity in the
industry. How many states are affected?
Tables 3.6 through 3.8 show the number of establishments and
employment in each of the 50 states in 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982.
The tables also show each state's percentage share of the total and
it's ranking relative to the other states. A rank of 1 is the
highest. States that tie, or have the same number, are given the
lower number. For example, Table 3.6 shows that in 1977 both
Pennsylvania and Florida had 35 establishments. The both received a
ranking of 7. The next largest state, Maryland, recieved a ranking of
9. The lowest rank (highest number) goes to the states with no firms.
In 1982 and 1977, this was rank 38, in 1972 it was rank 30 and in 1967
it was rank 20. All firms with no computer manufacturing firms have
the same rank.
Distribution of Plants. California clearly dominates the computer
manufacturing industry. Table 3.6 shows that in 1982 the state had
659 establishments or 38 percent of the total. This was 4 1/2 times
more plants than any other state. Massachusetts, was the 2nd largest
state in 1982 with respect to the number of computer manufacturing
plants. The state had 140 plants or 8 percent of the total, trailing
Table 3.6
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
New England
Maine 3 0.2 35 1 0.1 34 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
New Hampshire 29 1.7 16 10 1.1 18 2 0.3 26 1 0.6 17
Vermont 4 0.2 33 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 3 1.8 13
Massachusetts 140 8.0 2 73 8.0 2 66 11.3 2 19 11.3 3
Rhode Island 5 0.3 30 5 0.6 25 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Connecticut 32 1.8 11 23 2.5 10 12 2.1 12 0 0.0 20
Mid-Atlantic 0%
New York 99 5.7 3 65 7.2 3 53 9.1 3 21 12.5 2
New Jersey 59 3.4 6 44 4.8 4 41 7.0 4 10 6.0 5
Pennsylvania 39 2.2 10 35 3.9 7 26 4.4 7 11 6.5 4
East North Central
Ohio 28 1.6 18 13 1.4 16 6 1.0 17 0 0.0 20
Indiana 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Illinois 30 1.7 13 19 2.1 13 8 1.4 15 0 0.0 20
Michigan 41 2.4 9 21 2.3 12 18 3.1 9 7 4.2 7
9 1.0 19 10 1.7 14 6 3.6 9Wisconsin 11 0.6 25
Table 3.6 (Continued)
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
West North Central
Minnesota 70 4.0 5 43 4.7 5 29 5.0 6 10 6.0 5
Iowa 7 0.4 28 3 0.3 28 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Missouri 18 1.0 23 9 1.0 19 6 1.0 17 1 0.6 17
North Dakota 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
South Dakota 2 0.1 37 2 0.2 31 3 0.5 22 0 0.0 20
Nebraska 5 0.3 30 1 0.1 34 2 0.3 26 0 0.0 20
Kansas 11 0.6 25 6 0.7 24 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
South Atlantic
Delaware 0 0.0 38 1 0.1 34 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Maryland 28 1.6 18 27 3.0 9 11 1.9 13 3 1.8 13
Virginia 26 1.5 20 7 0.8 21 3 0.5 22 1 0.6 17
West Virginia 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
North Carolina 26 1.5 20 13 1.4 16 7 1.2 16 4 2.4 12
South Carolina 4 0.2 33 1 0.1 34 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Georgia 29 1.7 16 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Florida 49 2.8 7 35 3.9 7 30 5.1 5 6 3.6 9
Table 3.6 (Continued)
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
East South Central
Kentucky 0 0.0 38 2 0.2 31 2 0.3 26 0 0.0 20
Tennessee 9 0.5 27 4 0.4 27 3 0.5 22 0 0.0 20
Alabama 6 0.3 29 3 0.3 28 3 0.5 22 0 0.0 20
Mississippi 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
West South Central
Arkansas 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
o'
Louisiana 0 0.0 38 3 0.3 28 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Oklahoma 16 0.9 24 5 0.6 25 6 1.0 17 2 1.2 16
Texas 91 5.2 4 41 4.5 6 26 4.4 7 5 3.0 11
Mountain
Montana 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Idaho 5 0.3 30 2 0.2 31 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Wyoming 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 2 0.3 26 0 0.0 20
Colorado 42 2.4 8 22 2.4 11 17 2.9 10 7 4.2 7
New Mexico 3 0.2 35 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Arizona 30 1.7 13 19 2.1 13 13 2.2 11 3 1.8 13
Utah 30 1.7 13 7 0.8 21 4 0.7 21 0 0.0 20
Nevada 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Table 3.6 (Continued)
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
Pacific
Washington 32 1.8 11 14 1.5 15 6 1.0 17 0 0.0 20
Oregon 23 1.3 22 7 0.8 21 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
California 659 37.9 1 314 34.5 1 170 29.1 1 48 28.6 1
Alaska 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Hawaii 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
U.S. Total' 1741 100.0 909 100.0 585 100.0 168 100.0
Note: 1. U.S. total equals sum of states.
California by a wide margin. New York, Texas, Minnesota, and New
Jersey ranked 3rd through 6th with shares of 5.7, 5.2, 4.0, and 3.4
percent, respectively.
California, Massachusetts, New York, and Minnesota have always
been significant states in the computer manufacturing industry.
California was by far the largest state in all four years. The growth
of plants in the state occurred at a much faster rate than average
during all periods. As a result, California's share of total plants
increased consistently over time from 28.6 percent in 1967 to 37.9
percent in 1982.
Massachusetts, New York, and Minnesota, have also grown over time.
The actual number of new plants opened in these states was quite
substantial. However, these states generally grew at only average or
below average rates, and thus their percentage share declined over
time. The 1972-1977 period was one of relatively slow growth in the
computer industry as Table 3.2 showed. These three large states were
affected more than the states with fewer plants. Growth rates were
below average in the large states between 1972 and 1977. The actual
increase in the number of plants was less during 1972-1977 than in the
other two periods. Many smaller states actually opened more new
plants than did these larger states.
Massachusetts ranked third in number of plants in 1967 with 11
percent of the total. Its growth rate was below average in 1972-1977.
During this period, only 7 new plants opened in Massachusetts.
Connecticut and New Hampshire both had more growth than this. Growth
in Massachusetts was average in the other periods. The share of
plants in Massachusetts dropped from 11 percent to 8 percent over the
15 years.
New York has always been a very large state in the computer
industry, though its importance has declined substantially over time.
Growth has occurred, though at a rate much below average. As a
result, the state's share of total plants declined from 13 percent in
1967 to only 6 percent in 1982.
New Jersey and Minnesota also grew at slightly below average
rates. They retained a significant share of total plants, though
Minnesota's share declined from 6 percent to 4 percent and New
Jersey's from 6 percent to 3.4 percent.
Texas, which was the fourth largest state in 1982 has grown at a
relatively rapid pace since 1967 when it had only 5 computer
manufacturing plants. In 1982, the state had 91 pl3ants or just over
5 percent of the total.
There are several states that had a small but significant share of
plants in 1967. Growth was relatively slow in these states. The
number of plants in these states did grow over time, but at a slower
than average rate. As a result, the relative rank of many of these
states declined.
Pennsylvania was 4th in 1967 with 6.5 percent of total plants.
The state grew slowly and in 1982 was only 10th ranked with a 2
percent share of plants. Michigan dropped from 9th to 7th ranked and
Wisconsin from 9th to 25th between 1967 and 1972. Florida and
Colorado both grew at a faster than average rate initially, but growth
has since slowed.
Computer manufacturing plants were highly concentrated in a few
large states in every year between 1967 and 1982. The 10th largest
state in 1982 only had 2 percent of total plants. However, there are
a number of states that while remaining quite small in 1982, grew at
fairly rapid rates. If growth continues, they will become more
significant states in the industry. New Hampshire, Virginia, and Utah
have grown at fairly rapid rates, especially since 1977, though each
has only about 2 percent of total plants. Arizona, Connecticut,
Maryland, and North Carolina grew at a rapid rate through 1977, though
the growth rate slowed during 1972-1977. These states could become
significant in the computer industry, though it will take some time
even if growth continues at a rapid pace.
Table 3.7 shows the distribution of plants employing at least 20
workers. There are few differences compared to the distribution of
all plants (Table 3.6). The same states had the largest share of
establishments in both cases, and growth patterns were also similar.
Distribution of Employment. Table 3.8 presents information on the
distribution of employment by state. Complete data are available for
1967, 1972, and 1977, but only preliminary data are available for
1982. This affects the analysis in two ways. First, data are
reported only if employment in the state exceeds 500. In 1967-1977,
the minimum employment was only 150. Thus, it may appear that some
small states lost all their plants and employment in 1982. The
overall effect on employment shares will be minimal, however, Second,
there are seven states, Connecticut, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Idaho,
Colorado, Arizona, and Oregon, for which the Census reported only that
Table 3.7
NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS WITH 20 OR MORE EMPLOYEES,
MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
New England
Maine 3 0.3 26 1 0.2 29 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
New Hampshire 21 2.4 8 4 0.9 15 2 0.6 22 1 0.7 17
Vermont 3 0.3 26 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 3 2.2 12
Massachusetts 82 9.5 2 43 10.0 2 38 10.8 2 14 10.3 3
Rhode Island 3 0.3 26 3 0.7 18 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Connecticut 17 2.0 12 11 2.6 9 6 1.7 12 0 0.0 20
Mid-Atlantic
New York 49 5.7 3 34 7.9 3 34 9.6 3 19 14.0 2
New Jersey 24 2.8 7 23 5.4 4 22 6.2 4 8 5.9 6
Pennsylvania 20 2.3 9 18 4.2 6 15 4.2 6 11 8.1 4
East North Central
Ohio 10 1.2 18 3 0.7 18 2 0.6 22 0 0.0 20
Indiana 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Illinois 10 1.2 18 4 0.9 15 1 0.3 27 0 0.0 20
Michigan 17 2.0 12 9 2.1 11 13 3.7 8 5 3.7 8
Wisconsin 5 0.6 22 2 0.5 24 5 1.4 13 5 3.7 8
NUMBER
MANUFACTURING
Table 3.7 (Continued)
OF ESTABLISHMENTS WITH 20 OR MORE EMPLOYEES,
ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
West North Central
Minnesota
Iowa
Missouri
North Dakota
South Dakota
Nebraska
Kansas
South Atlantic
Delaware
Maryland
Virginia
West Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
5.3
0.3
0.5
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.0
1.7
1.0
0.0
1.6
0.2
1.4
Florida 25 2.9 6
23 5.4 4
1 0.2 29
4 0.9 15
0 0.0 38
1 0.2 29
1 0.2 29
1 0.2 29
1 0.2 29
10 2.3 10
3 0.7 18
0 0.0 38
5 1.2 14
1 0.2 29
0 0.0 38
17 4.0 7
22 6.2 4
0 0.0 30
4 1.1 15
0 0.0 30
3 0.8 18
1 0.3 27
0 0.0 30
0 0.0 30
4 1.1 15
3 0.8 18
0 0.0 30
5 1.4 13
0 0.0 30
0 0.0 30
15 4.2 6
0 7.4 5
0 0.0 20
1 0.7 17
0 0.0 20
0 0.0 20
0 0.0 20
0 0.0 20
0 0.0 20
2 1.5 14
1 0.7 17
0 0.0 20
3 2.2 12
0 0.0 20
0 0.0 20
5 3.7 8
NUMBER
MANUFACTURING
Table 3.7 (Continued)
OF ESTABLISHMENTS WITH 20 OR MORE EMPLOYEES,
ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
East South Central
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
West South Central
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Texas
Mountain
Montana
Idaho
Wyoming
Colorado
New Mexico
Arizona
Utah
Nevada
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
4.1
0.0
0.3
0.0
2.1
0.2
2.2
1.5
0.0
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.7
3.3
0.0
0.2
0.0
2.1
0.0
2.1
0.7
0.0
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
2.3
0.0
0.0
0.6
3.4
0.0
2.3
0.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.5
2.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.4
0.0
1.5
0.0
0.0
NUMBER
MANUFACTURING
Table 3.7 (Continued)
OF ESTABLISHMENTS WITH 20 OR MORE EMPLOYEES,
ELECTRONIC COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (M) Rank
Pacific
Washington 9 1.0 20 2 0.5 24 4 1.1 15 0 0.0 
20
Oregon 5 0.6 22 2 0.5 24 0 0.0 30 
0 0.0 20
California 345 40.1 1 154 36.0 1 113 32.0 1 34 25.0 1
Alaska 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Hawaii 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
U.S. Total' 861 100.0 428 100.0 353 100.0 136 
100.0
Note: 1. U.S. total equals sum of states.
Table 3.8
EMPLOYMENT IN FIRMS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
New England
Maine 1,750 0.5 375 0.2 29 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
New Hampshire 8,000 2.4 2,176 1.1 16 375 0.3 21 750 0.8 14
Vermont 1,750 0.5 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 375 0.4 16
Massachusetts 31,900 9.4 22,000 11.4 3 15,100 10.5 4 7,225 7.3 4
Rhode Island 750 0.2 400 0.2 28 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Connecticut NA NA 2,800 1.4 14 1,750 1.2 14 0 0.0 20
Mid-Atlantic
New York 24,600 7.2 16,700 8.6 4 19,300 13.5 2 18,957 19.2 2
New Jersey 4,800 1.4 5,600 2.9 9 4,700 3.3 6 2,500 2.5 9
Pennsylvania 6,900 2.0 5,700 2.9 8 3,000 2.1 13 4,343 4.4 6
East North Central
Ohio 700 0.2 1,750 0.9 17 200 0.1 28 0 0.0 20
Indiana 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Illinois 750 0.2 600 0.3 26 375 0.3 21 0 0.0 20
Michigan 3,300 1.0 3,400 1.8 12 4,600 3.2 7 2,400 2.4 11
Wisconsin 1,750 0.5 200 0.1 36 750 0.5 17 1,750 1.8 12
Table 3.8 (Continued)
EMPLOYMENT IN FIRMS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
West North Central
Minnesota 31,900 9.4 23,100 11.9 2 18,780 13.1 3 18,600 18.9 3
Iowa 750 0.2 375 0.2 29 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Missouri 800 0.2 500 0.3 27 375 0.3 21 200 0.2 19
North Dakota 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
South Dakota 1,750 0.5 750 0.4 23 750 0.5 17 0 0.0 20
Nebraska 1,750 0.5 750 0.4 23 375 0.3 21 0 0.0 20
Kansas 1,750 0.5 1,750 0.9 17 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20 1
South Atlantic
Delaware 0 0.0 375 0.2 29 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Maryland 1,750 0.5 1,100 0.6 22 750 0.5 17 
375 0.4 16
Virginia 3,000 0.9 1,750 0.9 17 375 0.3 21 250 
0.3 18
West Virginia 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
North Carolina NA NA 5,475 2.8 11 3,700 2.6 12 3,040 3.1 8
South Carolina 750 0.2 375 0.2 29 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Georgia 1,000 0.3 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 
20
Florida 11,800 3.5 6,700 3.5 6 4,550 3.2 8 3,850 3.9 7
Table 3.8 (Continued)
EMPLOYMENT IN FIRMS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
East South Central
Kentucky 0 0.0 375 0.2 29 375 0.3 21 0 0.0 20
Tennessee 1,750 0.5 1,750 0.9 17 1,750 1.2 14 0 0.0 20
Alabama 1,750 0.5 375 0.2 29 200 0.1 28 0 0.0 20
Mississippi 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
West South Central
Arkansas 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Louisiana 0 0.0 200 0.1 36 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Oklahoma NA NA 5,500 2.8 10 3,900 2.7 10 1,750 1.8 12
Texas 25,500 7.5 6,500 3.4 7 3,825 2.7 11 750 0.8 14
Mountain
Montana 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Idaho NA NA 375 0.2 29 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Wyoming 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 375 0.3 21 0 0.0 20
Colorado NA NA 3,000 1.5 13 5,075 3.5 5 4,650 4.7 5
New Mexico 1,750 0.5 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Arizona NA NA 7,600 3.9 5 4,500 3.1 9 2,500' 2.5 9
Utah 5,100 1.5 2,250 1.2 15 1,750 1.2 14 0 0.0 20
Nevada 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Table 3.8 (Continued)
EMPLOYMENT IN FIRMS MANUFACTURING ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT, BY STATE: 1967-1982
1982 1977 1972 1967
Share Share Share Share
State Number (%) Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank Number (%) Rank
Pacific
Washington 3,200 0.9 750 0.4 23 750 0.5 17 0 0.0 20
OREGON NA NA 1,750 0.9 17 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
California 105,900 31.2 58,500 30.2 1 40,900 28.6 1 24,250' 24.6 1
Alaska 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
Hawaii 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 0 0.0 30 0 0.0 20
U.S. Total 2  339,600 100.0 193,626 100.0 143,205 100.0 98,515 100.0
Notes: 1. The figure for Arizona is the minimum employment
and the figure for California is the maximum.
See endnote 2 for details of these calculations.
2. U.S. total equals sum of states.
employment in the state exceeded 2500. Thus, we cannot calculate
growth trends in these states.
The distribution of employment is similar to the distribution of
establishments, though there are some differences. California,
Massachusetts, New York, Minnesota, and Texas have the largest shares
of employment as well as establishments. California had a slightly
smaller share of employment than establishments, 31.2 percents vs.
37.9 percent in 1982, indicating that the average plant had fewer
employees in California than elsewhere. In contrast, the other 4
large states had higher shares of employment than plants, implying
larger than average sized plants.
New Jersey was a fairly significant state when evaluated on the
number of plants (3.5 percent or 6th largest). However, the state
only had 1.4 percent of total employment in 1982, making it a
relatively small state in the industry.
Growth trends of employment in California, New York, Minnesota,
and Texas were similar to patterns of plant growth. California grew
rapidly in every period and its employment share increased
consistently. New York and Minnesota grew, but at slower than avarage
rates. Texas grew rapidly, especially during 1977-1982.
Employment growth in Massachusetts was faster than average through
1977. Thus the state's share of employment increased, though its
share of plants declined, as Table 3.6 showed. However, employment
growth slowed a bit in 1977-1982.
Few states lost manufacturing plants over time, though some states
did lose employment. Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin all lost at
least 1,000 workers during one of the 5-year periods between 1967 and
1982. As discussed in the previous section, these states had a small,
though significant share of the industry (around 4 percent). But all
these states declined in importance over time due to slow or no
growth.
The share of plants in Florida had also declined, though its share
of employment was more stable. This puts Florida in a better growth
position than the other small states discussed above.
Employment grew in Colorado between 1967 and 1972, though at a
lower than average rate. The Census numbers indicate that employment
actually declined between 1972 and 1977, from 5,000 to 3,000. In
1982, we know only that employment exceeded 2,500. In order to
clarify the situation in Colorado, I talked with several people
connected with the computer industry in the state.4 One professor I
talked with argued that the observed employment decline between 1972
and 1977 occurred because IBM moved its tape drive operation from
Colorado to Arizona. Thus, the observed decline doesn't indicate that
Colorado is becoming an unattractive location. The same person also
argued that the state's employment was probably 8,000-10,000 in 1982.
Growth picked up in the state around 1978, after the 1975-1977
recession. Many new companies were also started in the state around
1980. All those I talked to argued that Colorado was an attractive
location for computer firms and they expected growth to continue.
New Hampshire, Virginia, and Utah had relatively rapid employment
growth as well as plant growth though each state only had about 2
percent of total employment in 1982. Connecticut and Maryland grew
relatively rapidly until 1977, then the growth rate slowed. Patterns
in Arizona and North Carolina are unclear because 1982 data are
unavailable.
Concentration of Plants and Employment. The electronic computing
equipment industry has been, and continues to be, geographically
concentrated. There is evidence that the concentration has lessened
somewhat since the late 1960s. However, we still find that a few
states have most of the plants and employment in the computer
manufacturing industry.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 present summary measures that substantiate
these conclusions. The five largest states had 61 percent of all
establishments, 65 percent of the establishments with over 20 workers
and 65 percent of total U.S. employment in 1982. The 10 largest
states had around 80 percent of all establishments and employment.
This is a high degree of concentration.
Table 3.9 also shows that there has been some geographic
dispersion in the location of firms. First, the number of states with
no firms in the industry decreased steadily over time, from 31 states
in 1967 to only 13 states in 1977 and 1982. A second indication of
dispersion is that the share of establishments and employment in the
largest states declined somewhat between 1967 and 1982. The five
largest states had 75 percent of all employment in 1967, 69 percent in
1972, 66 percent in 1977, and only 65 percent in 1982. The share of
plants in the large states decreased from 65 percent in 1967 to 59
percent in 1977, though increased slightly to 61 percent in 1982. It
is interesting to note, however, that the concentration of
Table 3.9
PERCENT OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND
EMPLOYMENT IN THE LARGEST STATES: 1967-1982a
1982 1977 1972 1967
States with no Establishments
or Employment
Number 13 13 21 31
Percent 26 26 42 62
Establishments
Percent of Total in 5 Largest States 61 59 62 65
Percent of Total in 10 Largest States 74 77 81 86
Establishments with 20+ Employees
Percent of Total in 5 Largest States 65 65 65 65
Percent of Total in 10 Largest States 77 81 83 86
Employment
Percent of Total in 5 Largest States 65 66 69 75
Percent of Total in 10 Largest States NA 82 85 91
Note: a. In 1982, data were reported only for states with at least
500 employees. In 1967-1977, minimum employment was 150.
establishments with 20 or more workers did not change at all over the
period.
Table 3.10 examines the degree of geographic concentration in the
growth of establishments and employment. Essentially, growth has been
concentrated in a few states, though there are indications that growth
is dispersing slightly.
The largest states generally did not have the fastest growth
rates, though they often had the largest actual increases. The 5
largest states had 57 percent of all new establishments and 63 percent
of new establishments with 20 workers or more in 1967-1982 and 52
percent of all employment growth during 1967-1977. The top 10 states
had about 70 percent of all new growth.
The evidence for increasing dispersion comes from comparing the
1967-1972 period to the 1977-1982 one. The share of establishment and
employment growth going to the 5 largest states was greater in
1967-1972 than 1977-1982. The 5 largest states had 59 percent of the
new establishments in 1967-1972 and only 55 percent in 1977-1982. 57
percent of new employment went to the 5 largest states in 1967-1972
compared to 54 percent in 1977-1982. In the relatively slow growth
period of 1972-1977, the concentration of growth in the largest states
was lowest. Essentially, the large states felt the impact of the slow
down in growth more than the small states. The small states, as a
result of these changes, received an increasing share of new
establishments. States other than the 10 largest had 24 percent of
the new plants in 1967-1972 and 36 percent in 1977-1982.
The conclusion from this discussion is clearly that the comptuer
Table 3.10
DECOMPOSITION OF THE GROWTH OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT:
6th through 10th
5 Largest States Largest States States with 0 All b
(in base year) (in base year) in Base Year Others Total
Establishments
1967-1982:
Actual Change
Percent of Total Change
1967-1972:
Actual Change
Percent of Total Change
1972-1977:
Actual Change
Percent of Total Change
1977-1982:
Actual Change
Percent of Total Change
Establishments with 20+
1967-1982:
Actual Change
Percent of Total Change
1967-1972:
Actual Change
Percent of Total Change
1972-1977:
Actual Change
Percent of Total Change
898
57.1
247
59.2
171
52.8
458
55.0
166
10.6
68
16.3
46
14.2
78
9.4
60
8.3
454
62.6
134
61.8
48
64.0
38
17.5
4
5.3
264
16.8
51
12.2
29
9.0
33
4.0
105
14.5
27
12.4
12
16.0
245
15.6
51
12.2
78
24.0
263
31.6
106
14.6
18
8.3
11
14.7
1573
100.0
417
100.0
324
100.0
832
100.0
725
100.0
217
100.0
75
100.0
Table 3.10 (continued)
DECOMPOSITION OF THE GROWTH OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT: 1967-1982~
6th through 10th
5 Largest States Largest States States with 0 All b
(in base year) (in base year) in Base Year Others Total
Establishments with 20+ (continued)
1977-1982:
Actual Change 270 29 17 117 433
Percent of Total Change 62.4 6.7 3.9 27.0 100.0
Employment
1967-1977c
Actual Change 49,618 14,842 18,125 12,526 95,111
Percent of Total Change 52.2 15.6 19.1 13.2 100.0 o
1967-1972:
Actual Change 25,473 4,217 8,650 6,350 44,690
Percent of Total Change 57.0 9.4 19.4 14.2 100.0
1972-1977:
Actual Change 24,145 10,425 5,975 9,876 50,421
Percent of Total Change 47.9 20.7 11.9 19.6 100.0
1977-1982: d
Actual Change 79,100 NA 4,500 NA 145,974
Percent of Total Change 54.2 3.1 100.0
Notes: a. In 1982, data were reported only for states with at least 500 employees. In 1967-1977,
minimum employment was 150.
b. Excludes those states with 0 at both beginning and end of period.
c. Used 1977 as end year because complete 1982 data were not available.
d. Florida, the 6th largest state in 1977, is included instead of Arizona, the 5th largest,
because 1982 data for Arizona was not available.
industry is highly geographically concentrated. The degree of
concentration has decreased only slightly over time.
Conclusions
One conclusion from this analysis of the Census of Manufacturers
survey is that the observed regional changes generally result from
shifts in one dominant state. The largest states, California,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Texas are the most significant states in
their regions in the computer industry. Some growth has spread into
neighboring states within the same region. For example, the rapid
growth in New Hampshire undoubtedly occurred because of the state's
proximity to Massachusetts. Growth in Oregon and Washington, states
close to California, also occurred at above average rates. Only in
the Mid-Atlantic region do all the states have a significant share of
the computer industry.
Thus, in discussing growth trends and potential in computer
manufacturing, one must examine patterns at the state level. What are
the projections from this analysis for growth in the different states?
The Largest States. Table 3.11 shows the 10 largest states ranked
according to the number of plants and employment in the different
years. California, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Minnesota
are (with only 3 exceptions for New Jersey) among the 6 largest states
in every year, measuring either establishments or employment.
California leads every list in every year. Approximately
one-third of all establishments and employment in the electronic
computing equipment industry is in California. The state had above
average growth rates in all periods, which meant that its share of the
Table 3.11
THE 10 LARGEST STATES IN THE ELECTRONIC
COMPUTING EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY: 1967-1982
1982a 1977 1972 1967
Establishments
1
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
California
Massachusetts
New York
Texas
Minnesota
New Jersey
Florida
Colorado
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Establishments with 20+
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Employment
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
California
Massachusetts
New York
Minnesota
Texas
Florida
New Jersey
New Hampshire
Pennsylvania
Arizona
California
Minnesota
Massachusetts
Texas
New York
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
California
Massachusetts
New York
New Jersey
Minnesota
Texas
Pennsylvania
Florida
Maryland
Connecticut
California
Massachusetts
New York
[New JerseyMinnesota
Pennsylvania
Florida
Texas
Connecticut
Maryland
California
Minnesota
Massachusetts
New York
Arizona
Florida
Texas
Pennsylvania
New Jersey
Oklahoma
California
Massachusetts
New York
New Jersey
Florida
Minnesota
Pennsylvania
Texas
Michigan
Colorado
California
Massachusetts
New York
New Jersey
Minnesota
i Pennsylvania
Florida
Michigan
Colorado
Texas
California
New York
Minnesota
Massachusetts
Colorado
New Jersey
Michigan
Florida
Arizona
Oklahoma
California
New York
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Minnesota
New Jersey
t Michigan
Colorado
Wisconsin
Florida
California
New York
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
Minnesota
New Jersey
Colorado
Florida
Michigan
Wisconsin
California
New York
Minnesota
Massachusetts
Colorado
Pennsylvania
Florida
North Carolina
New Jersey
Arizona
Note: a. Employment data in 1982 are not complete. As a result, rankings
below 5th place cannot be determined with certainty.
establishments and employment increased over time. None of the other
large states had growth rates that were consistently above average, as
did California. California is in a very strong position in the
industry as it is the largest state and growing rapidly.
In general, growth in the 4 other large states slowed somewhat
over time. Growth rates during 1967-1972 were generally average or
somewhat above average. Most of these states experienced below
average growth rates during what was overall a relatively slow growth
period in 1972-1977. Actual growth during this period was generally
substantially less than in 1967-1972. However, actual growth as well
as growth rates increased during 1977-1982. It is important to
remember that despite a slowing of growth, these states (and
California) are still the largest states in the industry.
Growth in all establishments in Massachusetts followed the pattern
described above. However, employment grew in the state at above
average rates until 1977 and then the rate slowed. Actual employment
growth was substantial in all periods. The forecast for Massachusetts
is essentially good, due to the strong employment growth.
New York is still a large and significant state in the computer
industry. However, if current trends continue, it is likely not to do
as well in the future. Growth in establishments was below average in
all periods. The state had no employment growth in 1967-1972 and
employment actually declined by 13 percent in 1972-1977. Employment
did increase in 1977-1982, though the growth rate was lower than
average.
The outlook for New Jersey is not great. Employment growth has
been relatively slow since 1972 and employment actually declined
during 1977-1982 and is now less than 2 percent of the total.
Minnesota is probably in a reasonable position for growth, though
past trends give mixed indications. Growth in establishments was
below average in all periods. The state had no employment growth
during 1967-1972. Employment did grow after 1972, but at below
average rates. Despite this, Minnesota ranked 3rd on employment in
1972 and 2nd in 1977 and 1982.
These 5 states will clearly continue to be important in the
computer industry. California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota appear to
have continued growth potential. The fate of New york and New Jersey
does not appear to be quite as bright. What does the future hold for
the other states in the U.S.?
Growing States. Texas is clearly a state with a future in the
computer industry. Texas had few plants and little employemnt in
1967. However, Texas was one of the fastest growing states in the
U.S. during the period between 1967-1982, but particularly after 1977.
As a result, Texas has become a significant state in the industry. It
was the 4th largest in terms of employemnt and number of plants in
1982.
Colorado, appears to be doing well in the computer industry. The
number of plants increased at below average rates through 1977, though
at about average rates during 1977-1982. The state ranked 8th in
terms of number of plants in 1982. Employment data are not complete
in Colorado, though several knowledgeable industry observers argued
that employment grew substantially between 1977 and 1982. The
interviews I conducted confirm the fact that Colorado is indeed an
attractive state in the industry (see Chapter 5 for detail).
Arizona is another state that appears to be doing well, though the
results are a little mixed. Employment grew at above average rates
and the state ranked 9th in employment in 1972 and 5th in 1977 (1982
data are unavailable). However, the growth rate in the number of
plants was somewhat betlow average.
Stable States. Florida and Pennsylvania generally ranked among
the 6th through 10th largest states in establishments and employment.
Both states had about 3-7 percent of total firms and employment.
Thus, though neither state is very large, they are significant states
in the industry. Employment growth during 1967-1972 was below average
in Florida. Pennyslvania actually lost employment during this period.
However, between 1972 and 1977, both states experienced above average
employment growth. Growth in Florida was average during 1977-1982 and
below average in Pennsylvania. This suggests that Florida will be
able to maintain its share of the industry. The status of
Pennsylvania is a little unclear, though the state does remain
significant in the industry.
Declining States. Two states, Michigan and Wisconsin have clearly
declined in importance in the industry. Both states, which are in the
East North Central region, were among the 10 largest in terms of
number of establishments in 1967, with about 4 percent of the total.
By 1982, Michigan had 2 percent and Wisconsin less than 1 percent of
all plants. Employment declined in Wisconsin to less than 500 in
1977, though grew a little by 1982. Employment fluctuated in
Michigan. These states each had 2 percent of the industry's
employment in 1967 and 1 percent in 1982.
States that are Probably Growing. The situation in a few states
is a little unclear since the trends give mixed indications. Some,
but not all trends suggest the state will grow. Oklahoma ranked 10th
on employment in 1972 and 1977, though it only had 5 establishments in
1977. Plant growth was above average in 1977-1982. Maryland and
Connecticut seemed to be growing up through 1977. Both states moved
into the top 10 in establishments in 1977, ranking 9th and 10th,
respectively. However, neither state had much employment. During
1977-1982, growth slowed and neigher state was in the top 10 in 1982.
North Carolina is often talked about as a state with growth
potential in the computer industry. However, it was not among the 10
largest states on any variable in 1982 (it ranked llth on employment).
North Carolina had slower than average growth during 1967-1972, but
above average growth during 1972-1977. Plant growth was also above
average in 1977-1982. Employment data are not available for 1982. If
the state continues to grow at above average rates, it could become a
significant state in the industry.
Fortune 500 Firms
The Fortune 500 firms play a significant role in the computer
manufacturing industry. These large firms employ most of the workers
in the industry, though they only represent a small fraction of the
number of establishments, as Table 3.12 shows. The table compares the
number of establishments and employment from the Census of
Table 3.12
ESTABLISHMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT: CENSUS OF
MANUFACTURERS AND SCHMENNER'S FORTUNE 500 PLANTS
Census of Schmenner's
Manufacturers Fortune 500
Establishments
1972 / Early 1970s 601 112
1978 / Late 1970s 931 152
Employment
1972 / Early 1970s 144,600 124,716
1978 / Late 1970s 192,600 178,482
Manufacturers (Table 3.1) and Schmenner's Fortune 500 firms (Tables
3.13 and 3.15). The samples are not identical and the years are not
quite the same, but the main point is clear. The Fortune 500 firms
employed at least 80 percent of all workers, though had less than 20
percent of all plants.
Schmenner's data are particularly useful because they provide
information not available in other sources. Schmenner collected
information on how a plant's status changed over the 1970s. We can
tell, for example, if the plant was a new branch plant, one that
closed, or one that moved locations. Information on changing
ownership, involving acquisions and divestitures, is also available.
Thus, we can take the overall change in plants and employment in a
region and examine the components of the change.
Schmenner's data also provide information on whether the plant is
located in a city, suburb, or rural area, and we can examine how this
varies for different regions and whether there were changes over the
1970s. We can also examine whether or how a company diversified its
plants geographically, with the data on whether the plant is in the
sae state as the corporation's headquarters.
Location of Plants and Employment
Plants. Table 3.13 shows the distribution of Fortune 500 computer
equipment manufacturing plants by region in the early and late 1970s.
The geographic distribution of plants is quite uneven. The majority
of plants were in three regions of the country in the early 1970s.
The Pacific region had almost 40 percent of the plants and New England
and the Mid-Atlantic each had about 17 percent. The South Atlantic
Table 3.13
COMPUTER MANUFACTURING PLANTS
OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES, BY REGION
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
U.S. Total
Early 1970s
Share
Number (%)
18 16.1
19 17.0
6
6
10
1
5
4
43
112
5.4
5.4
8.9
0.9
4.5
3.6
38.4
100.0
Late 1970s
Share
Number (%)
30 19.7
19 12.5
8 5.3
8 5.3
13 8.6
1 0.7
11 7.2
11 7.2
51 33.6
152 100.0
Percentage
Growth
66.7
0
33.3
33.3
30.0
0
120.0
175.0
18.6
35.7
region had 9 percent of the plants, and all other regions had less
than 6 percent.
The number of plants increased during the 1970s by 36 percent,
from 112 to 152. The fastest growing areas of the country were the
West South Central and Mountain states. The number of plants in these
states more than doubled, though the base was quite small in the early
1970s. New England was the only other region that grew faster than
the national average. Neither the Mid-Atlantic nor the East South
central regions experienced any increase in the number of
manufacturing plants. The latter, however, is an unimportant area in
terms of computer manufacturing. The Pacific states, with the largest
number of plants, grew at only half the national rate. The rest of
the country, the North Central and South Atlantic, grew about as fast
at the national average.
By the end of the 1970s, the Pacific, Mid-Atlantic and New England
still had the majority of plants, though their total share had
declined somewhat. Due to the slow and no growth in the Pacific and
the Mid-Atlantic, respectively, both regions' share declined. New
England's share of plants increased, to exceed that of the
Mid-Atlantic. The fastest growing regions, the West South Central and
Mountain, each increased their share by 3-4 percent. All other
regions were unchanged between the early and late 1970s.
Computer manufacturing plants were slightly more spread out among
the regions at the end of the 1970s compared to the beginning of the
decade. What happened within regions? Table 3.14 shows the
distribution of manufacturing plants by state in the early and late
Table 3.14
COMPUTER MANUFACTURING PLANTS OF
FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES, BY STATE
Number in
Early 1970s
Number in
Late 1970s
New England
Maine
New Hampshire
Vermont
Massachusetts
Mid-Atlantic
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
East North Central
Ohio
Illinois
Michigan
West North Central
Minnesota
Iowa
Kansas
South Atlantic
Delaware
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
East South Central
Tennessee
West South Central
Oklahoma
Texas
18
19 19
10
I
13
1
11
Table 3.14 (continued)
COMPUTER MANUFACTURING PLANTS OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES, BY STATE
Number in Number in
Early 1970s Late 1970s
Mountain 4 11
Colorado 1 3
New Mexico 0 1
Arizona 2 5
Utah 1 1
Idaho 0 1
Pacific 43 51
Washington 0 3
California 43 48
1970s.
More states had manufacturing plants by the end of the decade than
at the beginning. Twenty-nine states had at least one plant in the
late 1970s versus 21 in the early 1970s. In New England, one of the
fastest growing regions, most new plants were in Massachusetts, the
site of the majority of existing plants. However, both Maine and New
Hampshire got their first manufacturing plants during the decade.
Five of the eight Mountain states had at least one manufacturing
facility by the late 1970s, compared to only 3 states with sites at
the beginning of the decade. In the West South Central, the other
fast growing region, most new plants were constructed in Texas, though
Oklahoma got its first plants. In sum, computer manufacturing plants
of Fortune 500 companies became slightly more geographically dispersed
throughout the states during the 1970s. However, the change was not
overwhelming. The industry remained geographically concentrated.
The rest of the analysis of the Fortune 500 firms will not look at
individual states, but will only examine regional changes. As Table
3.14 showed, the number of plants per state is small, too small to
give reliable results.
Employment. Table 3.15 presents data on the regional distribution
of employment in plants of the Fortune 500 companies. Employment
refers to manufacturing personnel only, and thus excludes sales,
research and development, and distribution personnel.5 The regional
distribution of employment in the computer industry is similar to the
distribution of plants, though there are some interesting differences.
First, a word about the early 1970s employment figure. Table 3.15
Table 3.15
EMPLOYMENT IN COMPUTER MANUFACTURING PLANTS OF FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES, BY REGION
Early 1970s Early 1970s
Estimate 1a Estimate 2a Late 1970s Percentage Percentage
Share Share Share Growth Growth
Region Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Estimate 1 Estimate 2
New England 14,463 11.6 15,178 10.5 24,786 13.9 71.4 63.3
Mid-AtlanticC 47,659 38.2 49,019 34.1 46,017 25.8 - 3.4 - 6.2
East North Central 6,797 5.5 6,797 4.7 5 ,8 19b 3.3 -14.4 -14.4
West North Central 11,450 9.2 11,700 8.1 14,960 8.4 30.7 27.9
South Atlantic 10,231 8.2 11,171 7.8 13,336 7.5 30.3 19.4
East South Central 1,500 1.2 1,500 1.0 1,800 1.0 20.0 20.0
West South Central 1,966 1.6 3,326 2.3 8,871 5.0 351.2 166.7
Mountainc 6,950 5.6 11,450 8.0 18,130 10.2 160.9 58.3
Pacific 23,700 19.0 33,765 23.5 44,763 25.1 88.9 32.6
U.S. TOTAL 124,716 100.0 143,906 100.0 178,482 100.0 43.1 24.0
Notes: a. Estimate 1: Employment as reported; 22 out of 26 acquisitions have 0 employment.
Estimate 2: Assigns late 1970s employment to acquisitions reporting 0 in early 1970s.
b. Employment figure altered; see Appendix A, p.
c. These employment figures are higher than in the Census of Manufacturers. See text for
discussion.
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reports two employment figures because there was a problem obtaining
accurate information from plants that were acquired by one of the
Fortune 500 companies during the 1970s. In my sample, 26 plants were
acquisitions. Of these, 22 reported early 1970s employment of zero.
There are two explanations for this. One, the zero employment may be
valid. If the prior owner had opened the plant just before selling
the plant, the zero is accurate. This plant would have been listed as
a new branch plant if the company hadn't been sold. But since it was
sold, it is listed as an acquistion. Two, the zero employment is an
error, due to the fact that the new company didn't know what the
employment had been under the old owner. In this case, the zero does
not accurately reflect regional employment, though it does accurately
reflect the company's employment.
The first two columns in Table 3.15 report the early 1970s
employment including the zero employment for acquisitions. The second
set of early 1970s figures assigns the late 1970s figure to those
acquistions that report zero employment. The first set of figures
undoubtedly understates regional employment. The understatement will
be larger if most of the new owners of acquired plants did not know
the prior employment at the plant. The second set of figures probably
overstates actual employment. It is a little difficult to hypothesize
whether the acquistions gained or lost employment during the 1970s.
If they are like the plants that didn't change ownership, they gained
employment, and this early 1970s employment estimate is an
overstatement. But if the plants were sold because they were in
trouble, the new owner might have cut back employment in order to cut
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costs. In this case, the second early 1970s estimate is an
understatement. This problem with acquisitions is most severe in the
Pacific and Mountain regions. Thus, the two sets of employment
figures are most different for these regions.
Three regions, the Mid-Atlantic, Pacific and New England, had
almost 70 percent of the employment in the computer manufacturing
industry. These same three regions also contained the majority of
plants, though their individual shares were somewhat different.
Looking at the first set of early 1970s figures, the Mid-Atlantic had
38 percent of all employment, twice its share of plants, implying that
the size of individual plants in the region was much larger than
average. The trend in the Pacific was the opposite. Its employment
share of 19 percent was half its plant share, implying smaller than
average plants. New England's share of employment was 12 percent,
somewhat smaller than its share of plants.
The Fortune 500 firms in the computer manufacturing industry
employed few people in the East and West South Central regions, only
about 1.5 percent in each region. The remaining areas of the country
each had 6-9 percent of the industry's employment. The West North
Central and the Mountain states had somewhat higher share of
employment than plants and the reverse was true in the West South
Central. The other regions had an equal share of plants and
employment.
The Pacific and Mountain regions are most affected by the
different definitions of early 1970s employment. Including the late
1970s employment in acquisitions (estimate 2) increases employment in
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the Pacific region by about 10,000 and raises its share to 24 percent
in the early 1970s. This figure is still substantially less than its
share of plants. The Mountain states' employment increased by 4500
and their share of employment increased to 8 percent in the second set
of early 1970s figures. Differences between the two sets of early
1970s employment figues have little effect in the other regions.
Employment grew in all regions except the Mid-Atlantic and East
North Central during the 1970s. Growth was faster than the national
average in New England, the West South Cental, Mountain, and Pacific
regions. The West South Central was the fastest growing, more than
doubling its employment, though it had little employment in the early
1970s. Employment in New England increased by about 10,000 workers or
65-70 percent. The growth rates in the Pacific, Mountain, and West
South Central regions vary substantially depending on the definition
of early 1970s employment, though growth was above average by any
definition.
Growth in the West North Central was about average and in the
South Atlantic and East South Cental it was somewhat less than
average. Employment declined in the Mid-Atlantic by 4-6 percent and
in the East North Central by 14 percent.
The geographic distribution of employment in the late 1970s
shifted somewhat as a result of the varying regional growth rates.
The employment share in the Mid-Atlantic dropped at least 10
percentage points to 25 percent. New England increased its employment
share somewhat. The West South Central's share doubled to about 5
percent. Depending on the definition of early 1970s employment, the
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Mountain and Pacific states either increase their share substantialy
or slightly. Changes during the 1970s were small in all other
regions.
Comparison to Census of Manufacturers. The regional distribution
of the plants of the Fortune 500 companies is fairly similar to the
distribution of establishments with 20 or more employees in the Census
of Manufacturers. However, New England is doing better relative to
the other regions in plants of the Fortune 500 companies than shown by
the Census of Manufacturers.
Regional growth patterns during the 1970s were somewhat different
in the two samples. The Census of Manufacturers showed that both the
Mountain and East North Central regions lost establishments with 20 or
more during 1972-1977. However, the Mountain was the fastest growing
region in the Fortune 500 plants. The East North Central also
increased its number of Fortune 500 plants. The Pacific region had
higher than average growth in the Census of Manufacturers. It did not
do as well in the Fortune 500 companies, only growing at half the
average rate.
There are quite large differences for some regions in the
employment figures reported by Schmenner and the Census of
Manufacturers. We would expect that the Census figures would be
larger than Schmenner's since the Census sample is the larger one.
However, in 3 regions Schmenner's employment figures are substantially
larger than the Census figures.
Employment in the Mid-Atlantic is about 46,000-48,000 in
Schmenner's sample and 27,000-28,000 in the Census of Manufacturers.
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My hypothesis is that these differences arise due to differences in
the industrial coding in the two samples. We can identify individual
companies in Schmenner's sample. We find that 5 IBM plants in New
York account for 35,800 employees in the early 1970s and 34,900 in the
late 1970s, or about 75 percent of the Mid-Atlantic's employment as
reported by Schmenner. Since employment in these IBM plants is
greater than the total reported by the Census of Manufacturers, it is
clear that the two surveys treat IBM's employment differently.
(Semiconductors are one product manufactured in one IBM plant which
should not be listed with computer manufacturing. If Schmenner's
figures include these workers, this is part of the problem.)
Schmenner reports employment in the Mountain region to be about
18,000 in the late 1970s. The Census reports about 13,000 in 1977.
It is possible that this difference is real and arises because the
survey years are not identical. For example, growth in Colorado
appears to have increased after 1978, as discussed in the previous
section. However, as discussed below, the two employment figures lead
to quite different conclusions about the future growth potential of
the Mountain region.
I changed Schmenner's figure for the East North Central in the
late 1970s based on information I obtained in my NCR interview.
Without this change, employment in the East North Central would have
grown by 78 percent.6
The Census of Manufacturer's and Schmenner's sample give fairly
similar results in terms of the regional distribution and growth of
employment, given the problems with the Mid-Atlantic and Mountain
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regions and uncertainty in early 1970s estimates in the Pacific and
Mountain regions. The Pacific, New England, and Mid-Atlantic are the
largest regions, by far, in both samples. New England, the Pacific
and West South Central are the fastest growing. The Mid-Atlantic has
a higher employment share in Shcmenner's sample than the Census. The
region actually lost employment in Schmenner's sample, and had almost
no growth in the Census sample. Trends in the South Atlantic were
different in the two surveys. The region had higher than average
employment growth in the Census survey, but much lower than average
growth in plants of the Fortune 500 companies. The Mountain region,
in contrast was one of the fastest growing regions in Fortune 500
plants, but had almost no growth overall as shown in the Census.
However, it is unclear whether this observed difference is real. It
could be due to coding differences discussed above.
Components of Growth and Change
The overall changes in the number of manufacturing plants of the
Fortune 500 companies can be broken down into two components. The
number of plants in a region increases as firms open new branch plants
and decreases when a plant is closed.
Table 3.16 shows that among large firms in the computer
manufacturing industy, almost all the change in the number of plants
is due to the opening of new branch plans. There were 46 new branches
opened and only 6 plants closed during the 1970s. Only in the
Mid-Atlantic did the number of openings equal the number of closings.
The plant closings occurred in the regions with the largest number of
plants, New England, Mid-Atlantic and Pacific.
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Table 3.16
DECOMPOSITION OF CHANGES IN
THE NUMBER OF PLANTS, BY REGION
Total Change in New Plants Opened
Number of Plants Branch Plant & Closed Dur-
Region During the 1970s Plants Closings ing the 1970sa
New England +12 14 2 0
Mid-Atlantic 0 2 2 3
East North Central +2 2 0 2
West North Central +2 2 0 0
South Atlantic +3 4 1 0
East South Central 0 0 0 0
West South Central +6 6 0 0
Mountain +7 7 0 1
Pacific +8 9 1 3
U.S. TOTAL +40 46 6 9
Note: a. These plants are not included in any other tables.
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One other kind of physical change occurred in these sample firms.
The last column of Table 3.16 shows that there were 9 plants that were
opened or acquired and then closed or divested, all during the 1970s.
Only the Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, Mountain and Pacific were
affected by this type of change. The number of manufacturing
employees in these plants was small, less than 300 altogether. There
is no way to tell whether the plant was a new plant or an acquisiton
or whether it actually closed down or was divested. Therefore, we
don't know how it affected the region. For this reason, and because
the number of employees involved is so small, these plants are not
included in further analysis.
Acquisitions and divestitures are changes in ownership of existing
plants. These changes affect the selling and purchasing companies,
though do not necesarily affect the regions in which they are located.
Acquisitions and divestitures continue operating, and continue
manufacturing the same general product, though there may be some
changes in the exact products manufactured.
Table 3.17 shows, for plants that existed throughout the decade,
the number that had no change in ownership, the number acquired by the
sample firms and the number divested by them during the 1970s. These
large firms acquired a significant number of computer manufacturing
firms during the 1970s. 25 percent of all plants were not owned by
the sample firms at the beginning of the 1970s, but were acquired by
them some time during the decade. The Pacific region had the highest
level of acquisition activity. Over 35 percent of the plants were
acquisitions. Acquisitions were about 20 percent in all other
Table 3.17
OWNERSHIP CHANGES IN COMPUTER MANUFACTURING PLANTS
THAT WERE OPERATING THROUGHOUT THE 1970S, BY REGION
Total Number Existing
Existing; No Change Acquisitions Divestitures Throughout the Decade
Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of
Region Number Region Total Number Region Total Number Region Total Number Region Total
New England 13 81.3 3 18.8 0 0.0 16 100.0
Mid-Atlantic 14 82.4 3 17.6 0 0.0 17 100.0
East North Central 5 83.3 0 0.0 1 16.7 6 100.0
West North Central 5 83.3 1 16.7 0 0.0 6 100.0
South Atlantic 7 77.8 2 22.2 0 0.0 9 100.0
East South Central 1 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0
West South Central 4 80.0 1 20.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 -
Mountain 2 50.0 1 25.0 1 25.0 4 100.0
Pacific 25 59.5 15 35.7 2 4.8 42 100.0
U.S. TOTAL 76 71.7 26 24.5 4 3.8 106 100.0
Notes: a. Includes 7 plants that were moved between
and either the same city or county.
the two periods. All moves were within the same state
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regions, except the East North Central and East South Central, which
had none.
There was little divestiture of computer manufacturing plants
among these large firms.
These data also contain information on plants that relocated
during the 1970s. This type of change could have a substantial affect
on different regions. However, in this sample, there are only 7
plants that relocated. There was one each in the Mid-Atlantic, West
North Central and West South Central regions, and 4 in California.
All the plants that relocated remained in the same state. Those in
California relocated within the same county. All other plants moved
to another location in the same city. These changes are not large,
nor particularly interesting to this analysis, and I have included
those plants that relocated with the existing plants in Table 3.17.
New England, the West South Central, Mountain and Pacific regions
experienced the most rapid employment growth during the 1970s. Table
3.18 disaggregates this growth and examines how much occurred in new
branch plants, acquisitions, and in existing plants. It also examines
employment lost due to plant closings. Establishing a new branch
plant in an area is a strong statement about the area's attractiveness
because it requires a large capital investment. Employment growth in
branch plants was strong in these 4 rapidly growing regions.
Employment increased by 4,500-6,000 in each region. New England
received 26 percent of all the new employment in branch plants. The
three other regions each had about 20 percent of the total growth.
New branch employment accounted for over 40 percent of total
Table 3.18
DECOMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH DURING THE 1970S, BY REGIONa
Total Change in b Change in New Branch Closed
Region Change Existing Plants Acquired Plants Plants Plants
New England 10,323 5,538 715 6,130 -2,060
Percent 100.0 53.6 6.9 59.4 - 20.0
Mid-Atlantic -1,642 -2,406 1,360 254 - 850
Percent -100.0 -146.5 82.8 15.5 - 51.8
East North Central - 978 -1,360 0 382 0
Percent -100.0 -139.1 0.0 39.1 0.0
West North Central 3,510 2,650 250 610 0
Percent 100.0 75.5 7.1 17.4 0.0
South Atlantic 3,105 804 940 1,500 - 139
Percent 100.0 25.9 30.3 48.3 - 4.5
East South Central 300 300 0 0 0
Percent 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
West South Central 6,905 638 1,360 4,907 0
Percent 100.0 9.2 19.7 71.1 0.0
Mountain 11,180 2,100 4, 500 4,580 0
Percent 100.0 18.8 40.3 41.0 0.0
Pacific 21,063 5,913 10,065 5,585 - 500
Percent 100.0 28.1 47.8 26.5 - 2.4
U.S. TOTAL 53,766 14,177 19,190 23,948 -3,549
Percent 100.0 26.4 35.7 44.5 - 6.6
Notes: a. Employment in the early 1970s as reported, which means 22 acquisitions had 0
employment in the early 1970s.
b. Includes plants that moved. See Note a, Table 3.17.
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employment growth in each of these regions.
Employment grew substantially in existing plants in New England
and the Pacific. These two regions added 5,500 and 5,900 employees,
respectively, to existing plants during the 1970s. Almost all the
actual growth in existing plant employment occurred in these regions.
If we look at growth rates of employment in existing plants (Table
3.19), we see that the regional trends are similar to those of total
employment (Table 3.15). Therefore, even though actual growth was not
great in the West South Central and the Mountain regions, the rates
and thus the growth potential in the regions is high.
The Mid-Atlantic and East North Central regions are clearly in
trouble. Employment actually declined in both regions. Loss of
employment in plants that closed was three times that gained from new
branch plants in the Mid-Atlantic. Employment in the existing plants
declined. Only the increase in employment in plants that were
acquired prevented employment from declining further in the
Mid-Atlantic. Employment declined in existing plants in the East
North Central. New branch plant openings added little employment.
Employment in the West North Central and South Atlantic only
increased by about 3,000. Most of the West North Central's growth was
in existing plants. The South Atlantic's growth was spread over all
categories. The East South Central experienced practically no growth.
Characteristics of Growth
Location near Headquarters. One way to judge the relative
attractiveness of different regions is to examine whether companies
choose to expand within the region that their corporate headquarters
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Table 3.19
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN EXISTING PLANTS
DURING THE 1970S, BY REGION
(no change in ownership)
Early 1970s Late 1970s
Region Employment Employment Percentage Change
New England 12,403 17,941 44.7
Mid-Atlantic 46,809 44,403 - 5.1
East North Central 6,597 5,237 -20.6
West North Central 11,450 14,100 23.1
South Atlantic 10,092 10,896 8.0
East South Central 1,500 1,800 20.0
West South Central 1,966 2,604 32.5
Mountain 5,900 8,000 35.6
Pacific 22,726 28,639 26.0
U.S. TOTAL 119,443 133,620 11.9
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is located. Table 3.20 presents some evidence on this issue for the
firms in this sample. Two points are evident. First, the regional
location of the corporate headquarters of companies in this sample is
quite concentrated. The three regions of the South as well as the
Mountain states have essentially no corporate headquarters in the
area.
Second, there are substantial differences among regions in the
degree of clustering around corporate headquarters. Companies
headquartered in the Pacific region had, on average, 64 percent of
their plants in the Pacific in the late 1970s. All the companies
headquartered in the Pacific had at least one plant located in the
region. Corporations headquartered in New England and the East North
Central had 20 percent of their plants located in that region. The
figure for the Mid-Atlantic was 27 percent. Four of the 7 companies
headquartered in New England did not have any plants in the region.
This figure was 2 out of 5 for the Mid-Atlantic and 4 out of 8 for the
East North Central. No companies headquartered in the West North
Central had plants there.
Changes during the 1970s were not large and in a sample of this
size are not statistically significant.
City/Suburban/Rural Location. Computer manufacturing firms are
located predominatly in suburban areas. Table 3.21 shows that
slightly less than 60 percent of all plants were in the suburbs, while
about 30 percent were in central cities and 10 percent in rural areas.
These figures were essentially unchanged during the 1970s. (The small
observed increase in rural locations is statistically insignificant; t
Table 3.20
PLANTS LOCATED IN SAME STATE AS CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS, BY REGION
Early 1970s Late 1970s
Region of Percent of Percent of
Corporate Companies' Plants Number of Companies' Plants Number of
Headquarters in Region Companies in Region Companies
New England 22.6 7 20.1 7
Mid-Atlantic 29.9 5 26.7 5
East North Central 9.1 7 20.2 8
West North Central 0 3 0 3
South Atlantic 50.0 1 50.0 1
East South Central 0 0
West South Central 0 100.0 1
Mountain 0 0
Pacific 78.3 6 64.0 7
U.S. TOTAL 30.7 29 32.3 32
Table 3.21
LOCATION OF PLANTS IN CENTRAL CITY, SUBURBAN, AND RURAL AREAS, BY REGION
Early 1970s Late 1970s
Central Central
Region Total City Suburban Rural Total City Suburban Rural
New England (%)
(number)
Mid-Atlantic (%)
(number)
East North Central (%)
(number)
West North Central (%)
(number)
South Atlantic (%)
(number)
East South Central (%)
(number)
West South Central (%)
(number)
Mountain (%)
(number)
Pacific (%)
(number)
U.S. TOTAL (%)
(number)
100.0
(18)
100.0
(19)
100.0
(6)
100.0
(6)
100.0
(10)
22.2
(4)
21.1
(4)
16.7
(1)
66.7
(4)
30.0
(3)
100.0 100.0
(1)
100.0
(5)
100.0
(4)
100.0
(43)
100.0
(112)
(1)
80.0
(4)
100.0
(4)
25.6
(11)
32.1
(36)
44.4
(8)
68.4
(13)
66.7
(4)
33.3
(2)
60.0
(6)
0.0
(0)
20.0
(1)
0.0
(0)
74.4
(32)
58.9
(66)
33.3
(6)
10.5
(2)
16.7
(1)
0.0
(0)
10.0
(1)
0.0
(0)
0.0
(0)
0.0
(0)
0.0
(0)
8.9
(10)
100.0
(30)
100.0
(19)
100.0
(8)
100.0
(8)
100.0
(13)
20.0
(6)
21.1
(4)
37.5
(3)
50.0
(4)
23.1
(3)
100.0 100.0
(1)
100.0
(11)
100.0
(11)
100.0
(51)
100.0
(152)
(1)
72.7
(8)
81.8
(9)
25.5
(13)
33.6
(51)
46.7
(14)
68.4
(13)
50.0
(4)
25.0
(2)
69.2
(9)
0.0
(0)
27.3
(3)
0.0
(0)
74.5
(38)
54.6
(83)
33.3
(10)
10.5
(2)
12.5
(1)
25.0
(2)
7.7
(1)
0.0
(0)
0.0
(0)
18.2
(2)
0.0
(0)
11.8
(18)
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= 0.726.) It is difficult to evalute whether there are regional
differences in the preference for city, suburban and rural locations
because the number of cases is so small. Plants in the West North
Central, West South Central and Mountain regions had a higher than
average tendency to be located in central cities, at the expense of
suburban and rural areas. One likely explanation for this occurrence
has to do with the fact that cities in these regions are newer, less
industrialized and likely to be less dense than cities in other
regions. Therefore, it may be that cities are dissimilar in different
regions, and not that locational preferences differ by region.
The patterns are similar if we examine employment by location as
Table 3.22 shows. New England and the East North Central have a
higher proportion of employment than plants in rural areas. This
causes the percent of U.S. employment in rural areas to be slightly
higher than the percent of plants. The West North Central and Pacific
regions had a slightly higher percent of employment in central cities
than was true when examining plant location.
Conclusions
The regional location patterns of firms and employment of Fortune
500 companies are fairly similar to patterns observed in the Census of
Manufacturers. Overall, the Pacific, New England, and the
Mid-Atlantic are the most important regions. In terms of future
growth, the Pacific, New England, and West South Central appear to
have the most potential.
There are some differences between the two samples. New England
is quite attractive to the Fortune 500 companies. Potential growth is
Table 3.22
EMPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL CITY, SUBURBAN AND RURAL AREAS, BY REGION
Early 1970s Late 1970s
Central Central
Region Total City Suburban Rural Total City Suburban Rural
New England
Percent
Mid-Atlantic
Percent
East North Central
Percent
West North Central
Percent
South Atlantic
Percent
East South Central
Percent
West South Central
Percent
Mountain
Percent
Pacific
Percent
U.S. TOTAL
Percent
14,463 1,730
100.0 12.0
47,659
100.0
6,797
100.0
11,450
100.0
10,231
100.0
18,185
38.2
200
2.9
2,893 9,840
20.0 68.0
22,524 6,950
47.3 14.4
4,197 2,400
61.7 35.3
7,450 4,000
65.1 34.9
2,139 7,492
20.9 73.2
1,500 1,500
100.0 100.0
1,966
100.0
1,840
93.6
6,950 6,950
100.0 100.0
23,700
100.0
124,716
100.0
0
0.0
126
6.4
0
0.0
9,240 14,460
39.0 61.0
49,234
39.5
0
0.0
600
5.9
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
55,692 19,790
44.7 15.9
24,786
100.0
46,017
100.0
5,819
100.0
14,960
100.0
3,351
13.5
15,105
32.8
582
10.0
10,100
67.5
13,336 3,240
100.0 24.3
1,800 1,800
100.0 100.0
8,871
100.0
18,130
100.0
44,763
100.0
178,482
100.0
8,317
93.8
16,644
91.8
8,150 13,285
32.9 53.6
24,312
52.8
3,237
55.6
4,250
28.4
9,456
70.9
0
0.0
554
6.2
6,600
14.3
2,000
34.4
610
4.1
640
4.8
0
0.0
0
0.0
0 1,486
0.0 8.2
15,127 29,636
33.8 66.2
74,266
41.6
0
0.0
79,595 24,621
44.6 13.8
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fairly assured looking at this sample of plants. The Mountain region
also appears to be doing better in the Fortune 500 sample than the
Census sample. The Pacific, in contrast showed relatively higher
growth in the Census sample than in the Fortune 500 sample, though the
region is doing well in both samples.
Schmenner's data provided information on the changing status of
plants over the 1970s. The Census figures just showed overall
changes. Schmenner's data on the Fortune 500 firms allow us to break
down the overall change into a growth and decay component and to
examine the incidence of changes in ownership. The computer
manufacturing industry grew substantially during the 1970s. The
number of new branch plants was large. Few plants closed. This
sample of companies acquired a significant number of existing plants
during the decade and divested only a few. Relocation of plants was
quite rare.
Most new branch plants were opened in the fast growing New
England, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific regions. Total
employment was much smaller in the West South Central and Mountain
states than in the other two regions. However, the actual employment
growth in new branch plants was fairly similar in all regions. This
suggests that the West South Central and Mountain regions are in a
strong position.
Actual employment growth in existing plants was highest in the
Pacific and New England. However, rates of employment growth were
high in the Mountain and West South Central, as well as in New England
and the Pacific.
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In sum, this analysis of the components of growth suggests New
England, the West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific regions have
the strongest growth potential in computer plants of the Fortune 500
companies.
This chapter has used published data to analyze the location and
growth patterns of computer manufacturing firms. The objective was to
discern which states and regions were the most significant in the
industry, and which areas, according to the trends, have the most
future growth potential.
The next several chapters examine the industry in more detail to
understand what drives location decisions. These chapters rely
heavily on interview data from large computer manufacturing companies.
The next chapter examines how computers are produced, including how
much of the final system is actually manufactured by the computer
company, details of the manufacturing process itself, and how this has
changed over time. The following chapter analyzes what factors make
different areas attractive, how this has changed over time, and what
can be expected in the future.
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Notes
1. Roger W. Schmenner, Making Business Location Decisions (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982). This study deals mostly
with the decision-making process itself, including how how
different firms decide when to open new plants and how they go
about doing it.
2. It is not possible to get exact employment figures for the Pacific
and Mountain regions in 1967 due to confidentiality problems
(described in detail in Appendix A; data on California and Arizona
were not reported). Employment in the Pacific and Mountain
regions combined was 31,400. Based on this, and individual state
data, we can calculate that the maximum employment in the Pacific
was 24,250 and the minimum in the Mountain was thus 7,150. (These
estimates appear to be reasonable, when we examine time trends in
California and Arizona in Table 3.8.)
3. The 1967 figure is an estimate. The actual figure is between
6,100 and 10,600. The New England estimate is subject to far more
error than the figures for any other region. See Appendix A for a
discussion of missing data and assignments.
4. The individuals I talked to were:
Jack Scott, currently Vice President of Memorex Corporation;
Randy Harrison, in the Governor of Colorado's high technology
commission;
Professor Jerry Allen, in the Busineess School at the University
of Colorado, Boulder.
5. Schmenner says "to the extent possible...significant numbers of
sales, R&D or distribution personnel which could easily be
identified as working at the plant site were excluded from these
employment estimates." (Schmenner 1980, p. 10).
6. Schmenner's sample showed that employment in NCR's Dayton, Ohio
plant was 1400 in the early 1970s and 7000 in the late 1970s.
From my interviews and an NCR publication it was clear that the
late 1970s figure was incorrect. NCR cut its Dayton employment
drastically during the 1970s. I used an employment figure of 700
for the late 1970s, reported in "Fact Book--The World of NCR" (p.
16), published by NCR in 1982.
7. This analysis does not present conclusive proof about the relative
attractiveness of different regions. Essentially there are two
types of Fortune 500 companies that have plants manufacturing
computers. There are companies whose sole business is in
computers, such as IBM and Digital Equipment Corporation. Then,
there are companies that operate in a number of industries, of
which computer manufacturing is one, and not the first line of
business. Exxon and General Electric are examples of this latter
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type of corporation. Depending on the primary business of the
corporation, the headquarters location may or may not be a good
place to locate the computer part of their business. The data
from the computer firms I interviewed will help distinguish the
behavior of these two types of companies.
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Chapter 4
COMPUTER MANUFACTURING AND LABOR DEMAND
In order to understand the locational preferences of companies we
need to know what is involved in making computers and the mix of
inputs used in production. This chapter examines, in detail, how
computers are produced and the changes that have occurred in their
manufacture over time. It also examines how changes in the
manufacturing process have affected the type and quantity of labor
demanded by the industry.
The computer industry has always been an industry with a labor
orientation. It is not an industry that, for example, must be located
near natural resources. Transportation costs to the market are also
not a significant factor in determining plant location since computers
have a high value relative to their weight. The industry has always
needed to attract people, with various skills and training, and has
chosen locations with this in mind.1
One conclusion from the following analysis is that there have been
three distinct periods in the history of the computer industry. The
first period, prior to the mid-1960s, was the birth of the computer
industry, from the development of the first computer until the
beginning of the computer's widespread commercial acceptance. The
second period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, saw the
development of the industry and the increasing commercial use of
computers in business and industry. The third period, beginning in
the mid-1970s and continuing today, can be characterized as an
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explosive growth stage, in business use, and beginning in the 1980s,
in home and personal use. The manufacturing process and mix of labor
demanded by the industry differs in these periods, as will become
clear throughout the chapter.
This chapter is divided into three broad sections: the
manufacturing process; labor force; and factors that have caused
changes in the manufacturing process overtime.
Four aspects of the manufacturing process are particularly
relevant to this thesis. One concerns the design of the computer.
The computer of the 1980s is very different from the computer of the
1960s. The changes that have occurred significantly affected the
labor required to manufacture computers. Another important aspect is
the degree of vertical integration in production, or how much of the
final product a computer company actually manufactures in-house and
what it purchases from other companies. Changes in the degree of
automation and the use of assembly line techniques are two other
factors that have radically affected what goes on in computer plants
and the mix of labor necessary for production.
Changes in the manufacturing process had substantial effects on
the type of labor demanded by the industry. The second section of the
chapter turns to an examination of these effects.
The final section of the chapter examines, briefly, the causes of
the observed changes in the manufacturing process.
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Manufacturing Process
Changes in the Product
There were three major changes in the design of computers during
the 1970s. First, the importance of semiconductors increased
dramatically. The functions and power available from a single chip
grew exponentially, which expanded the capabilities of computers.
Second, since the late 1970s, software has become increasingly more
important in the functioning of computers. This trend is expected to
continue in the future. Finally, the life cycle of a computer has
been decreasing, and products are outdated within three years. These
changes have all had significant effects on the composition of the
labor force required to manufacture computers, as discussed below.
Increasing Importance of Semiconductors. Integrated circuits, a
type of semiconductor, were first used commercially in computers
beginning in the mid-1960s. However, at this time, the technology was
still extremely new and uncertain. The circuits were expensive to
manufacture, and quality control was poor. As a result of these
factors, the IBM 360 series introduced in the mid-1960s used a hybrid
circuit, that was part way between an integrated circuit and a
transistor. Semiconductor technology improved rapidly, and by the
mid-1970s the power of a single silicon chip was tremendous. As a
rough estimate, the amount of information that can be stored on a
single chip increased by a factor of 10 every 5-8 years and the trend
continues today. The price of chips has decreased almost as much as
the power has increased.
All computer companies now have semiconductor research and
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development facilities that design the proprietary integrated circuits
they use (the heart of the computer). Most companies also manufacture
their proprietary circuits. The design and the first stage of
semiconductor manufacture require highly skilled and trained
engineers. Thus, the increasing importance of semiconductors in the
manufacture of computers has led to an increase in the demand for
electrical and chemical engineers relative to other personnel.
Increasing Importance of Software. Software has become an
increasingly important part of the computer, particularly since the
late 1970s. Functions that were previously performed by hardware are
now done by software. In addition, computers are now being designed
and built to perform functions and do work that the end user used to
have to do. For example, built-in software allows the user to easily
produce spread sheets by just keying in the data. The computer does
the formatting and produces the final spread sheet. As a result of
these changes, DEC reported in 1978 that its software costs were
rising absolutely and as a percentage of the cost of a total system.
They project software costs will increase throughout the 1980s.2
Representatives of Prime reported that hardware costs in 1972 were
high relative to costs in 1983, and that currently the hardware is
cheaper to produce than the software.
This emphasis on software meant that the demand by computer
companies for software engineers and skilled programmers increased
substantially during the late 1970s and that demand will continue to
be strong in the future.
Shorter Product Life Cycle. The life cycle of computer products
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has been decreasing since the early 1970s as the pace of technological
change rapidly made products obsolete. Today, NCR estimates that the
average product is manufactured for 3 years and then it becomes
obsolete. The decrease in the life of products has been particularly
dramatic for NCR as the design of its cash register and accounting
machine products did not significantly change for 50 years.
The shorter product life cycles mean that companies must spend an
increasing proportion of their revenues on development expenses, thus
further increasing the demand for engineers, particularly product
engineers.
All the changes discussed above in the computer design, have
increased the demand for product, software, chemical, and electrical
engineers and for skilled programmers. This has dramatically affected
the composition of the labor force in computer manufacturing
companies. The extent of the change is documented in a later section.
Vertical Integration
The degree of vertical integration in manufacturing refers to the
proportion of a company's final product it actually manufactures
in-house and how much it purchases from other companies. The more
vertically integrated a firm is, the larger proportion of the product
it makes itself. There are many components and steps involved in
manufacturing computers, including designing and manufacturing
integrated circuits (ICs), fabricating circuit boards, assembling ICs
onto circuit boards, making cables, switches, metal frames and
cabinets, and finally, assembling the entire computer. Then, there
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are a whole range of peripheral devices, including terminals,
printers, tape drives, and disk drives that are necessary to use the
computer, which the computer firm must either manufacture or purchase.
Decisions a company makes concerning the components it chooses to
make itself and those it chooses to buy from other companies have
clear implications for the number and kinds of plants it needs and the
size and skills of the workforce it hires. For example, if a company
chooses to make some of the integrated circuits it uses, it will need
engineers and scientists capable of designing the chips. (Even if the
company doesn't manufacture ICs, it will need to be involved to some
degree in designing the chips and will need some engineers for this.)
Fabricating the integrated circuits themselves requires relatively
skilled labor, though wiring the circuits requires meticulous, but not
highly skilled workers. In contrast, if a company chooses to make the
frames and cabinets for its computers, it needs to have a metalworking
facility with skilled metalworkers. In general, a company will need
an increasing proportion of direct manufacturing labor the more
vertically integrated it chooses to become. However, if the company
also has extremely automated production, the proportion of direct
labor will be reduced.
There are three factors that affect the degree of vertical
integration that a company finds profitable. The first is the size of
the company and its market power. Companies that produce large
volumes can manufacture more components and products in-house than can
companies will smaller volumes. Large companies realize economies of
scale in production. It is cost effective for the large companies to
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employ automated equipment as they can spread the costs of the
machines over a large number of units.
Small companies, in contrast, don't sell enough units to make it
cost effective to be as automated as the large companies. As a
result, it is cheaper for the small companies to purchase some
components or products from outside vendors than to manufacture
everything in-house. The vendors, by producing large volumes, can
manufacture at a lower cost than the small companies.
An additional benefit of size is a result of the market power of
large companies. The large company can impose its standard on the
rest of the industry. For example, the IBM 360 series became the
standard against which other companies had to compete in the late
1960s. The smaller companies are then forced to compete essentially
by offering a less expensive machine than the large company, and are
thus more cost conscious than the large company.
The second factor that affects a company's level of vertical
integration is the technology used to produce computers, particularly
the degree of automation. When manufacture is done mainly by hand,
production tends to occur in-house. Outside vendors cannot produce
the product significantly cheaper as the primary costs are wages and
not capital equipment. In addition, some of the production that is
done by hand is in the developmental stages and thus needs to be
manufactured in-house in close proximity to the research personnel.
When production is automated, though not completely so, as it is
today, it is cheaper to purchase from outside vendors, unless the
company is large and can realize the economies of scale discussed
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above.
In the future, when design as well as production is more automated
than today, smaller companies may begin to produce more in-house.
Computer-aided design (CAD) machines and machines with artificial
intelligence will reduce the costs of developing and manufacturing
products. Thus even though the machines are costly, savings in design
and production costs will shift the balance in favor of in-house
manufacture.
The final factor affecting the degree of vertical integration is
the complexity of the product. Research and design costs are what
make a strategy of vertical integration expensive. These costs are
related to the complexity of the product. Mainframe computers are
more complex than mini and personal computers, and thus the research
and design costs of mainframe comptuers are the highest. Even the
peripheral equipment used by mainframe computers is more complex to
design than that used by smaller machines. For example, the disks
used in mainframe systems are about 4 times as dense as those used by
mini systems. It is more complex and thus more costly to design and
produce the denser disks. Essentially, it costs less to design a
minicomputer than a mainframe machine. As a result, the minicomputer
manufacturers can afford to produce more in-house than can most
mainframe manufacturers (except the largest manufacturers, as
discussed above).
In my sample of computer companies, there are four distinct types
of firms with different degrees of vertical integration. Because
companies are different sizes and produce different types of products,
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different strategies of vertical integration are the most cost
effective. IBM is a large, highly vertically integrated company
today, and will probably remain so in the future. IBM's volumes are
high and the company realizes economies of scale in production so that
being highly vertically integrated is most cost effective. The other
mainframe companies, Sperry, NCR, Honeywell, and Burroughs, were
vertically integrated in the past, but are much less vertically
integrated today due to changes in their market power. The large
minicomputer manufacturers, DEC, Data General, and Hewlett Packard,
are quite vertically integrated today due to the nature of their
products and their high volumes. There is some suggestion that this
may change in the future. Finally, there are the small companies,
Prime and Amdahl, that have never found it cost effective to be
vertically integrated.
IBM. IBM is a highly vertically integrated firm. The company
makes practically all its computers and all its own peripheral
devices. It supplies most of its semiconductor needs within the
company, having made $1.6 billion worth of semiconductors in 1983.3
It does purchase standard, easily made electronic components from
other companies. The company's emphasis on vertical integration began
in the mid-1960s when IBM began manufacturing what became the most
popular series of computers, the 360 line. Prior to the 360 series,
IBM had been a leading purchaser of electronic parts.
IBM's personal computer line, introduced in 1981, is a notable
exception to the above statement. Currently, IBM only assembles and
tests its personal computer (PC). This lack of vertical integration
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is related to the history and development of the PC. IBM was
relatively late in developing a personal computer product and felt the
need to produce a superior machine in a short period of time. IBM
gave responsibility for developing the computer to one of its
Independent Business Units (IBU). The IBUs, which are small groups of
people working on a new product, operate somewhat independently, in an
effort to foster entreprenurial activity. The mission of the PC group
was to develop a cost competitive product, in any way it could. The
group shopped around for the best components it could find, which
often were not made by IBM. In fact, 90 percent of the PC is made by
other companies. Even the microprocessor, the heart of the computer,
is made by another company, Intel. (IBM currently owns 26 percent of
Intel, but did not in 1981 when the PC was released.) The PCjr, a
smaller version of the PC, never even sees the inside of an IBM.
plant.5 Revenues from PC sales represented about 10 percent of IBM's
$47 billion revenues in 1984, so the volume of products outsourced is
substantial.
There are several indications that IBM intends to remain highly
vertically integrated. First, IBM has plans to begin making more of
the PC itself. IBM would like to expand its existing plant in Mexico
to become a major manufacturing facility for personal computers,
though IBM and the Mexican government have been unable to reach an
agreement concerning the expansion plans.6 Second, IBM
representatives indicated that the company has no intention of
decreasing its degree of vertical integration in the manufacture of
other products. In fact, some products are becoming more
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IBM-manufactured. The increasing importance of software in computers
will keep the 'manufacture' in-house, due to the proprietary nature of
software. Finally, IBM's recent acquisition of Rolm, the
communications company, extends IBM's product line in a new direction,
indicating a continuing interest in expanding its markets and
products. Prior to acquiring Rolm, IBM had purchased 23 percent of
the company's stock, in an effort to gain expertise and have greater
access to communications equipment. This type of "partnership"
agreement could have been taken as an indication that IBM was not
planning to extend its degree of vertical integration. However, the
acquisition makes it clear that IBM has no intention of altering its
strategy with respect to vertical integration.
For IBM, being highly vertically integrated is the most cost
effective strategy of production. IBM sells tremendous volumes of
products and as a result can realize significant economies of scale in
production. The large volumes permit IBM's manufacture to be highly
automated and the company is an industry leader in the use of
robotics.
Prior to the mid-1960s, IBM purchased many components for its
computers. The change in strategy occurred because IBM's comptuer
sales increased significantly with the introduction of its 360 series
in the mid-1960s. Being vertically integrated became the most cost
effective strategy.
Other Mainframe Manufacturers. Honeywell, NCR, Burroughs, and
Sperry are all less vertically integrated than IBM. No two companies
have pursued exactly the same strategy with respect to vertical
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integration, though the patterns are similar. The companies
manufacture some, though not all the computers they market. For
example, NCR and Burroughs purchase their office automation
workstations. Honeywell markets a large computer manufactured by NEC.
All companies purchase at least some of the peripheral products that
they market with their computers.
Burroughs, Sperry, NCR, and Honeywell all design the proprietary
logic circuits that are the heart of the computer. However, they
pursue different strategies in manufacturing these integrated
circuits. Burroughs is the only company that doesn't manufacture its
proprietary circuits. Burroughs currently has technological
agreements with several companies, including Intel and Motorola.
These agreements give Burroughs the rights to certain processes so the
company can do some development work, mostly relating to chip and
packaging technologies. Burroughs buys most of its chips from these
semiconductor companies.
NCR and Honeywell not only manufacture their own proprietary logic
chips, but also sell semiconductors to other companies. NCR began
manufacturing semiconductors in 1971, but didn't begin selling them
outside the company until 1981. Honeywell has had an in-house
division involved in the research and manufacture of semiconductors
since 1965.7 In addition, Honeywell bought Synertek, a semiconductor
company in 1978. The purchase of Synertek made Honeywell the owner of
one of the largest wholly-held semiconductor operations.8 Honeywell
considers Synertek's ability to sell outside the company a good test
of the quality of its semiconductors.
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These four mainframe companies all fabricate some of their own
circuit boards and buy others, generally the more technically simple
ones. Assembling the integrated circuits onto the circuit boards is
all done in-house. Circuit boards are then assembled into final
products.
Sperry, Honeywell, NCR, and Burroughs are all less vertically
integrated today than they were in the past. These companies were
able to be quite vertically integrated in the past because most of
their past business was in markets in which they had a large share of
the market. NCR had a virtual monopoly in the cash register market
and Burroughs was a dominant force in the adding machine market.
Sperry (through its acquisition of Remington Rand) was a major
typewriter manufacturer before becoming involved in computers.
Honeywell was a large maker of electrical and electronic products and
was a powerful force in the computer industry in the late 1950s.
Because they sold large volumes, it was cost effective for these
companies to be vertically integrated as they could realize economies
of scale in producing in-house. Thus, these companies had a history
of being highly vertically integrated.
The competitive situation changed for these companies in the late
1960s. Representatives at NCR and Burroughs admitted that their
companies were slow to respond to the changed market, so that it was
not until around the mid-1970s that they altered their strategy with
respect to vertical integration. Essentially, these companies had a
much smaller share of the computer market than they had of their old
markets. IBM had four times the installed base of mainframe computers
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than did Honeywell and 10 times more than Sperry, Burroughs, and NCR
in 1982 (Table 2.1). In addition, IBM because of its size, set the
standard for the industry, and the other mainframe companies had to
compete essentially by offering a lower priced machine, and thus
keeping production costs low became very important. As a result,
being highly vertically integrated was not the least cost way for them
to produce computers. All production decisions are now "make vs. buy"
decisions, meaning that the company evaluates all components and
products as to whether it is cheaper to manufacture them in-house or
to purchase them from other companies, and how the manufacture of a
given product fits into their overall market strategy. Most companies
expect to continue purchasing more components in the future.
Sperry remained committed to a strategy of vertical integration
longer than the other mainframe companies, and remains somewhat more
vertically integrated today. As late as the mid-1970s, Sperry
stressed the importance of vertical integration and increased the
in-house manufacture of components during this period. For example,
the company was fabricating its own metal cabinets in 1976, a job that
had previously been subcontracted out.
Sperry has chosen, unlike Burroughs and NCR, to make its own
office automation workstation. There are several reasons for this.
Sperry was later than the other mainframe companies in entering the
office automation market and were under considerable pressure to do
so. The product that Sperry eventually marketed was more advanced
than most being marketed at the time. Sperry argues that its
internally designed and produced equipment is more profitable than
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purchased products, and that the workstations have the highest profit
margins of the small system's components. Sperry does buy printers
and disks for its workstation from other companies. Sperry's strategy
may well be the least cost way of manufacturing its office automation
products. However, the strategy also reflects choices that Sperry has
made in allocating its scarce resources. Other companies do not
necessarily make the same choices. Since these companies can't
manufacture everything themselves, they have to decide in which
products to invest their research and development dollars, as this is
the limiting factor.
The changes in the degree of vertical integration were abrupt and
dramatic at NCR. The company's business, beginning the in the late
1800s, was in cash registers, a market in which the company had a
virtual monopoly. The company was totally vertically integrated.
They had their own wells, post office, and power plant (which sold
power to the city of Dayton at times). The company had the largest
screw machine facility under one roof in the U.S. They made their own
non-standard screws, so that no one else could service their machines.
Because the company had almost the entire cash register market, it
could afford to be vertically integrated and this was the most
profitable strategy for NCR.
Today, NCR's position is very different. It now wants to make
industry standard products. Vertical integration is no longer the
least cost strategy. They buy many components, when vendors' skills
10
and costs satisfy their standards.
The change at NCR began in the early 1970s when the company made a
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full-scale transition from mechanical cash registers to electronic
products. NCR had been making computers since 1953, when it bought
the Computer Research Corporation. However, its general philosophy
and mode of operating was based in the mechanical era, when it had
monopoly power. In the early 1970s, the competitive situation in the
computer industry forced NCR to alter its manufacturing strategy.
Large Minicomputer Manufacturers. DEC, Data General, and Hewlett
Packard, the large minicomputer companies in my sample all have a high
degree of vertical integration in production. DEC considers itself a
"make" company, meaning that it makes most of what it needs. Data
General manufactures approximately 80 percent of the products it
sells, making the company highly vertically integrated.1 Hewlett
Packard also manufactures most of the products it sells.
The minicomputer companies design and manufacture all their CPUs
and most of their peripherals. They design and fabricate their custom
integrated circuits, and buy all others. The companies fabricate some
of the circuit boards they use, particularly the high technology ones.
All assembly of circuit boards and final assembly of products is done
in-house.
DEC increased its degree of vertical integration during the 1970s.
The company was able to satisfy most of its core memory needs
internally by 1973.12 The company began to manufacture printers and
video terminals in 1974, and established a semiconductor facility in
1976.13 DEC began manufacturing a broad range of mass storage
products in the late 1970s.
Data General, the youngest of the three minicomputer companies,
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has always stressed the importance of vertical integration. In 1975,
President Edson de Castro claimed that vertical integration was the
key to survival in the minicomputer industry. According to him, the
small computer business would go to the fully integrated companies
because this was the only way to keep product costs down.14 Data
General became the first minicomputer maker to manufacture integrated
circuits, in 1973.
There are two reasons that being highly vertically integrated is
the least cost strategy for these minicomputer makers. First, they
sell large volumes of computers and thus can realize economies of
scale in production. At the end of 1982, DEC had an installed base of
424,000 minicomputers, Data General had 118,000 and Hewlett Packard
had 78,000 (Table 2.2). IBM, which had by far the largest installed
base of mainframe computers, had 66,000 installed (Table 2.1).
Minicomputers being less expensive than mainframes are sold in rquch
larger volumes.
The second reason the minicomputers remain vertically integrated
is that their systems are much less complex than mainframe systems.
Research and development costs of the CPUs and the peripherals are
much lower for minicomputers and thus companies can afford to produce
more products in-house than if the systems were more complex.
There are some indications that the minicomputer companies may be
forced to become less vertically integrated in the future. An
industry analyst, at Burroughs, speculated that some of DEC's
troubles, as evidenced by its earnings decline and the drop in its
stock in the summer of 1983, arose because its production costs were
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too high. In the future, one way to cut costs may be to outsource
more components.
A second, though related trend that may lead to less vertical
integration is that minicomputer manufacturers are beginning to
compete with one another based on their software, as opposed to their
hardware. From the customers' viewpoint, the actual machines of
different vendors are somewhat interchangeable and software is the
distinguishing characteristic. In addition, there are large economies
of scale in the production of minicomputers as they are relatively
simple products. Thus, the decrease in the relative importance of
hardware coupled with the hugh economies of scale may lead some mini
manufacturers to begin outsourding their CPUs, thus creating a
situation similar to that which occurred in the mainframe segment.
Small Companies. The other firms in my sample, Prime and Amdahl,
are not very vertically integrated.
Prime, a manufacturer of minicomputers has low volumes and a
limited product line. As a result, vertical integration is not a cost
effective strategy. Initially, Prime did not have the financial
resources to vertically integrate production. Later, the company
chose not to integrate. Prime feels it can buy anything cheaper than
it could make it. The vendors do all the research and development
work, and make the capital investments. Prime can easily switch to a
new product and vendor when the technology changes.
Amdahl manufactures mainframes that are plug-compatible with IBM
machines. The cost of being vertically integrated is prohibitivly
high for Amdahl essentially because research and developments costs
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for their product are very expensive. Amdahl concentrates most of its
activity on engineering, development, marketing, and service. Amdahl
is a much smaller company than the other mainframe manufacturers,
discussed above, selling only about 200 machines a year. The company
only produced one product, large CPUs, until two years ago, and
computers still represent 80-90 percent of its business. Amdahl now
also makes a communications processor and strorage products that
complement their CPUs.15
There are some indications that the degree of vertical integration
in production may decrease in all but the largest companies in coming
years. Companies are facing two conflicting pressures. One,
technological change is occurring at a rapid pace in the industry. It
is difficult for most companies to keep up with all the developments
in semiconductors, computers, and communications equipment. The
second pressure comes from the market, where users are demanding
complete solutions to all their data and word processing needs. Thus,
companies are forced to provide more products, but it is becoming
increasingly more difficult to do this, within one company. IBM and
possibly AT&T will be notable exceptions to this statement.
One way for companies to deal with these pressures is to buy
ready-made products from other companies, and thus we may see
decreasing vertical integration. Another solution involves entering
various types of alliances or "strategic partnerships." For example,
some computer companies are taking equity positions in related
companies. IBM'S recent stock purchase in Intel, the semiconductor
manufacturer, is an important example. NCR owns part of a
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communications company, Ztel, to give it expertise in the
communications field. Honeywell, NCR, Sperry, and several other
companies jointly own Magnetic Peripherals Inc., a company
manufacturing disk and tape drives.
Companies are pooling resources for research and development of
new technologies. A number of companies, including Honeywell, DEC,
and Sperry have invested money in Trilogy Systems, which is developing
a new semiconductor technology called "wafer scale integration" that
will increase the power of integrated circuits and potentially will
enable computers to be smaller, faster, and cheaper than machines
currently produced. Computer companies are also entering into
technology development, exchange, and liscensing agreements with other
companies. They are forming joint ventures and joint product
development agreements.16
According to one article, these types of cooperative arrangements
are increasing and argues that this is a positive sign. The U.S. high
tech industry has pursued what it calls a self-centered strategy of
vertical integration, a strategy which has often been self-defeating.
An "enlightened policy of cooperation" is necessary for success in the
increasingly competitive industry, and particularly in the competition
against the Japanese. Japanese government and industry have worked
together for a long time and are involved in centrally planning and
coordinating high technology research and production.17
Computer companies will need to hire relatively less manufacturing
labor, the more components and products that they purchase from other
companies. They will need to hire relatively more engineers and other
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professionals to evaluate and make decisions about the products they
purchase, and to make decisions concerning which vendors will supply
the products.
This analysis raises a question about what the occupational
distribution in the industry as a whole is like and how it has changed
over time. The issue is essentially how capital vs. labor intensive
are the operations of the vendors who supply components to computer
manufacturing companies. Without further research it is impossible to
have a definitive answer to this question. Vendors' operation may be
capital-intensive since by selling large volumes they will be able to
realize economies of scale in production that the computer companies
could not and could thus afford highly automated equipment. Some
operations could also be labor-intensive, particularly if production
occurs off-shore in low wage countries.
Automation
The design and manufacture of computers is highly automated today,
though the process is not identical in all companies and in all
plants. Products are now being designed in ways that allow automated
assembly. Companies expect the degree of automation to increase
substantially in the future.
Computers are now being used to aid in designing computer systems,
particularly in designing integrated circuits and circuit boards.
Computer-aided design (CAD) can significantly reduce the design costs.
For example, in the early 1980s, Prime reported that using computers
reduced the time involved in designing circuit boards by 90 percent.18
IBM also reported significant savings from using computer based
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systems to design integrated circuits.
In the future, with the advent of "expert systems," the design and
production of semiconductors, for example, will be much more automated
than today. Expert systems, which are a type of artificial
intelligence system, will allow an electrical engineer to specify the
functions the chip needs to perform and the system will output the
mask or design used in manufacturing the chip.
Computers are essentially printed circuit boards in cabinets.
Thus, the bulk of the manufacturing process consists of fabricating
and assembling the boards. Cabinets, frames, and wiring also have to
be produced, though as described in the previous section, most
companies buy ready-made cabinets and frames today. After the circuit
boards are manufactured, they have to be assembled into the central
processor (CPU) or peripherals and the complete system has to be
assembled.
Fabricating and assembling printed circuit boards is a highly
automated process. Circuit boards begin as copper plates. Machines
are used to drill the holes into which the integrated circuits fit.
Then, the design of the circuit board is photographed onto the copper
board. The final step in the fabrication process is electroplating
the board, which involves dipping it into a number of chemical and
metal solutions.
Assembly of the circit boards involves inserting the various types
of semiconductors into the holes on the board. This step is also
quite automated today. The first step is generally to put the
different semiconductors onto a tape in a specified order. This is
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done by a machine that can be programmed to put the circuits on in the
order required for any type of circuit board. The operator corrects
errors when, for example, the machine misses a component. This tape
of components is then put into another machine that will insert the
circuits onto the printed boards. Operation of this machine is fairly
simple.
The components are soldered to the board to complete the
connections. This is done automatically, with the boards run on an
assembly line over a machine that solders all the connections.
Basic assembly is highly automated in most of the companies in my
sample. Honeywell estimates that 95 percent of its integrated circuit
insertion is done by machine. NCR's assembly is also about 95 percent
automated. One plant manager at NCR estimated that if the assembly
were done by hand, it would require six floors of production space,
compared to less than 1 floor today. Data General estimates that
60-65 percent of its boards have 80-85 percent of their components
inserted automatically. The degree of automatic insertion depends on
the type of circuit board. Memory boards, for example, are 100
percent automated at Data General. Some components, like power
supplies, are shaped such that they can't be fed into a machine. A
Burroughs representative estimated that the assembly and test of
circuit boards was 80-90 percent automated and said this is not at all
unusual for the industry.
Circuit boards undergo two types of test. The first determines
whether there are any short circuits or bad connections on the
individual boards. The second test analyzes whether the board
146
performs the functions it should. Most testing is now automated
because the boards are so complex. Many boards are multi-layered,
making visual inspection impossible since one can't see all the
connections. Technicians are required to figure out exactly what is
wrong with the board when a test procedure uncovers an error, and to
correct the error.
The flow of materials is automated to some degree in most plants.
This can mean, for example, automatic retrieval of parts from a
central storage area as occurs at Data General and Hewlett Packard.
Some plants have automated the flow of products from one workstation
to another. This type of automation will increase in the future. IBM
expects that automating the product flow in one of its plants will
increase productivity by 30 percent over the next 5 years.20
Inventory is also generally controlled by computer these days.
The degree of automation in production varies by company, and from
plant to plant within a company. Automated equipment is expensive and
the investment must yield a reasonable return to make it cost
effective. Two factors, the volume of production and the cost of
labor the machine replaces, are most important in determining whether
the investment is cost effective.
High volumes of production are necessary to make an investment in
automated equipment worthwhile. One reason that IBM is a leader in
the use of robotics in manufacturing is that it produces large volumes
and can thus spread the costs of capital equipment over many units.
The company has spent $11 billion over the last 5 years on automated
plants and a wide range of automated equipment, including robots.
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IBM's semiconductor facility in Vermont has $400 million worth of
computer equipment used to aid in the production of chips. Burroughs
discovered that it wasn't cost effective for them to have a highly
automated circuit board fabrication facility. They built such a plant
in California, designed to turn out large volumes of each kind of
circuit board. However, computers have a large number of many
different kinds of circuit boards. As a result, it wasn't cost
effective to use such a highly automated plant and the plant was
underutilized and unprofitable. Burroughs eventually closed the
facility and now fabricates boards in a smaller, less automated plant.
Honeywell's European plants are less automated than its U.S. plants
because the volume of production is Europe is lower. As volumes
increase, Honeywell plans to automate the European plants.
Plants located in areas such as the Caribbean and Asia, where
labor is quite inexpensive, are often less automated than their U.S.
counterparts. For example, Honeywell has a plant in Haiti that
manufactures most of the cables used in its computers. The company's
plant in Lawrence, Massachusetts also makes some cables. The process
in Lawrence is much more automated than in Haiti, even though volumes
in the U.S. are much lower. Data General has a plant in the
Philippines that assembles printed circuit boards that are the power
supplies for their computers. All insertion is now done by hand.
Some of the components used in power supplies are tower-like
structures and as a result cannot be assembled by machine. However,
the labor is so cheap that it doesn't pay to automate the production
of power supplies at all. Data General's circuit board assembly in
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Hong Kong is currently not very automated, though the company plans to
fully automate the plant in the next several years. Labor rates in
Hong Kong, which used to be very cheap, have risen to the point that
automation is now cost effective.
Production was not always as automated as it is today. Core
memory, which was used prior to the introduction of semiconductor
memory had to be wired together by hand and required large quantities
of unskilled assembly workers. The insertion of integrated circuits
onto boards was done by hand in the late 1960s and early 1970s. DEC
did some automatic testing of components in the mid-1960s, though not
nearly as much as today.21 DEC also used numerically controlled
devices for machining certain electromechanical peripheral devices in
the late 1960s.22 The sample companies that were formed prior to
1960, IBM, NCR, Honeywell, Burroughs, and DEC, all emphasized that
they experienced substantial changes in the manufacturing process due
to automation around the mid-1970s. Honeywell specifically mentioned
they installed a substantial amount of automated quipment within the
last 5 years. Part of NCR's transition from electromechanical to
electronic products, beginning in the mid-1970s, involved installing
automated equipment.
Companies formed in the 1970s, Prime, Data General and Amdahl,
didn't experience changes as radical in their manufacturing process as
did the older companies. However, all companies expect substantial
changes in the future.
Finally, Apple's new Macintosh manufacturing plant provides an
example of what the future may hold. The plant has received much
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publicity and is described as the "premier automated micro computer
factory." The factory, which cost $20 million, was built from
scratch, so there was no previous structure or equipment to influence
the design of the facility. The automated equipment in the plant
includes an automatic guidance vehicle system that delivers components
such as keyboards and circuit boards to different stations in the
plant. Circuit board assembly is highly automated, and machines
automatically put the boards on an assembly line that moves them to
the circuit insertion machines. At this plant it takes 26 minutes to
assemble an entire machine. One computer rolls off the line every 27
seconds. And, the entire factory only employs 68 people. Despite the
high degree of automation, one of the factory's engineers predicts the
23
plant will be obsolete in a couple of years.
Assembly Line Techniques and Increasing the Division of Labor
Computer plants don't look like automobile manufacturing plants.
However, computer companies have applied some assembly line techniques
to production and have increased the division of labor to separate the
manufacturing process into discreet tasks in order to an increase
productivity. Assembly line techniques in manufacturing are not new,
unlike the use of automated equipment discussed above.
DEC claims that its PDP-8 computer was the first computer to be
put together on an assembly line--in 1964.24 Cabinets and
subassemblies were put onto a line at a predetermined rate. The
assembly was completed and forwarded to the check out.25 IBM's 360
line, which was introduced in 1965, was produced using assembly line
techniques, though production did not employ much automated
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equipment.
There are numerous examples of how companies have worked to
increase the division of labor and how assembly line techniques are
used today. For example, in NCR's financial terminal manufacturing
plant, the final assembly is done by one of two methods, depending on
the product. One method is to have one person assemble the entire
product. The other involves having several people assemble the
product, each doing one piece of the assembly. The goal is to
minimize the number of tasks that each person is required to do.
Thus, products that don't require much labor are assembled by one
person. The more complex products are assembled using assembly line
techniques.
Honeywell's facility to fabricate and assemble printed circuit
boards is a good example of how the manufacture of circuit boards has
been separated into discreet tasks. For example, one person runs the
machine that photographs the board design onto the copper plate,
another runs a component insertion machine, and yet another repairs
boards with errors. The tasks that any one person performs are as
limited as possible.
An executive at Burroughs stressed the importance of getting the
production into a good process flow, managed by their own computer
technology. Automation is important, but there is much that can be
done to improve efficiency even without automated equipment.
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Labor Force
The changes in the manufacturing process, discussed above, have
significantly affected the labor required by the industry. Overall,
the industry now needs more engineers, fewer skilled technical
workers, and more unskilled assembly workers, than a decade ago.
However, the mix of labor does vary from plant to plant. This section
discusses these changes in detail.
Two different sources of data provide information on this subject.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes a matrix of the
occupational distribution within different industries. Data are
available for 1970 and 1980 so we can examine how the occupational
requirements in the computer industry changed during the 1970s. The
computer companies I studied also provided information on their labor
requirements and how these changed over time.
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BLS Occupational Distribution
The BLS has produced industry-occupation matrices for 1970 and
1980 that show the occupational composition of various industries.
Table 4.1 presents this information for the occupations that are
significant in the computer and office machines industries.
Essentially, all detailed occupations that represented at least 1
percent of total industry employment are included. The table also
provides the 1970 occupational distribution across all manufacturing
industries, as a basis for comparison. (See Appendix for more detail
on the surveys.)
The 1970 and 1980 information come from two different surveys.
Table 4.1
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1970 AND 1980
Electronic
Computing Office, Computing &
All Equipment Accounting Machines
Occupation Manufacturing (SIC 3573) (SIC 357)
1970 1970 1970a 1980
Professional, Technical & Related.
Engineers
Electrical
Industrial
Mechanical
Others
Engineering & Science Technicians
Drafters
Electrical & Electronic Technicians
Others
Computer Specialists
Programmers
Systems Analysts
Others
All Other Professional, Technical
& Related
Managers, Officials & Proprietors
Sales Workers
9.44
3.05
.80
.56
.66
1.03
2.21
.69
.43
1.09
.50
.31
.17
-03
3.68
6.04
2.40
37.61
10.30
4.73
1.58
1.92
2.08
7.20
1.41
3.78
2.02
11.44
6.19
4.53
.72
8.66
9.56
2.53
30.89
8.62
3.72
1.41
1.74
1.76
5.99
1.30
2.96
1.74
8.57
4.64
3.40
.53
7.70
34.90 b
11.88
6.00
2.55
1.08
2.25
8.79
.81
5.99
1.98
6.52
5.03
1.48
NA
7.71
8.90
3.22 1.14
Table 4.1 (continued)
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1970 AND 1980
Electronic
Computing Office, Computing &
All Equipment Accounting Machines
Occupation Manufacturing (SIC 3573) (SIC 357)
1970 1970 1970 1980
Clerical 12.27 17.45 17.76 18.35
Secretaries 2.59 5.62 5.25 3.52
Stenographers & Typists .98 .98 1.20 .71
General Clerks, Office NA NA NA 2.31
Bookkeepers & Accounting Clerks 1.32 .96 1.10 1.16
Office Machine Operators .88 2.80 2.59 1.83
Computer & Peripheral Equipment .23 1.70 1.37 1.19
Keypunch/Data Entry .42 .87 .87 .34
Others .23 .23 .35 .30
All Other Clerical 7.82 7.10 7.62 8.82
Crafts and Kindred 19.49 10.45 13.43 5.22
Metal Working 4.94 2.02 2.95 1.04
Machinists 1.88 .98 1.09 .28d
Others 3.06 1.04 1.86 .76
Table 4.1 (continued)
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1970 AND 1980
Electronic
Computing Office, Computing &
All Equipment Accounting Machines
Occupation Manufacturing (SIC 3573) (SIC 357)
1970 1970 1970a 1980
Crafts and Kindred (continued)
Mechanics, Repairers & Installers 3.58
Data Processing Machine Repairersc .06
Others 3.52
Blue-Collar Worker Supervisors 3.97
All Other Crafts and Kindred 7.00
Operatives 42.97
Assemblers 4.67
Semi-Skilled Packing & Inspecting 6.26
Checkers & Examiners 3.51
Others 2.75
Semi-Skilled Metalworking 5.84
All Other Operatives 26.20
Service Workers & Laborers 7.40
Actual Number of Workers 19,635,900
4.82
3.56
1.26
2.48
1.13
20.46
9.43
4.54
4.23
.31
2.70
3.79
1.95
187,900
6.75
2.80
3.95
2.54
1.19
23.52
10.04
4.81
4.33
.49
3.93
4.74
2.30
278,800
1.71
.40d
1.27
1.62
.85 e
25.23
16.48
4.51
4.30
.21
1.96
2.28
3.30
489,699
Table 4.1 (continued)
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1970 AND 1980
Notes: a. Calculated as a weighted average of Office, Accounting Machines (357 except
3573) and Electronic Computing Equipment (3573), using total national employ-
ment (Table 4 in Bulletin 2086) as the weights.
The following adjustments made 1970 and 1980 more comparable:
b. Purchasing Agents moved from Professional & Technical to Managers.
c. Called Computer Service Technicians in 1980.
d. Millwrights moved from Mechanics to Metalworking.
e. Inspectors and Testers, included with Other Crafts and Kindred, moved to
Checkers and Examiners.
Sources: 1970: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The National
Industry - Occupation Matrix, 1970, 1978, and Projected 1990, Bulletin 2086, April 1981,
Table 1.
1980: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The National Industry -
Occupation Matrix, 1982, Projected 1995, unpublished computer printout.
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The 1970 information is based on 1970 Census data, which is then
adjusted by the BLS. The 1980 data come from the 1980 Occupational
Employment Survey (OES) conducted by the BLS.28 There are two
differences between these surveys which have to be noted because they
affect the comparability of the data, as is evident in the discussion
below. The first difference is that the BLS surveys establishments to
obtain information and the Census information is based on individuals
reporting their own occupations. Presumably, the BLS reports on
occupations are more accurate than the Census reports. The second
major difference between the surveys is that the BLS collects
information on fewer occupations than does the Census. In each
(3-digit) industry, the BLS collects information on 200 detailed
occupational titles, including residual categories. All jobs in the
industry are constrained to fit into one of these occupations. The
Census classification has over 400 occupational titles. As a result
of this difference, the BLS has larger residual categories than does
the Census.
The 1970 data are available for electronic computing equipment
(SIC 3573) as well as for the broader office, computing, and
accounting machines sector (SIC 357). However, the 1980 information
is only available for the broader category. Electronic computing
equipment represents the majority of this category, 67 percent in 1970
and 82 percent in 1980. The occupational distributions in the
detailed and broad industry groups are somewhat different, though not
dramatically so. It is not difficult to figure out what the detailed
distribution would look like in 1980, if the information were
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available. In any case, my comparisons between 1970 and 1980 will
have to be at the 3-digit level (SIC 357).
Table 4.1 shows that almost 40 percent of the employees in the
computer industry were professional and technical workers in 1970.
Approximately 10 percent were engineers, 7 percent were technicians,
11 percent were computer specialists, and the rest were in a residual
category. These figures are considerably higher than those for all
manufacturing industries, where only 9 percent of the workforce were
professionals.
The other substantial difference between the computer industry and
all manufacturing industries is that only about 20 percent of the
workers in the computer industry were operatives compared to 43
percent for all manufacturing. However, it is interesting to note
that the computer industry does employ proportionally more assemblers
than do all manufacturing industries, 9.4 percent vs. 4.7 percent,
respectively in 1970. The computer industry employs a slightly higher
proportion of managers and clerical workers and a slightly lower
proportion of crafts workers than do all manufacturing industries.
There were four significant changes in the occupational
distribution of the office, computing, and accounting machines
industry between 1970 and 1980. The first is the growth in the
proportion of engineers. Engineers were 8.6 percent of the total (SIC
357) in 1970 and 11.9 percent in 1980, a growth of over 3 percentage
points. If information were available for just the computer industry
segment, the proportion of engineers would be even higher in 1980 as
there are relatively more engineers employed in the computer industry
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than in other segments of the office machines industry. However, the
growth in the percent between 1970 and 1980 would not be any greater
than observed for SIC 357. The second shift is the relative growth in
the number of technicians, which increased from approximately 6 to 9
percent of the workforce.
The third important change during the 1970s was in the growth of
assembly-machine operatives, from 10 percent of the workforce to 16.5
percent. The increasing use of automated equipment is undoubtedly
responsible for most of this change. Finally, the proportion of metal
workers decreased from 3 percent to 1 percent. The decreasing
vertical integration reported by many computer companies, such as
buying instead of manufacturing frames and cabinets, accounts for some
of this change.
There are some differences between the 1970 and 1980 figures which
are probably spurious. The table shows that the number of computer
specialists decreased between 1970 and 1980. It is difficult to
imagine that this is a real change. It probably results from
differences in the classification of certain job descriptions in the
two years. The observed decline in the percent of sales workers and
the percent of mechanics is also spurious and is probably due to an
error by the BLS. Because sales and service workers in computer
companies are often located in offices that are physically separated
from the headquarters or the manufacturing plant, some of these
workers were misclassified by the BLS into a wholesale trade industry
(SIC 508) when they should have been classified in the office machines
industry. (See Appendix for a discussion of some other, less
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important spurious differences.)
Computer Firms
The data from the ten computer companies I studied support the
results from the BLS surveys. The interviews I conducted in the
companies provide more detail concerning the extent of the changes.
Engineers. Many of the changes in the computer industry,
discussed at the beginning of the chapter, increased the demand for
engineers. The increasing importance of software, the extraordinary
advances in semiconductor technology, and the increasingly rapid
introduction of new products, increased the need for electrical,
chemical, software, and development engineers in the late 1970s. This
trend is expected to continue into the future. Data Resources, Inc.
estimates that the demand for engineers in the semiconductor and
electronics industries will increase by 60 percent between 1980 and
1993, from 35,000 to 56,000.29
Representatives from the companies in my study all emphasized the
importance of engineers. Engineers are now the dominant employment
category at IBM. Engineers make up one-third of the workforce in all
Hewlett Packard manufacturing plants. Sperry reported that 44 percent
of its total workforce were professionals in 1980. This includes more
than just engineers, but still shows the relative importance of highly
skilled workers. Honeywell reported that 30 percent of the personnel
in its circuit board fabrication and assembly plant were
professionals, a relatively high figure given that circuit board
operations are more labor-intensive than other aspects of computer
manufacturing.30
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Some companies, like Prime and Amdahl, due to the nature of their
products and the fact that they were started in the 1970s, haven't
experienced an increased demand for engineers. Demand has always been
high. However, most other computer companies increased their demand
for engineers substantially in the 1970s. Burroughs, Honeywell, and
Data General all noted that they now employ more engineers relative to
production workers than they did in the past. Engineers have been the
most critical component for DEC since the late 1970s. The company
expects to use more engineers in all plants in the future, replacing
technicians. The number of engineers will also increase as software
becomes more important.
NCR experienced particularly dramatic changes in the demand for
engineers when it made the transition from electromechanical to
electronic products in the early 1970s. The ratio of manufacturing to
engineering personnel was 96 to 4 prior to the 1970s. Today, equal
numbers are employed in manufacturing and engineering.
Manufacturing Labor. There is not much labor involved in
manufacturing computers today. Relatively more labor was used in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, though it was still not the most important
component. We have to go back to the era of electromechanical
accounting and tabulating machines to find direct labor an important
component of costs.
One way to analyze the importance of direct labor in manufacturing
is to examine the material-labor-burden (MLB). The MLB takes
manufacturing costs and breaks them down into the percent spent on
materials, direct labor, and overhead (which includes indirect labor,
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such as plant supervisors and manufacturing engineers as well as
general overhead expenses such as fringe benefits and costs of power).
These manufacturing costs include only those costs directly related to
manufacturing. They are not the full cost of the plant's activities
because they exclude, for example, administrative and new product
development expenses.
Table 4.2 presents the MLB information for those companies for
which it is available. The data, which come from the interviews I
conducted, show that direct labor expenses are less than 10 percent of
manufacturing costs today. IBM and NCR report the lowest direct labor
expenses, only 5 percent. Burroughs extended the analysis further,
noting that direct labor costs only represent 1-4 percent of the costs
of goods sold, including the mark-up over production costs. The
company is striving to get direct labor as close to zero as possible.
The table shows that direct labor costs were about twice as high
in the early 1970s as they are today. Even then, however, they were
still only 15-20 percent of product costs.
Both Burroughs and NCR report dramatic differences in labor costs
comparing today's electronic products and the electromechanical
business machine products of the 1950s and 1960s. The old products
were much more labor-intensive, with labor representing 20-30 percent
of product costs.
Another way of examining the declining importance of direct
manufacturing labor is to examine the relative amounts of direct and
indirect labor used in manufacturing. Table 4.3 presents this
information for IBM and DEC. Both companies have experienced a
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Table 4.2
DECOMPOSITION OF MANUFACTURING COSTS INTO PERCENT
ATTRIBUTABLE TO MATERIALS, DIRECT LABOR, AND
OVERHEAD: SELECTED COMPUTER COMPANIESa
Late 1960s- Prior to 1970s
Company Today Early 1970s (mechanical products)
NCR
Materials
Direct Labor
Overhead
BURROUGHS
Direct Labor
DEC
Materials
Direct Labor
Overhead
Indirect Labor
Other
70%
7%
50%
8-10
40
14% 20-30%
50%
15-20
30
IBM
Direct Labor
PRIMEb
Materials
Other
Direct Labor
5% or Less
85%
15
Less than 10
Notes: a. Compiled from company interviews.
b. Essentially no change since company founded in 1972.
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Table 4.3
RATIO OF DIRECT MANUFACTURING LABOR
TO INDIRECT MANUFACTURING LABOR
Company Today Prior to 1970s
DEC
Direct Labor
vs 2:1 4:1
Indirect Labor
IBM
Direct Labor
vs 1:1
Indirect Labor
Typewriters:
Direct Labor
vs 1:2
Indirect Labor
Semiconductors:
Direct Labor
vs 1:5
Indirect Labor
Source: Company interviews.
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decline in the amount of direct labor relative to indirect labor. DEC
employed 4 direct laborers for every indirect one in the late 1960s.
The ratio is 2 to 1 today. IBM always had a different mix of direct
and indirect workers than DEC. IBM used to have an equal number of
direct and indirect workers. Today, the ratio varies considerably by
product. IBM employs 2 indirect workers for each direct worker in
manufacturing typewriters, which are still fairly mechanical products.
Semiconductors involve less actual manufacturing, and here there are 5
indirect workers for every direct worker.
Composition of Direct Labor. Manufacturing computers requires
relatively more unskilled assembly workers and relatively fewer
skilled technicians today than in the past. Technicians essentially
built computers during the 1960s and early 1970s because the
manufacturing process was so complex. Automated assembly equipment
was introduced in the early 1970s, which required a substantial number
of unskilled workers to operate the machines. Technicians were
involved in testing and trouble shooting. The total amount of labor
required decreased as the use of automated equipment increased during
the late 1970s and early 1980 s. However, manufacturing still required
proportionaly more assembly workers and less technicians.
Table 4.4 shows the breakdown of assembly vs. technical workers
employed in manufacturing plants today. The number of unskilled
assembly workers was 2-4 times greater than the number of technicians
employed in the 6 companies for which the information is available.
The unskilled assembly workers are involved in putting the product
together, including inserting semiconductors onto printed circuit
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Table 4.4
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF UNSKILLED AND SKILLED LABOR
IN MANUFACTURING: SELECTED COMPUTER COMPANIES
Assembly/ Technicians/
Company Unskilled Skilled
(%) (%)
NCR: Financial Terminal Plant 85 15
Burroughs 66 33
Sperry: Satellite Manufacturing Plants 80 20
Honeywell: Circuit Board Fabrication 71 29
& Assembly
DEC: Keyboard Assembly 80 20
Data General: System's Integration 66 33
Source: Company interviews.
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boards, and assembling the boards into the CPUs and peripherals.
Technicians are involved in the test stage. All components,
subassemblies and final products go through numerous tests. The
technicians perform the tests and diagnose any problems that occur.
The skills and training required for assembly and technical jobs
are quite different. Assembly workers are unskilled. They don't need
a high school degree, and for example, most assemblers in Honeywell's
circuit board plant don't have one. At this same plant, because many
of the assemblers are first generation immigrants, many can't read or
write English. Other companies also report that a high school degree
is more than sufficient education for assembly work. Training occurs
on the job and only takes about one week.
Technicians all have high school degrees and some further
training, such as technical school training or a 2 year associates
degree. Some technical testing jobs require a college degree.
The career path for assemblers today is slow and rocky,
particularly for women. Assembly jobs themselves are dead end. One
reporter studying assembly work in Silicon Valley described the job
ladder as consisting of Assembler and Glorified Assembler.31 There
are two directions to move from assembler. One is to a managerial
ladder, supervising and managing production. At Honeywell, this is a
somewhat risky path as the manager ladder is a tough one. A worker
takes a pay cut when first becoming a manager. Managers can
potentially earn more than hourly workers, but this is not guaranteed
as managers do not get automatic seniority raises. As a result, many
workers choose to remain hourly assembly workers, with guaranteed pay
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increases.
The technical ladder is the other path from assembly worker. In
Silicon Valley companies, where two-thirds of the workforce are women,
relatively few women assemblers are chosen for the technical path. To
become a technician requires training, as discussed above, and most
companies give the technical training to men. The article on Silicon
Valley cites a survey that found men in technical positions outnumber
women by 3 to 1.32
The assembly and technical testing jobs remain as distinct job
ladders at many companies. It is unclear whether they have to be so
different. One executive at Honeywell argued that you could train
someone for the first stage testing jobs, which involve testing
connections on circuit boards, in just 3 days. He argued that this
should be a promotion for the hourly assembly workers. It would be
feasible and the workers would feel good about becoming technicians.
However, management has not chosen to have the promotion system work
this way.
The labor required in manufacturing was quite different in most
companies 15 years ago. Machinists and technicians made the
computers. Representatives at Honeywell reported that the average
skill level in manufacturing was much higher in the past than it is
today. DEC characterized the change in manufacturing as being a
substantial loss of technical direct labor. At NCR, the manufacturing
process also was much more complicated in the past. The assembler had
to be able to read and understand technical drawings. Notes on the
drawings indicated the changes that had to be made for different
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models of the product. The assembler also tested equipment.
Essentially, the workers were responsible for assembling and testing
the entire product, and as a result they were highly skilled.
IBM, in contrast to other companies, uses fewer assemblers today
than in the past. The difference between IBM and the other companies
probably lies in differences in the degree of automation. IBM
production is more automated today than in many other companies and as
a result little labor is required in manufacturing.
DEC predicts that the manufacturing process will require less
technicians in the future as the quality of products improves, and
there are less rejected parts. Then, fewer technicians will be needed
to diagnose and correct errors.
There have been quite significant changes in the labor demanded by
the computer manufacturing industry since the mid-1960s. Both
national data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
information from my interviews with computer company executives lead
to the same conclusion. A polarization in the labor force has
developed. Companies now employ relatively more professional
engineers and unskilled assembly workers than in the past. What has
been lost over the 20 years are the skilled, technical blue-collar
occupations.
Factors Affecting Production
There are two factors, technological change and competition, that
have caused some of the observed changes in the manufacturing process
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and thus the labor force, discussed in the previous sections. This
section discusses each of these factors, briefly. They are not the
focal point of the thesis, but they do provide insights into firms'
behavior and aid in developing the theoretical framework for location
decisions, discussed in the final chapter.
Technological Change
The computer industry is characterized by technological change.
There have been enormous changes in the technology of computers and in
the technology of manufacturing computers since they were first
introduced. Technological innovations created semiconductors and
continue to increase their power and complexity. The use of
semiconductors signalled the introduction of the third generation
computers, which were radically different f.rom the second generation
computers that used transistors. Innovations in software have led to
the use of software instead of hardware for certain tasks.
Technological innovations have made changes in the manufacturing
process possible, such as automated assembly and the use of computers
to manage the flow of products.
Technological innovations were necessary for some of the changes
in the manufacturing process to have occurred. However, technological
changes are not sufficient to explain all the observed changes. It is
even unclear whether the technological innovations were the driving
force behind the changes. Competition and changes in the nature of
competition also appear to have had substantial effects on computer
design and on the manufacturing process.
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Competition
The demands of competition have always affected computer
manufacturing to some degree. Competition primarily centered around
developing new products in the 1960s and early 1970s. Price
competition has become extremely important since the mid-1970s,
particularly among the mainframe products, though in recent years, it
has extended to other products as well.
One industry analyst at Burroughs argued that the cost of the
final product became important in the mainframe market for the first
time in the mid-1970s. Prior to this time, there was always someone
willing to buy the machines, particularly the government. As a
result, companies built machines independent of their cost
effectiveness. This changed in the mid-1970s as price became the
dominant factor affecting sales. Three factors influenced the change.
First, new buyers entered the computer market in the late 1970s.
These new buyers were small companies who realized that computer
technology would increase their efficiency, but they had limited
resources to spend on computers. These buyers were so numerous that
they could demand a price and product suited to their needs.
Second, the mid-1970s was a period of double digit interest rates.
As a result, capital spending was much tighter than before. Companies
who already had computers installed became cost conscious when
upgrading or expanding their computer systems. New buyers tended to
shop around for highest value per dollar of capital investment.
Third, competition from new U.S. companies and foreign companies,
particularly Japanese, heated up in the mid-1970s, putting enormous
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pressure on existing companies.
Honeywell and NCR both emphasized the increasing importance of
price competition over time and the resulting pressures to reduce
production costs. Honeywell experienced substantial changes beginning
in the late 1970s, when cost competition became very important. The
company had to cut prices in order to stay in business, which meant
they also had to cut manufacturing costs. Honeywell's manufacturing
strategy changed as a result of these pressures. As discussed in
detail earlier in the chapter, one major change was that the company
became less vertically integrated, evaluating all components and
products as to whether it was cheapest to make or buy them. Honeywell
also spent substantial sums automating its manufacturing equipment
beginning at this time.
NCR's transition from mechanical to electronic products in the
early to mid-1970s was fairly abrupt and differences between the two
periods are easily highlighted. NCR moved from having a virtual
monopoly in cash registers to being one of many companies in a highly
competitive environment. Prices for electronics products were
declining rapidly forcing the company to be very cost conscious.
These competitive pressures are what forced them to move away from
being highly vertically integrated.
Thus far, it has been primarily the mainframe manufacturers who
have had to make the most severe adjustments in the face of increasing
cost sensitivity and price competition. The mainframe companies were
the ones most affected by the increasing demand for smaller, more
powerful computers. It seems likely, however, that in the near future
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the minicomputer makers will have to become increasingly cost
sensitive also. One analyst argued that the plummet in DEC's stock in
the summer of 1983 was related to the fact that its costs were out of
line. He argued that the company hadn't realized it would have to
contain product costs. DEC's view of the future is indeed one where
increasing competition, from U.S. and Japanese companies, will exert
pressures to keep costs down, which will affect manufacturing and
location decisions.
There is some evidence to suggest that in the 1960s, product as
opposed to price competition affected what was produced. Robert
Sobel, studying IBM, argued that one factor that drove IBM's
introduction of the third generation 360 series was that Honeywell had
a machine more powerful (and less expensive) than the current IBM
offering. If IBM was going to maintain its market share, it had to
produce a more advanced computer. 33
Conclusions
There have been three distinct periods in the history of the
computer industry. The first period, prior to the mid-1960s, was the
birth of the computer industry, from the development of the first
computer until the beginning of the computer's widespread commercial
acceptance. During this time, computers were a small part of most of
my sample companies' business. NCR and Burroughs, for example, had
most of their resources in electromechanical office and accounting
machines products. Computers were a new and untested product with an
uncertain future. Manufacturing of computers was intimately related
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to research and development, and thus the industry employed
significant numbers of scientists, engineers and skilled technicians.
The second period, from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, saw the
development of the industry and the increasing commercial use of
computers in business and industry. The mid-1960s signalled the
introduction of a new generation of computers, using integrated
circuit technology. This development reduced the costs of computers
and led to the increasing commerical use of computers. Computer
companies during the ten years between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s had
a high degree of vertical integration in production. For IBM, at
least, this was a change from the first period when the company had
purchased substantial volumes of components. Manufacturing was not
automated in the mid-1960s, though assembly line techniques were often
employed. Companies began to use some automated manufacturing
equipment during the period. The demand for skilled technicians was
high because both the product and manufacturing process were quite
complex.
The computer industry changed substantially beginning around the
mid-1970s. Demand exploded and competition increased, exerting
pressures to reduce prices. Advances in semiconductors and the use of
software changed the nature of the computer itself. These changes
substantially increased the demand for engineers in the industry. The
use of automated equipment increased steadily after the mid-1970s.
This decreased the amount of manufacturing personnel needed and
shifted the composition of the direct labor to use significantly more
unskilled assembly workers relative to skilled technicians. The
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mainframe comptuer companies, other than IBM, decreased the amount of
vertical integration in their manufacturing, as pressures to reduce
costs increased.
From this summary we can draw several implications concerning the
future of computer manufacturing. One, we are unlikely to see an
increase in the number of manufacturing plants or employment. Even as
demand increases in the future, advances in automation and an overall
increase in the efficiency of plants will reduce the number of
facilities needed to produce computers.
Some companies, particularly those producing large mainframes,
have already consolidated manufacturing activity. Burroughs, NCR, and
Honeywell all report closing some manufacturing plants since 1980.
Decreased demand for these companies products explains some of these
closings, though not all of them. These companies all report that
they can manufacture products in less physical space today than they
could in the past. DEC does not anticipate adding plants or people in
the future, even though production will increase. Changes in the
design of the computer and changes in the manufacturing process will
alter what goes on within plants, and more computers can be produced
in less space.
The type of labor employed in the computer industry has been
changing and will continue to change in the future. There are
essentially two types of people that are now involved in developing
and producing computers, engineers and assembly workers. We saw a
relative increase in the number of highly skilled professional
engineers and scientists in the late 1970s, a trend which according to
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all predictions will accelerate in the future. Unskilled assembly
workers have been becoming an increasingly large part of the
manufacturing workforce. As the proportion of assembly workers has
increased, the relative number of skilled technicians involved in
manufacturing has decreased, and dramatically so since the 1960s.
Essentially, we have ended up with a two-tier workforce, of skilled
professionals on one hand and unskilled assemblers on the other.
The other major shift in the labor force, that is just beginning
to be felt, is due to the decreasing importance of the hardware side
of the industry and the increasing importance of the service side.
The new computer users of the 1980s have included unsophisticated,
first time purchasers in small business, and purchases for home and
personal use. These new users require different sales approaches and
more support than the sophisticated, large industry users. As a
result, computer companies must invest more of their resources in
service and distribution than they did in the past. These activities
are very labor intensive, requiring skilled people to provide training
for new customers and repairing machines. In addition, trained sales
personnel are more important in a highly competitive environment. One
executive suggested that the computer industry is becoming a more
service-like industry, a trend which will continue in the future.
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Chapter 5
FACTORS AFFECTING U.S. LOCATION DECISIONS
Deciding where to locate a computer manufacturing plant is a
complicated decision. There is not just one factor that determines
which areas are most attractive, but there are a number of factors
that work together. In addition, the areas that companies have found
attractive and the qualities that make these areas attractive have
changed over time. To complicate matters further, not all companies
respond in exactly the same way. Companies were organized at
different times, have developed at different rates, and have different
strategies. Despite these qualifications, we can draw certain
conclusions about the factors that are important in making location
decisions and thus about the areas that computer companies find
attractive.
Chapter 4 discussed how the manufacture of computers has changed
over time, and particularly how this affected the mix of labor
demanded by the industry. Chapter 5 starts from this point and
examines how these changing labor requirements have affected location
decisions. The labor required is available in many parts of the
country, so the issue is then what characteristics make the labor in
certain areas of the country more attractive than others.
The factors that make different areas attractive to the computer
industry have changed over time and thus the areas in which companies
built new facilities have changed. Changes in locational preferences
have essentially followed the changes in the manufacturing process
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discussed in Chapter 4, and so we can examine separately the location
decisions made prior to the mid-1960s, those made between the
mid-1960s and mid-1970s, and those made since the mid-1970s. Before
discussing in detail the different factors that have affected plant
location decisions, I will outline what factors have been most
important in each period.
During the 1950s and early 1960s computers were in the
developmental stage and were being used for relatively specialized
purposes. The major location issue during this period was where
computer companies were started. The innovations in computer
technology and the development of the early machines centered around
universities because this was where the creative engineering talent
was. As a result, most companies were either spun-off from university
research projects or else started near universities. Computer
companies did not expand their facilities much prior to the mid-1960s
as demand was relatively low.
The period between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw the growth and
development of the computer industry. Demand for computers increased
and companies expanded their facilities. The manufacture of computers
required large amounts of manufacturing labor, particularly assemblers
and technicians. Companies developed in essentially two different
patterns during this period. Generally the newer computer companies
exhibited different patterns from the older companies.
The older companies are those that were formed prior to the
development of computers and thus they had a history of manufacturing
products other than computers. Their current businesses also involve
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more than just computers. One of the two factors that had the most
influence on where the computer operations of these companies expanded
was past location decisions made by the company. Past decisions refer
to locations chosen by the company to manufacture products other than
computers. In addition, many of the older companies got into the
computer business by acquiring existing small computer companies.
Thus, the past decisions made by the original companies affected
location patterns. The second factor that was important for the older
companies was the location of their existing computer facilities.
When the companies needed more manufacturing space they often expanded
in an area in which they already had facilities, because it was the
easiest strategy. These factors were most important for Burroughs,
Honeywell, and NCR. Hewlett Packard, though somewhat different from
the other companies, tended to expand heavily around its headquarters.
The new computer companies or the companies in which computers
were the main line of business responded to slightly different
pressures during the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. These companies were
more affected by changes that occurred in the industry because
computers were their largest product. They could also be more
responsive to changing conditions because they had few existing plants
and were thus not restricted by previous capital investments. They
experienced a great need for additional manufacturing labor and
located plants specifically with this in mind. They were influenced
to a certain degree by the prevailing wages in an area and sought
areas without a history of organized labor. They, like the older
companies, tended to locate facilities within several hours of each
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other for ease of communication and control. DEC, Data General, and
Sperry responded to these factors.1
IBM because of its large size and market power behaved differently
from the other companies in my sample, as is discussed in detail
below. Essentially, IBM always located in university twons with
sufficiently large labor pools to attract the necessary manufacturing
labor.
Since the mid-1970s engineers have become the most crucial
component in computer manufacturing. Companies that have expanded
since this time have built in areas with pools of engineering talent.
This is near superior universitites and in areas with a pleasant
quality of life that is attractive to professionals.
This chapter discusses only U.S. locations. Chapter 6 turns to
the factors influencing foreign location decisions. The stories are
quite different, though clearly what has occurred in the U.S. affects
what companies choose to do abroad.
The rest of the chapter discusses the factors that have affected
the location of computer plants. It begins with how the labor
demanded affects location decisions and then goes on to examine
specific factors that differentiate areas and make some areas more
attractive than others.
Labor
The mix of labor demanded by specific computer companies is
related to two factors. One is the industry-wide demand for labor
which is affected by changes in the manufacturing process. The other
factor is the way individual companies chose to organize the functions
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of different plants. Both these factors affect the type of labor
d'emanded by individual manufacturing plants which in turn affects
location decisions.
The overall mix of labor demanded by computer manufacturing
companies has changed since the 1960s, as discussed in Chapter 4. I
argued that the history of the computer industry could be divided into
three periods, distinguished in part by the relative amounts of
engineers, technicians, and assembly workers employed. Prior to the
mid-1960s when the industry was new, skilled engineers and technicians
were required to manufacture the machines. During the second period,
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the industry utilized large
amounts of manufacturing labor, particularly unskilled assembly labor.
The labor requirements have changed since the mid-1970s and the
industry now employs relatively more engineers and relatively less
manufacturing workers than in the second period.
Companies organize the functions of their manufacturing plants in
different ways. The organization has changed over time for some
companies, which has affected their location decisions. Before
turning to an examination of how labor demand affects plant locations,
we need to first examine how companies organize their manufacturing.
Organization of Plants' Functions. There are two basic ways to
organize production, though companies can and do combine them. At one
end of the spectrum, each plant produces an entire product, from
research and development through all stages of manufacturing. This
strategy is one where each manufacturing plant is relatively
autonomous. At the other end of the spectrum, each plant produces a
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piece of the product. A central manufacturing plant does all the new
product development and planning, and assigns tasks to the various
satellite manufacturing plants. Components are shipped to one plant
for final assembly and testing.
There are a number of factors that would lead companies to
organize their production in different ways. One, the technology of
the product will affect whether it is possible to physically separate
pieces of the product in different manufacturing facilities. Two, the
size of the company will affect the strategy that is feasible. For
example, a very small company would not have large enough volumes to
efficiently establish numerous autonomous facilities. The
organizational structure of the company is a third factor that will
affect how a company chooses to organize production. In a company
with a centralized, functional management structure, the locus of
power is concentrated at the top of the organization and departments
or divisions are organized according to function, such as
manufacturing, marketing, and finance. This type of company may tend
to centrally organize its production. On the other hand, a company
with a divisional structure, organized around product lines will be
more likely to have each plant producing a separate product (Galbraith
and Nathanson 1978).
The way a company organizes the functions of its plants affects
the mix of labor employed in the different plants. For example, a
plant that is responsible for an entire product, from development
through production will need to have scientists, engineers, and
manufacturing personnel of all types, including technicians, skilled,
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and unskilled workers. This type of plant must be located in an area
that can attract and retain engineers, as well as an area that has an
adequate supply of manufacturing labor. On the other hand, a plant
producing just one part of the product will have more specialized
labor requirements. A plant that only does subassembly work, for
example, will employ a high proportion of assembly workers. This type
of plant will locate in an area where it can draw on a large pool of
unskilled labor.
Table 5.1 summarizes how the companies in my sample organize the
functions of their manufacturing plants in the current era
(essentially post-1975) and in the years prior to the 1970s. I
developed this typology based on the case studies I prepared and it is
somewhat simplified. Data from the companies, presented below,
provide more detail concerning their structure. No one strategy
predominates today. There is a mix of strategies among both mainframe
and mini computer companies.
Some companies have changed the organization of their plants over
time. When a company is first formed and has only one facility, it is
autonomous by definition. The question here, is how companies
structure production when they begin to expand their facilities. Most
companies' early plant expansions were satellite facilities probably
because the companies were relatively small and did not have the
resources or final demand to justify autonomous facilities.
IBM manufacturing facilities are generally involved in all aspects
of production, from research and development of new products to final
manufacturing. Production has been organized this way at least since
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Table 5.1
ORGANIZATION OF COMPUTER MANUFACTURING PLANTS:
SELECTED COMPUTER COMPANIES
Current (post-1975)
Organization of Plants
Past (prior to 1970s)
Organization of Plants
IBM
NCR
Burroughs
Sperry
Honeywell
Amdahl
DEC
Data General
Hewlett Packard
Prime
Autonomous
Autonomous
Autonomous
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Autonomous
Satellite
Autonomous
Satellite
Autonomous
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Satellite
Source: Company Interviews
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the late 1950s. IBM's large size has allowed it to run autonomous
facilities.
There are several exceptions to the above statements concerning
IBM. The first is that the complete development of a new site takes
time. A new plant cannot be built and immediately begin producing the
most complex products. Therefore, new sites often begin as satellite
facilities to an existing plant. In addition, sometimes new sites are
developed to fill a specific product need, and thus the plant serves
as a satellite plant for a number of years. An example of this is
IBM's facility in Burlington, Vermont, opened originally in the late
1950s. For approximately 7 years this plant employed about 400
unskilled assembly workers, manufacturing wire contact relays that
were used in a product manufactured in a New York plant. It was not
until the company needed to expand semiconductor production that the
Burlington plant became an autonomous facility.
IBM's strategy in manufacturing semiconductors differs from that
of other products. IBM is beginning to centrally structure its
semiconductor operations. This means that the product development
work and decisions concerning the manufacturing process are determined
by one facility. Then, any number of satellite plants produce the
product, in the way dictated by the main plant. Thus, the satellite
plants are simply production facilities. There are two advantages to
this strategy that are particularly relevant to semiconductor
production. First, satellite plants can produce very high volumes.
Semiconductors are currently needed in large quantities and will be
needed in even larger volumes in the future. The second advantage
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relates to the difference between the manufacture of semiconductors
and computers. Semiconductor manufacturing is a very complex process,
and it is technically difficult to structure production so that each
plant makes an entire product. In the future we can expect IBM's
semiconductor operations to be centrally sturctured and the production
of other products to remain decentralized.
NCR and Burroughs both organized production with a central
headquarters and satellite manufacturing facilities until the early
1970s. Today, plants are organized by product with engineering and
manufacturing all done at one site.
The transition was particularly dramatic at NCR. All production
and engineering decisions were made in Dayton, Ohio, the company
headquarters prior to the 1970s. Approximately 80 percent of the
actual manufactuing was also done in Dayton. The plants outside
Dayton served only as parts suppliers. NCR began to decentralize its
operations in the early 1970s, moving production to plants outside
Dayton. Only 20 percent of total production remained in Dayton by
1974. The majority of the manufacturing was moved to newer, smaller,
and more efficient plants in other parts of the country. Individual
plants were given responsibility for a product or group of products,
which involved combining the engineering and manufacturing functions.2
However, it was not until 1980 that NCR decentralized its new
product development, putting development responsibilities in each
plant. Under the old system, a central product development group told
each engineering and manufacturing plant what to make. The problem
with the old arrangement was that if a new product had problems, each
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group pointed the finger at the other one. No group had the clear
responsibility.
Production at Sperry and Honeywell has always been organized with
a central manufacturing plant and satellite sites making pieces of the
final product. Sperry had two distinct centers of computer activity
in the 1950s and 1960s, in Philadelphia and Minneapolis. Each central
plant had several satellite facilities within about a 3 hour radius.
These two separate centers existed because Remington Rand (merged with
Sperry Corporation in 1955) got into the computer business by
acquiring two small computer firms in these areas. The product lines
in Philadelphia and Minneapolis were different, so they developed
separately for most of the 1950s and 1960s. Today, Philadelphia
serves as the computer division's world headquarters and no longer
does any manufacturing. Sperry also opened a manufacturing plant in
Salt Lake City, Utah in the mid-1960s. This plant now has a satellite
facility about 150 miles away.
Honeywell manufactures computers in two clusters of facilities, in
Boston, Massachusetts and Phoenix, Arizona. All satellite plants are
in the same city as the central plant. An exception to this is that
Honeywell has some satellite plants in Asia that do subassembly work
for all divisions.
The minicomputer makers, like the mainframe manufacturers,
organize production in a number of ways. DEC and Hewlett Packard
manufacturing plants operate as autonomous units today. Both
companies had more centrally structured operations in the past.
The plants that DEC opened in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
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during its first major expansion of facilities, were all satellite
facilities, with central headquarters in Maynard, Massachusetts. New
plants began doing one of two things. Some began as final assembly
and test plants. They received subassemblies from other plants and
assembled complete systems and shipped them to customers. Other
plants began by manufacturing subassemblies, which involved inserting
components on printed circuit boards. The reason the plant was opened
determined which of these activities the plant performed. European
plants were often started to get a presence in a country, so the plant
would begin doing final assembly. In contrast, DEC went to Puerto
Rico to get assembly labor, and thus this plant started doing
subassembly work. Most of these plants eventually integrated
backwards or forwards, to produce an entire product, and now are
fairly autonomous.
All research and development work was done in or closely around
Maynard until the late 1970s. This changed beginning in 1978 when DEC
opened a storage products plant in Colorado. The Colorado plant was
given complete product responsibility, including research and
development. Engineering was becoming a more important part of the
product, relative to manufacturing so that it was necessary to have
the engineering and manufacturing together.
DEC's printed circuit board plant, opened in 1981, is an exception
to the above statements. This South Carolina plant fabricates circuit
boards and assembles components onto the boards. The boards are then
shipped to other DEC plants that assemble entire products. The site
acts as a satellite plant for other manufacturing facilities.
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Hewlett Packard's manufacturing strategy changed as the company
grew. The company started out with one central manufacturing plant.
A number of satellite facilities assembled the components manufactured
in the central plant into final products. As demand grew, the central
plant could not supply enough components and the assembly plants began
doing their own manufacturing. This cycle repeated itself as the new
manufacturing plants built up their capacity, sold to other assembly
plants, and eventually couldn't keep up with demand.
Hewlett Packard's current structure revolves around 50 product
divisions. The company had a fairly explicit strategy to keep the
divisions relatively small, so that when a division got too big, some
piece of it was spun off into a new division. This represented a
desire and philosophy to keep relatively small, decentralized product
groups.
This philosophy is also reflected in the organization of the
company's manufacturing facilities. Hewlett Packard's goal is for
each plant to be a complete facility, performing all activities from
research and development to manufacturing and marketing. This
strategy applies to foreign as well as domestic plants.
Production at Data General is centrally structured and has always
been so. One reason for this is that the organization of the company
is also very centralized. The founder and president is a strong
individual, who has wanted to maintain relatively tight control over
the company.
Data General's only facility for a number of years was outside
Boston in Southboro. The company needed more space in the mid-1970s
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as the plant got crowded and congested. Data General wanted to keep
the manufacturing centralized in Southboro, so it established
satellite facilities in Maine and New Hampshire to do subassembly work
and assembly of peripherals. Products are all shipped back to
Southboro for final assembly and test. Production is still organized
in this way.3
Data General opened a second set of facilities in North Carolina
in the late 1970s that duplicated those in New England. Both areas
make the same products and are complete facilities, engaged in
research and development, manufacturing, and assembly.4
Amdahl, a manufacturer of IBM plug-compatible mainframes and
Prime, a mini computer manufacturer are both quite small companies,
formed in the early 1970s. Amdahl currently has two manufacturing
plants and Prime has three. The size of the companies dictates that
production be centrally organized.
How have the changes in labor demanded by the computer industry in
general, and by specific companies affected the location of computer
manufacturing plants? Not all companies are affected in the same way
because they organize their production differently, have grown at
different rates, matured in different historical periods. However,
general patterns do emerge.
Prior to the Mid-1960s--Engineering Talent. The computer industry
was emerging during the years prior to the mid-1960s. There was
little physical expansion of manufacturing facilities. Companies were
young and product demand was limited, so that most companies could
manufacture enough computers to satisfy demand in one or two plants.
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The issue during this period is where computer companies began, and
how the type of labor they needed affected the initial location.
The development and manufacture of the early computers were
intimately related, and thus scientists, engineers, and skilled
technicians were in great demand, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Companies began in areas that were rich in engineering talent. This
meant areas with well-known universities. The importance of
universities is discussed in more detail in a later section. The
point here, is that the universities supplied the talent necessary to
design and develop computers.
Mid-1960s to Mid-1970s--Manufacturing Labor. The ten years from
the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s saw the development of the computer
industry. The demand for manufacturing labor was high and growing.
Advances in technology had not reduced the relative amount of direct
labor involved in manufacturing computers. Many companies that
expanded during this time, and particularly those that established
satellite manufacturing facilities, located in areas with large pools
of unskilled assembly workers. Assembly workers have always tended to
be women and many are also immigrants. DEC, Data General, Sperry, and
Honeywell all made location decisions during the 1960s and 1970s based
on the need to attract unskilled assembly workers.
DEC was formed in 1959 and for approximately 10 years its only
U.S. location was in Maynard, Massachusetts, just 45 minutes from
Boston. DEC was growing rapidly during the late 1960s and the company
reached a point where it could no longer get enough assembly labor in
the Maynard area. The assembly workers were predominantly women and
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DEC had a 9am to 3pm shift and a 6pm to 10pm shift to accomodate women
with children. However, they still needed more labor. DEC opened new
plants in several towns in Massachusetts during the late 1960s and
early 197 0s in order to tap new sources of female assembly labor. The
Westminster and Westfield plants are two examples. The plants were
satellite facilities and were located within 2 hours of Maynard, close
enough so that control could be maintained by headquarters. The need
for an expanding labor supply drove most location decisions at DEC
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Sperry had two central manufacturing sites in the 1950s and 1960s,
in the Philadelphia and Minneapolis areas. The Pennsylvania
operations were located in central Philadelphia during the 1950s and
moved to suburban Bluebell in the early 1960s. The company needed
more manufacturing space as the computer operations grew during the
1960s. They chose to spin off specialized manufacturing activities to
separate locations. One of the first activities to be moved was core
memory manufacturing. The manufacturing process required mostly
unskilled assembly workers, though some technicians were needed for
testing. Sperry located this facility in Strasburg, about one hour
from headquarters, close enough for management to easily maintain
control.
The Minneapolis facility reached the limits of its capacity in the
late 1960s as the commercial systems business grew. Sperry first
moved the labor-intensive subassembly operations out of Minneapolis.
They built a plant in Jackson, Minnesota, about 100 miles southwest of
Minneapolis in 1968 to assemble printed circuit boards and to
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manufacture cables and harnesses. Sperry needed more manufacturing
space in the mid-1970s and established a plant in Clearlake, Iowa, a
town about 3 hours from Minneapolis. The plant assembled and tested
computers, receiving boards, cabinets, and power supplies from other
plants.
The Jackson and Clearlake plants were both satellite facilities
that just did manufacturing. All the administrative and engineering
functions were performed in Minneapolis. The work done in these
facilities required mostly unskilled assembly labor. Approximately 80
percent of the manufacturing labor was unskilled and 20 percent were
technicians and engineers. One of the attractive features about both
these sites was the existence of a large number of unemployed women
who wanted to work to supplement their family income. They were
loyal, dedicated, and liked to work, and thus were an ideal workforce.
Sperry also opened a manufacturing plant in Salt Lake City, Utah
in the mid-1960s that now is the center of terminal and minicomputer
manufacturing. One reason for the Utah location was the availability
of a good supply of unskilled labor. Salt Lake City attracts Asian
immigrants who find California too expensive.
Data General's headquarters and main manufacturing plant were
located outside Boston, in Southboro, Massachusetts in the early
1970s. The Massachusetts plant became congested as demand for its
products grew and the company spun off specialized manufacturing
operations. Data General opened a plant outside Portland, Maine in
1975 to assemble peripheral equipment, manufacture metal frames and
cabinets, and fabricate circuit boards. The company opened a plant in
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Portsmouth, New Hampshire a year later to assemble printed circuit
boards and CPUs. The Massachusetts plant now does the final systems
assembly. The New Hampshire and Maine plants are essentially assembly
operations and require primarily assembly labor.
Honeywell's Brighton, Massachusetts plant that currently
fabricates and assembles printed circuit boards used to manufacture
the entire computer system. As demand grew and Honeywell needed more
manufacturing space, they divided the production process, leaving the
predominantly unskilled assembly work in Brighton. The plant, which
is located within the Boston city limits, has been able to take
advantage of the existence of a large pool of unskilled workers living
in the city. Approximately 30 percent of the plant's employees were
minorities and 30 percent were women in 1983. Seventy percent of the
women and minorities were employed as assembly workers.5 It seems
clear that Honeywell made production decisions in order to most
effectively tap a large pool of unskilled workers.
IBM, even though its manufacturing plants were relatively
autonomous, needed to locate in areas with large labor markers during
the late 1950s and 1960s. The manufacturing process required a
substantial quantity of direct labor, so plants had to be in areas
from which they could draw a large pool of manufacturing labor. The
areas IBM opened plants in the late 1950s and 1960s included
Lexington, Kentucky; Rochester, Minnesota; Burlington, Vermont; and
Boulder, Colorado. These were all relatively small cities at the time
with surrounding areas capable of supplying large quantities of
manufacturing labor. One of the attractive features of the Burlington
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site was that it was a relatively depressed area with an unemployment
rate of 20 percent when IBM moved there. The area therefore had a
ready and willing supply of assembly workers.
However, IBM never located in an area simply to get unskilled
workers. Since they eventually wanted their plants to be autonomous,
locations also had to be attractive to professionals.
NCR and Burroughs expanded existing facilities or constructed new
plants near their existing plants. They needed to attract
manufacturing labor, but were able to do so in their existing
locations. Hewlett Packard also tended to expand around its main
location outside San Francisco. Prime and Amdahl, both founded around
1970 were young and emphasized research and development over
manufacturing, and as a result did not locate to attract manufacturing
labor.
After the Mid-1970s--Engineering Talent. The demand for engineers
increased beginning in the mid-1970s as the computer industry grew and
changed. Individual computer companies also changed, so that many
companies had relatively autonomous manufacturing plants around this
time. This change has meant that companies must locate plants in
areas that are attractive to professionals. Companies still need to
be able to attract manufacturing labor, but this is much less
important than it was in the past. New plant locations since the
mid-1970s have reflected these changes.
The criteria for plant locations changed at DEC in the late 1970s.
The company needed engineers and located in areas that engineers found
attractive. One example of this is the storage products plant opened
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in Colorado Springs in 1978. The engineering talent for designing
disks was in Colorado because a number of companies had disk
facilities there and thus the best opportunities for disk engineers
were in Colorado. In order for DEC to attract the best disk
engineers, the company had to go to where the engineers lived.
NCR was forced to relocate a plant in 1980 because it could not
attract enough engineers. NCR had a plant in Millsboro, Delaware, 100
miles south of Wilmington, near the Maryland border, in the "middle of
nowhere." The plant was built in the days of mechanical products and
had been converted to an electronic cash register plant. However, NCR
couldn't attract design engineers to the plant, and as a result over
half the engineers working in the plant were consultants from
Washington. This was a costly way to run an operation. NCR relocated
the plant to near Greenville, South Carolina, primarily to attract
engineering talent.
NCR also opened two microelectronics facilities in Colorado in the
late 1970s. The company already had one microelectronics plant in
Dayton, but chose to expand capacity elsewhere, in an area that
clearly attracted engineering talent.
Burrough's view of the future is that U.S. locations will be
determined by an area's ability to attract good professional people,
particularly engineers. It will become increasingly important to
locate in areas that are attractive to engineers, particularly
manufacturing engineers capable of programming and maintaining
robotics and automated equipment. Burrough's recent locations are
indicative of these trends. The company opened a research center in
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Austin, Texas in the late 1970s and a facility to design and develop
distributed data processing (DDP) systems in Boulder, Colorado in the
1980s.
Other computer companies opened plants in the latter half of the
1970s in areas that are clearly attractive to professionals. For
example, Honeywell opened a plant to manufacture integrated circuits
in Colorado Springs. Data General established a facility for
research, development, and manufacture of terminals in Austin, Texas.
The company also established development and manufacturing sites in
the Research Triangle area of North Carolina. Hewlett Packard opened
plants in Boise, Idaho; Vancouver; Spokane and Seattle, Washington;
and Eugene and Portland, Oregon. These are all areas that are
attractive to professional engineers.
IBM is somewhat different from the other companies in my sample in
several ways. One, most IBM plants have always operated as autonomous
facilities. This means that IBM has always had to locate in areas
that were attractive to engineers. Second, when IBM opens a new plant
it transfers about 1,000 professionals, managers, and technicians.
Thus, IBM must locate the new plant in an area to which its present
professional employees are willing to move.
Today, managerial and programming talent are more important and
manufacturing personnel are less important than they were in the past.
As a result, IBM's locations are even more oriented to attracting
professionals than they used ot be. The areas where IBM opened new
plants in the 1970s reflect this. Three of the new facilities were in
Austin, Texas; Tuscon, Arizona; and Raleigh, North Carolina.
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Computer companies have located their manufacturing plants, in
part, to tap specific labor sources. But this still doesn't tell us
what makes certain areas attractive and other not. Most parts of the
country have a sufficient quantity of workers capable of assembling
computers. Why do companies choose the specific areas they do? Many
areas of the country can attract engineering and professional labor.
However, computer companies have only located in a small number of
areas. What explains this?
Wages
The wage rate in an area is a factor in location decisions, though
it is not a deciding factor. A low wage rate can make an area that is
already attractive more so. Conversely, high wages can make an
unattractive area more unattractive. However, a high wage rate won't
necessarily prohibit expansion in an area that has other positive
features. Low wages, by themselves, won't make an area attractive for
plant location.
The evidence for these conclusions comes primarily from
occupational wage data I collected on the prevailing wage rates in
different areas. These are not just the wages paid by the computer
industry, but they are the wages paid by the firms a computer company
would be competing with for labor if it moved into a given area.
I collected data on wages in approximately 22 Standard
Metropolitan Statistical areas (SMSAs; these were the only areas for
which some of the data were available) for two periods, 1969-1971 and
1979-1981. The 15 occupations I examined covered a significant
proportion of workers in the computer industry (see Table 4.1). The
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wage data come from three different surveys as no one source was
complete. Table 5.2 briefly describes each survey and the occupations
surveyed in each. For more detail on the surveys, including complete
definitions of the occupations, see Appendix.
I have used the occupational wage data in two ways. First, in
Chapter 3 I examined employment data to analyze which states were
growing and which states were declining in the computer industry.
Using the wage data, I have analyzed whether the rapidly growing
states had low wage rates and whether the states that were not growing
as fast as others had particularly high wages. Second, I have
analyzed the interview data to determine whether companies expanded in
high or low wage areas. None of the companies I interviewed said that
low wages were a deciding factor in U.S. location decisions. However,
the issue is, whether the wage rates have affected decisions at all,
and whether this has changed over time.
Occupational Wage Data. An analysis of the wage data shows that
the wage patterns among different areas are similar for the four
manufacturing occupations, assembler, inspector, machinist, and
machine tool operator. Therefore, I will discuss these occupations as
one group. The wage patterns for electrical and mechanical engineers
are similar, though they are different from the patterns in the
manufacturing occupations. The other occupations for which I
collected wage data include clerical and office occupations, computer
programmers and analysts, and engineering and science technicians.
None of my sample companies located specifically to take advantage of
these types of labor. However, because these occupations represent
Table 5.2
WAGE SURVEYS: SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS
Percent
Survey of SIC Unit of
Survey Years Occupation 3573 Observation Universe
BLS Industry Nov. 1970- Assembler 9.4 Establishment Machinery
Wage Survey April 1971; Inspector 4 .2a manufacturing
Jan. 1981 Machinist 1.0 (SIC 35)
Machine-tool b
operator 2.7
BLS Area Wage Aug. 1970- Secretary 5.6 Establishment All
Survey June 1971; Steographer & manufacturing
Jan.-Dec. Typist 1.0
1980 Accounting Clerk 1.0
Computer Programmer,
business 6.2
Computer System
Analyst, business 4.5
Computer Operator 1.0
Drafter 1.4
Electronics
Technician 3.8
Dicennial 1970c Electrical & elec- 4.7 Individual All men,exper-
Census 1980 tronics engineer ienced civilain
Mechanical engineer 1.9 labor force
Notes: a.
b.
c.
Part of checkers and examiners.
Includes semi-skilled metalworking.
Earnings pertain to 1969 and 1979, respectively.
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about 25 percent of the workforce in the industry, it is important to
understand whether the wage patterns in these occupations reinforce
the patterns observed in the manufacturing or engineering occupations.
I discuss these occupations as a third group.
Tables 5.3-5.6 present the data for hourly wages in the four
manufacturing occupations, assembler, inspector, machinist, and
machine tool operator. The tables also show the relative ranking of
the SMSAs according to average wages, with a rank of 1 representing
the highest wage area. The difference in average annual wages between
the highest and lowest areas was about $3,000 in 1970 and $8,000 in
1980 (nominal wages) for all four occupations. These occupations
represented about 17 percent of total employment in the computer
industry in 1970, and thus these wage differences will have a
significant effect on the total wage bill.
The states with the highest employment in the computer industry in
1982 were California, Minnesota, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas
(see Table 3.8). Are these states high or low wage areas? The answer
is mixed.
California, the state with by far the most employment in the
industry has both high and low wage areas. The San Francisco SMSA has
some of the highest average wage rates in the country. The average
wages of inspectors, machinists, and machine tool operators are all
the highest of the SMSAs I examined. The wages of assemblers were the
fourth highest. The San Francisco SMSA includes some of "Silicon
Valley," but most of the electronics industry is in the adjacent Santa
Clara county. Wages paid to assemblers in the two counties in 1979
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Table 5.3
MEAN HOURLY WAGES OF ASSEMBLERS IN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1981
Mean Mean Percent
Hourly Hourly Change
Wage Rank Wage Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1981 1981 1981
Boston, MA 3.60 10 6.87 15 90.8
Hartford, CT 3.44 14 7.81 8 127.0
Worcester, MA 3.73 8 7.03 14 88.5
Buffalo, NY 3.80 6 8.45 6 122.4
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 3.50 13 6.49 18 85.4
New York & Long Island, NY 3.10 19 6.28 19 102.6
Philadelphia, PA 3.38 17 7.07 13 109.2
Pittsburgh, PA 3.83 5 8.01 7 109.1
Chicago, IL 3.72 9 7.10 11 90.9
Cleveland, OH 3.78 7 8.68 4 129.6
Detroit, MI 4.16 2 9.84 2 136.5
Milwaukee, WI 4.15 3 9.94 1 139.5
Minneapolis, MN 3.42 16 7.10 11 107.6
St. Louis, MO 3.60 10 7.73 9 114.7
Atlanta, GA 5.77 22
Baltimore, MD 3.59 12 6.78 16 88.9
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 2.83 21 6.01 20 112.4
Houston, TX 3.43 15 8.50 5 147.8
Tulsa, OK 3.05 20 7.24 10 137.4
Denver, CO 3.12 18 5.93 21 90.1
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 2.82 22 6.64 17 135.5
Portland, OR 4.27 1 9.61 3 125.1
San Francisco, CA 3.91 4
Total 3.56 7.49 110.4
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Table 5.4
MEAN HOURLY WAGES OF INSPECTORS IN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1981
Mean Mean Percent
Hourly Hourly Change
Wage Rank Wage Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1981 1981 1981
Boston, MA 3.57 17 7.37 20 106.4
Hartford, CT 3.38 20 7.75 16 129.3
Worcester, MA 3.65 15 7.56 19 107.1
Buffalo, NY 3.82 12 8.52 9 123.0
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 4.00 5 8.06 13 101.5
New York & Long Island, NY 3.53 19 7.06 21 100.0
Philadelphia, PA 3.76 14 7.58 18 101.6
Pittsburgh, PA 3.92 9 9.09 7 131.9
Chicago, IL 3.95 8 8.73 8 121.0
Cleveland, OH 3.96 7 9.26 5 133.8
Detroit, MI 4.23 3 10.40 2 145.9
Milwaukee, WI 4.07 4 9.26 5 127.5
Minneapolis, MN 3.99 6 7.72 17 93.5
St. Louis, MO 3.59 16 8.37 10 133.1
Atlanta, GA 6.40 23
Baltimore, MD 3.81 13 8.01 14 110.2
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 3.08 22 7.82 15 153.9
Houston, TX 3.92 9 9.30 4 137.2
Tulsa, OK 3.29 21 8.16 12 148.0
Denver, CO 3.91 11 6.94 22 77.5
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 3.54 18 8.18 11 131.1
Portland, OR 4.47 2 10.09 3 125.7
San Francisco, CA 4.79 1 11.10 1 131.7
Total 3.83 8.38 118.8
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Table 5.5
MEAN HOURLY WAGES OF MACHINISTS IN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1981
Mean Mean Percent
Hourly Hourly Change
Wage Rank Wage Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1981 1981 1981
Boston, MA 4.10 13 9.21 11 124.6
Hartford, CT 4.57 4 9.10 13 99.1
Worcester, MA 3.92 18 8.26 19 110.7
Buffalo, NY 4.27 9 8.80 14 106.1
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 3.62 22 8.59 17 137.3
New York & Long Island, NY 4.16 11 8.15 20 95.9
Philadelphia, PA 4.10 13 8.67 16 111.5
Pittsburgh, PA 4.03 17 9.15 12 127.0
Chicago, IL 4.57 4 10.04 8 119.7
Cleveland, OH 4.42 7 10.69 4 141.9
Detroit, MI 4.76 3 12.45 2 161.6
Milwaukee, WI 4.38 8 10.30 6 135.2
Minneapolis, MN 4.15 12
St. Louis, MO 5.08 1 10.74 3 111.4
Atlanta, GA 6.85 22
Baltimore, MD 4.09 16 9.23 10 125.7
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 3.81 21 8.70 15 128.3
Houston, TX 4.10 13 10.41 5 153.9
Tulsa, OK 3.89 20 8.51 18 118.8
Denver, CO 3.91 19 7.92 21 102.6
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 4.23 10 9.76 9 130.7
Portland, OR 4.52 6 10.25 7 126.8
San Francisco, CA 4.95 2 13.04 1 163.4
Total 4.26 9.49 122.8
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Table 5.6
MEAN HOURLY WAGES OF MACHINE TOOL OPERATORS IN MACHINERY MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES, BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1981
Mean Mean Percent
Hourly Hourly Change
Wage Rank Wage Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1981 1981 1981
Boston, MA 3.74 16 8.13 18 117.4
Hartford, CT 3.82 13 8.25 15 116.0
Worcester, MA 3.66 17 7.70 21 110.4
Buffalo, NY 3.83 12 8.58 13 124.0
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 4.01 8 8.87 8 121.2
New York & Long Island, NY 3.43 20 6.87 23 100.3
Philadelphia, PA 3.86 11 8.56 14 121.8
Pittsburgh, PA 3.79 14 9.13 5 140.9
Chicago, IL 4.35 4 8.83 10 103.0
Cleveland, OH 3.99 9 9.04 6 126.6
Detroit, MI 4.45 3 10.46 2 135.1
Milwaukee, WI 4.29 6 10.06 4 134.5
Minneapolis, MN 3.78 15 8.94 7 136.5
St. Louis, MO 4.49 2 8.84 9 96.9
Atlanta, GA 7.25 22
Baltimore, MD 3.54 19 8.20 16 131.6
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 3.24 21 8.10 19 150.0
Houston, TX 3.65 18 8.82 11 141.6
Tulsa, OK 3.22 22 8.17 17 153.7
Denver, CO 4.15 7 8.69 12 109.4
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 3.90 10 7.93 20 103.3
Portland, OR 4.32 5 10.25 3 137.3
San Francisco, CA 4.77 1 11.14 1 133.5
Total 3.92 8.73 122.7
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were similar and it is difficult to believe that wages in other
occupations could be markedly different.6 The conclusion is
therefore, that high wage rates haven't slowed growth in the area.
Los Angeles, in contrast, has some of the lowest wage rates in the
country. The area ranks in the bottom third of all areas for
assemblers and machine tool operators and in the bottom half for
inspectors and machinists.
Massachusetts and Minnesota are both large and growing states in
the computer industry and both are generally low wage areas in terms
of these manufacturing occupations. Boston and Worcester, the two
Massachusetts areas for which wage data are available, generally rank
in the bottom third of all areas, and the relative positions of these
cities worsened between 1970 and 1980. Wages in the Minneapolis,
Minnesota SMSA are generally in the bottom half of the distribution.
Employment declined in New York during the 1970s though the state
retained a significant share of the industry's total employment. New
York City, including Long Island had practically the lowest wage rates
in the manufacturing occupations. The Buffalo SMSA, in contrast, had
average or above average wages. The eastern part of New York has a
higher proportion of electronics employemnt than does the rest of the
state. Buffalo has the older machinery manufacturing industries.
Therefore, the low wages prevailing in the New York area are a more
accurate measure of wages facing computer manufacturing firms.
Texas, a relatively fast growing state, particularly since 1977
paid low wages in these manufacturing occupations in 1970. Wages in
Dallas-Ft. Worth remained relatively low in 1980. However, in
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Houston, Texas, wage rates increased substantially during the 1970s so
that in 1980 Houston ranked in the top 5 areas for wages paid
assemblers, inspectors, and machinists.
Workers in Colorado received some of the lowest wages in the
country and relative wages declined during the 1970s. Census
employment numbers are incomplete, though several industry analysts
argued that employment has grown rapidly since 1977. Low
manufacturing wages may have contributed to this growth.
Employment in the computer industry declined during the 1970s in
Michigan and the state's relative ranking on employment dropped from
7th to 12th. Employment has been declining in Wisconsin since 1967.
These decreases are not surprising given that wages in Detroit,
Michigan and Milwaukee, Wisconsin are among the highest in the
country. Detroit ranked second or third on wages in all the
manufacturing occupations. Assemblers in Milwaukee received the
highest wages in 1980 and the area ranked in the top third in all the
other occupations.
Generally, though not in every case, wages in the Midwest tend to
be high and those in the South and Mountain states are lower than
average.
The conclusion form this analysis is that high wage rates don't
retard growth in areas that are attractive for numerous other reasons,
as evidenced in California. On the other hand, high wages can make
areas, like Detroit, Michigan, that have few redeeming features, as
viewed by the computer industry, even more unattractive. Low wages
are clearly as asset in Massachusetts and Minnesota, but they didn't
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prevent decline in New York.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present data on the annual earnings of
electrical and electronics and mechanical engineers in 1969 and 1979.
There are less clear regional patterns in the earnings of engineers
than there were in the earnings of manufacturing workers. High and
low wage areas are spread somewhat more evenly across the states than
was true for the manufacturing occupations.
The differences in earnings among SMSAs at first glance appear
sizeable. The highest paid electical and electronics engineers earned
$28,000 a year in 1980 and the lowest paid earned $22,000, a
difference of $6,000. However, 8 SMSAs, those ranked 6th through
13th, all had average earnings in the $25,000 range. Thus, the
differences among SMSAs are greatest at the ends of the distribution.
A similar conclusion holds when examining the earnings of mechanical
engineers. The difference between the top and bottom SMSAs was
$10,000, though 8 SMSAs all had average earnings of $24,000 in 1980.
Engineers in California and Boston, Massachusetts had relatively
high earnings, which didn't prohibit these areas from growing.
Minneapolis, also a large and growing area in the computer industry,
in contrast, had relatively low salaries. Salaries in Texas, also a
growing area were somewhat below average.
Low engineering salaries don't necessarily prohibit an area from
declining as was also true for manufacturing labor rates. Engineering
salaries in Wisconsin were lower than average and yet employment
declined.
Engineers in Detroit, Michigan received some of the highest
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Table 5.7
MEDIAN ANNUAL EARNINGS OF MALE ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS,
BY SMSA: 1969 AND 1979
Median Median Percent
Annual Annual Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1969-
SMSA 1969 1969 1979 1979 1979
Boston, MA 14,078 7 25,744 8 82.9
Hartford, CT 13,362 14 23,956 17 79.3
Worcester, MA 12,484 24 23,691 20 89.8
Buffalo, NY 13,295 15 25,340 12 90.6
Newark, NJ 14,699 1 28,381 1 93.1
Jersey City, NJ 11,852 27 24,123 16 103.5
New York & Long Island, NY 14,266 6
New York, NY 25,443 10
Long Island, NY 27,920 2
Philadelphia, PA 14,378 5 26,547 5 84.6
Pittsburgh, PA 13,554 11 25,400 11 87.4
Chicago, IL 12,883 20 23,905 19 85.6
Cleveland, OH 12,540 23 23,206 23 85.1
Detroit, MI 13,728 10 27,274 3 98.7
Milwaukee, WI 12,434 25 23,232 22 86.8
Minneapolis, MN 13,021 18 22,718 25 74.5
St. Louis, MO 12,940 19 24,478 15 89.2
Atlanta, GA 12,766 21 23,468 21 83.8
Baltimore, MD 13,760 9 26,954 4 95.9
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 22,635 26
Dallas, TX 12,761 22
Ft. Worth, TX 13,805 8
Houston, TX 13,172 16 23,933 18 81.7
Tulsa, OK 11,889 26 22,143 27 86.2
Denver, CO 13,405 13 24,537 14 83.0
Los Angeles, CA 14,404 4 25,682 9 78.3
Anaheim, CA 14,477 3 25,762 7 78.0
Portland, OR 13,079 17 22,945 24 75.4
San Francisco, CA 13,495 12 25,264 13 87.2
San Jose, CA 14,502 2 25,942 6 78.9
Total 13,371 24,838 85.8
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Table 5.8
MEDIAN ANNUAL EARNINGS OF MALE MECHANICAL ENGINEERS,
BY SMSA: 1969 AND 1979
Median Median Percent
Annual Annual Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1969-
SMSA 1969 1969 1979 1979 1979
Boston, MA 13,590 11 24,346 10 79.1
Hartford, CT 14,193 6 23,345 17 64.5
Worcester, MA 12,641 25 22,417 23 77.3
Buffalo, NY 12,708 23 24,318 11 91.4
Newark, NJ 14,425 5 25,552 4 77.1
Jersey City, NJ 11,239 27 20,830 27 85.3
New York & Long Island, NY 14,073 7
New York, NY 23,196 20
Long Island, NY 25,631 3
Philadelphia, PA 13,893 9 25,064 6 80.4
Pittsburgh, PA 13,491 12 25,372 5 88.1
Chicago, IL 13,223 17 24,225 12 83.2
Cleveland, OH 13,369 14 24,211 13 81.1
Detroit, MI 15,000 1 31,001 1 106.7
Milwaukee, WI 12,673 24 23,230 19 83.3
Minneapolis, MN 12,732 22 22,330 24 75.4
St. Louis, MO 12,983 20 23,607 16 81.8
Atlanta, GA 13,315 16 21,538 26 61.8
Baltimore, MD 13,694 10 23,779 15 73.6
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 22,572 22
Dallas, TX 13,171 18
Ft. Worth, TX 13,335 15
Houston, TX 13,481 13 24,771 9 83.7
Tulsa, OK 12,739 21 22,608 21 77.5
Denver, CO 13,101 19 23,344 18 78.2
Los Angeles, CA 14,611 4 24,896 8 70.4
Anaheim, CA 14,880 2 24,105 14 62.0
Portland, OR 12,237 26 21,909 25 79.0
San Francisco, CA 14,007 8 24,910 7 77.8
San Jose, CA 14,856 3 25,942 2 74.6
Total 13,469 24,039 78.5
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salaries in the country. This was just one more negative aspect of
Detroit, contributing to the overall decline of the computer industry
in the area. The two SMSAs in New York also paid relatively high wages
to engineers. The state retained a substantial share of employment in
the computer industry, though it lost employment during the 1970s.
Engineers in the Midwest did not receive particularly high
salaries, except in Detroit. This contrasts dramatically to the fact
that manufacturing labor in the Midwest received some of the highest
wages in the country. Engineers' salaries are generally lower in the
South than other parts of the country, though there are some
exceptions.
This analysis of engineering salaries shows that companies don't
simply expand in areas with low wages. They expand in areas that are
attractive to engineers, some of which have higher wages than others.
In addition, the observed wage differences among most SMSAs is not
large enough to significantly affect location decisions.
Wage data on the clerical and technical occupations appear in
Tables 5.9 through 5.17. Clerical and technical workers are available
throughout the country and therefore companies don't choose locations
based on the availability of these workers. The issue here is whether
the wage patterns of the clerical and technical workers are similar to
those observed for manufacturing workers or engineers. Are certain
areas generally low wage or high wage areas? Or do the wages of the
clerical and technical workers exhibit different patterns,
counterbalancing the advantages or disadvantages of different areas?
The answer is mixed as an analysis of the data shows.
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Table 5.9
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF SECRETARIES,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 133.00 17 262.00 17 97.0
Hartford, CT 135.09 14 246.00 21 82.1
Worcester, MA 131.00 19 254.50 20 94.3
Buffalo, NY 135.50 12 278.00 6 105.2
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 138.50 7 266.00 15 92.1
New York & Long Island, NY 149.50 3 268.24 13 79.4
Philadelphia, PA 134.50 15 271.50 11 101.9
Pittsburgh, PA 138.50 7 286.00 3 106.5
Chicago, IL 143.00 5 274.00 9 91.6
Cleveland, OH 137.50 10 270.50 12 96.7
Detroit, MI 182.50 1 380.00 1 108.2
Milwaukee, WI 138.50 7 256.00 19 84.8
Minneapolis, MN 126.50 22 231.00 22 82.6
St. Louis, MO 135.50 12 267.00 14 97.0
Atlanta, GA 133.00 17 263.50 16 98.1
Baltimore, MD 134.00 16 278.00 6 107.5
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 129.46 20 273.50 10 111.3
Houston, TX 136.00 11 276.50 8 103.3
Denver, CO 140.50 6 280.00 5 99.3
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 150.50 2 306.14 2 103.4
Portland, OR 127.50 21 257.00 18 101.6
San Francisco, CA 145.00 4 285.50 4 96.9
Total 138.87 274.13 97.4
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Table 5.10
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF STENOGRAPHERS & TYPISTS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 105.64 19 212.51 17 101.2
Hartford, CT 115.43 9 245.85 7 113.0
Worcester, MA 96.42 22 196.85 20 104.2
Buffalo, NY 109.27 16 239.40 9 119.1
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 111.28 11 208.35 18 87.2
New York & Long Island, NY 119.08 3 201.49 19 69.2
Philadelphia, PA 104.86 20 240.81 8 129.6
Pittsburgh, PA 109.40 15 229.46 12 109.7
Chicago, IL 116.85 6 234.28 11 100.5
Cleveland, OH 110.61 13 223.28 15 101.9
Detroit, MI 145.45 1 298.31 1 105.1
Milwaukee, WI 116.43 7 213.11 16 83.0
Minneapolis, MN 102.48 21 187.39 21 82.9
St. Louis, MO 111.18 12 225.15 13 102.5
Atlanta, GA 118.32 5 297.41 2 151.4
Baltimore, MD 108.25 18 251.63 5 132.5
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 116.06 8 257.53 4 121.9
Houston, TX 110.60 14 247.46 6 123.7
Denver, CO 115.12 10 237.83 10 106.6
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 125.98 2 261.43 3 107.5
Portland, OR 108.61 17 173.00 22 59.3
San Francisco, CA 118.59 4 224.42 14 89.2
Total 113.45 232.13 104.6
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Table 5.11
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF ACCOUNTING CLERKS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 115.13 20 207.00 21 79.8
Hartford, CT 213.00 18
Worcester, MA 128.53 6 212.50 19 65.3
Buffalo, NY 129.60 5 249.50 5 92.5
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 124.82 12 215.00 17 72.2
New York & Long Island, NY 132.09 4 220.41 15 66.9
Philadelphia, PA 116.37 18 240.50 7 106.7
Pittsburgh, PA 139.83 2 268.00 2 91.7
Chicago, IL 126.85 9 229.50 12 80.9
Cleveland, OH 121.75 13 224.50 14 84.4
Detroit, MI 157.93 1 296.50 1 87.7
Milwaukee, WI 125.13 11 216.00 16 72.6
Minneapolis, MN 110.33 21 195.00 22 76.7
St. Louis, MO 127.96 8 230.00 11 79.7
Atlanta, GA 119.82 15 209.00 20 74.4
Baltimore, MD 126.58 10 263.50 3 108.2
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 115.91 19 225.00 13 94.1
Houston, TX 121.35 14 241.50 6 99.0
Denver, CO 118.82 16 236.00 9 98.6
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 128.52 7 236.50 8 84.0
Portland, OR 118.35 17 231.50 10 95.6
San Francisco, CA 135.39 3 252.50 4 86.5
Total 125.76 232.40 84.8
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Table 5.12
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF KEY ENTRY OPERATORS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 106.00 16 210.50 16 98.6
Hartford, CT 101.31 22 195.50 21 93.0
Worcester, MA 102.68 21 200.00 20 94.8
Buffalo, NY 112.30 10 242.00 5 115.5
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 110.32 13 218.00 12 97.6
New York & Long Island, NY 116.24 6 214.47 14 84.5
Philadelphia, PA 105.71 17 217.00 13 105.3
Pittsburgh, PA 112.43 9 246.50 3 119.2
Chicago, IL 118.82 4 218.50 11 83.9
Cleveland, OH 111.35 12 223.00 10 100.3
Detroit, MI 142.87 1 312.50 1 118.7
Milwaukee, WI 109.56 14 206.00 18 88.0
Minneapolis, MN 102.90 20 195.00 22 89.5
St. Louis, MO 112.83 8 214.00 15 89.7
Atlanta, GA 118.57 5 202.50 19 70.8
Baltimore, MD 108.55 15 233.00 6 114.6
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 112.10 11 225.50 8 101.2
Houston, TX 104.08 19 223.50 9 114.7
Denver, CO 113.31 7 228.00 7 101.2
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 128.17 2 252.70 2 97.2
Portland, OR 105.28 18 208.00 17 97.6
San Francisco, CA 119.34 3 242.50 4 103.2
Total 112.49 224.03 99.2
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Table 5.13
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS ANALYSTS, IN BUSINESS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 253.41 9 425.00 19 67.7
Hartford, CT 413.90 21
Worcester, MA 262.00 4 436.50 16 66.6
Buffalo, NY 243.76 13 451.50 13 85.2
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 274.94 3 442.50 15 60.9
New York & Long Island, NY 286.70 2 510.43 2 78.0
Philadelphia, PA 237.59 14 456.50 10 92.1
Pittsburgh, PA 258.54 6 502.00 3 94.2
Chicago, IL 256.77 8 446.00 14 73.7
Cleveland, OH 227.80 18 478.00 6 109.8
Detroit, MI 300.19 1 544.00 1 81.2
Milwaukee, WI 233.70 16 431.50 18 84.6
Minneapolis, MN 432.50 17
St. Louis, MO 217.45 19 410.00 22 88.5
Atlanta, GA 246.38 10 452.00 12 83.5
Baltimore, MD 211.68 20 456.00 11 115.4
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 259.81 5 475.50 7 83.0
Houston, TX 232.66 17 469.50 8 101.8
Denver, CO 244.71 11 463.00 9 89.2
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 258.00 7 500.52 4 94.0
Portland, OR 243.89 12 418.50 20 71.6
San Francisco, CA 234.68 15 482.00 5 105.4
Total 249.23 458.97 84.2
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Table 5.14
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS, IN BUSINESS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 198.28 12 374.00 10 88.6
Hartford, CT 350.50 16
Worcester, MA 177.27 18 348.50 17 96.6
Buffalo, NY 179.04 17 391.00 5 118.4
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 211.01 4 371.00 11 75.8
New York & Long Island, NY 233.67 1 379.32 7 62.3
Philadelphia, PA 104.28 20 456.50 1 337.8
Pittsburgh, PA 184.08 16 355.50 14 93.1
Chicago, IL 205.45 6 348.50 17 69.6
Cleveland, OH 185.93 14 379.00 8 103.8
Detroit, MI 228.31 2 449.00 2 96.7
Milwaukee, WI 201.44 9 338.00 21 67.8
Minneapolis, MN 359.50 13
St. Louis, MO 195.67 13 338.00 21 72.7
Atlanta, GA 200.46 10 339.00 20 69.1
Baltimore, MD 185.59 15 352.50 15 89.9
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 203.70 7 389.50 6 91.2
Houston, TX 200.25 11 348.00 19 73.8
Denver, CO 207.42 5 408.50 4 96.9
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 217.13 3 414.55 3 90.9
Portland, OR 152.52 19 365.00 12 139.3
San Francisco, CA 201.82 8 377.00 9 86.8
Total 193.67 374.20 93.2
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Table 5.15
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF COMPUTER OPERATORS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 136.75 19 263.50 16 92.7
Hartford, CT 279.00 12
Worcester, MA 133.09 20 258.00 18 93.9
Buffalo, NY 141.16 16 325.00 2 130.2
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 151.36 8 265.50 15 75.4
New York & Long Island, NY 156.65 6 290.30 7 85.3
Philadelphia, PA 139.40 17 280.00 11 100.9
Pittsburgh, PA 145.76 14 253.00 20 73.6
Chicago, IL 157.45 4 280.50 10 78.2
Cleveland, OH 148.13 11 293.00 6 97.8
Detroit, MI 184.73 1 383.50 1 107.6
Milwaukee, WI 147.34 12 251.50 21 70.7
Minneapolis, MN 232.00 22
St. Louis, MO 146.11 13 258.00 18 76.6
Atlanta, GA 157.13 5 286.50 9 82.3
Baltimore, MD 138.23 18 289.50 8 109.4
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 142.13 15 272.00 13 91.4
Houston, TX 150.67 9 271.50 14 80.2
Denver, CO 158.25 3 297.50 5 88.0
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 165.55 2 298.13 4 80.1
Portland, OR 150.07 10 259.00 17 72.6
San Francisco, CA 153.31 7 301.00 3 96.3
Total 150.16 281.27 87.3
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Table 5.16
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF DRAFTERS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 174.46 4 327.00 5 87.4
Hartford, CT 294.50 18
Worcester, MA 170.68 8 308.50 13 80.7
Buffalo, NY 163.83 14 343.50 3 109.7
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 165.51 12 278.50 21 68.3
New York & Long Island, NY 179.85 2 287.79 20 60.0
Philadelphia, PA 170.67 9 326.50 6 91.3
Pittsburgh, PA 173.56 5 336.00 4 93.6
Chicago, IL 172.89 6 316.50 10 83.1
Cleveland, OH 163.00 16 317.50 8 94.8
Detroit, MI 241.36 1 463.50 1 92.0
Milwaukee, WI 162.07 18 289.50 19 78.6
Minneapolis, MN 165.33 13 304.50 15 84.2
St. Louis, MO 168.13 10 317.50 8 88.8
Atlanta, GA 142.98 21 263.00 22 83.9
Baltimore, MD 162.08 17 352.00 2 117.2
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 153.55 20 312.50 12 103.5
Houston, TX 163.62 15 316.00 11 93.1
Denver, CO 165.62 11 306.50 14 85.1
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 174.93 3 297.02 17 69.8
Portland, OR 158.06 19 300.00 16 89.8
San Francisco, CA 170.88 7 320.50 7 87.6
Total 169.67 317.22 87.0
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Table 5.17
MEAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF ELECTRONICS TECHNICIANS,
BY SMSA: 1970 AND 1980
Mean Mean Percent
Weekly Weekly Change
Earnings Rank Earnings Rank 1970-
SMSA 1970 1970 1980 1980 1980
Boston, MA 158.50 10 298.50 19 88.3
Hartford, CT 177.60 4 301.50 17 69.8
Worcester, MA 308.00 15
Buffalo, NY 288.50 20
Newark & Jersey City, NJ 272.00 22
New York & Long Island, NY 286.75 21
Philadelphia, PA 304.50 16
Pittsburgh, PA 171.00 6 356.00 3 108.2
Chicago, IL 188.00 3 323.00 12 71.8
Cleveland, OH 161.50 9 301.50 17 86.7
Detroit, MI 438.50 1
Milwaukee, WI 311.00 13
Minneapolis, MN 310.00 14
St. Louis, MO 196.50 1 367.00 2 86.8
Atlanta, GA 334.50 10
Baltimore, MD 166.00 7 353.50 4 113.0
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 176.50 5 349.00 5 97.7
Houston, TX 164.00 8 328.50 11 100.3
Denver, CO 339.00 8
Los Angeles-Anaheim, CA 191.00 2 347.05 6 81.7
Portland, OR 342.00 7
San Francisco, CA 337.95 9
Total 175.06 327.19 86.9
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Wages paid clerical and technical workers in California are
relatively high. Since manufacturing labor and engineers also
received high salaries, the conclusion is that California is a
relatively high wage state across most occupations.
Clerical and technical workers in Massachusetts and Minnesota
received relatively low wages. Since manufacturing labor and
engineers also received relatively low salaries in Minneapolis, the
area is in general a low wage one. Massachusetts is generally a low
wage state, though professional engineers were relatively well paid.
Wages paid clerical and technical workers in New York, Colorado,
and Texas ranged from average to well above average. This contrasts
to the relatively low wages paid manufacturing labor in these states.
Thus, the areas are not clearly high or low wage areas. However,
relative wages increased in Texas during the 1970s, and if the trend
continues Texas could become a relatively high wage state.
Michigan, or at least Detroit, is clearly a high wage area. Wages
paid clerical and technical workers are generally the highest and
often exceed the second ranked SMSA by a significant amount. For
example, technicians in Detroit received annual salaries $5,500 higher
than the second ranked St. Louis, in 1980. This size of difference
holds for other occupations as well.
The wages paid manufacturing labor were generally high in the
Midwest and low in the South. These generalizations don't hold across
all the clerical and technical occupations. Many clerical workers in
the Midwest cities received average to low wages, particularly in
1980. Technicians and stenographers and typists in the South received
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relatively high wages. Relative wages substantially increased in the
South during the 1970s for many occupations, including secretaries,
stenographers and typists, accounting clerks, and key entry operators.
The conclusion is thus that the Midwest and South are mixed areas,
with some high wage and some low wage occupations.
Computer Companies. None of the executives that I interviewed
stressed that wage rates were a crucial factor in their U.S. location
decisions. (Wage rates do affect foreign location decisions, as
discussed in Chapter 6.) Either, this is true, and there are factors
other than low wage rates that make the labor in certain areas more
attractive than others. Or, companies are reluctant to discuss wages
because it is a sensitive subject. I think, for the companies I
interviewed, wage rates are not crucial factors. One reason this is
true is that these companies don't pay the lowest wages in the
industry. For example, at Honeywell's printed circuit board
fabrication and assembly plant in Boston, hourly workers (assembly and
inspection jobs up to, but not including technicians) currently
recieve $6.00-$12.00 an hour. NCR says it locates in areas with
moderate wages, not the lowest or the highest. IBM is reputed to pay
higher wages than the other large computer companies.
The above discussion is not meant to imply that companies ignore
wage rates. In some cases, companies will shift production to avoid
paying extremely high wages. Many of the plant expansions of my
sample companies during the 1960s and early 1970s were into areas that
paid relatively low manufacturing wages. However, wage differences
don't appear to explain many location decisions made since the
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mid-1970s.
NCR and Burroughs have both made some location decisions partly in
response to extremely high wages. NCR's transition from mechanical to
electronic products in the early 1970s involved decentralizing
production out of their headquarters in Dayton, Ohio. Prior to the
transition, 80 percent of the manufacturing was done in Dayton. Only
20 percent of the production remained there a few years later. The
company didn't stress wages as being the reason for the move, though
wages clearly played a role. Dayton was the company's highest cost
plant prior to the early 1970s. Average wages in Dayton were $4.95
per hour and in other plants they were $2.50 to $3.00 per hour.
Thus, shifting production out of Dayton had a sizeable effect on the
total wage bill. The company also stated that when they introduced
electronic products in Dayton they forced wages down to the point that
Dayton is now one of the lowest cost plants.
Burroughs used to have a number of manufacturing plants in
Detroit. Today, only one plant remains in Detroit, and its product is
mechanically based as opposed to electronics based. The company
argues that electronics products are not done in Detroit because by
the time it was clear to Burroughs that electro-mechanical products
would be almost totally replaced by electronics products, Burroughs
had plants in California and Philadelphia producing electronics
products. It seems clear that this is indeed part of the story. The
Burroughs facilities in California and Philadelphia date back to the
1950s and have always been involved in the development and production
of computers.
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However, it also seems clear that Burroughs never tried to do much
electronics production in Detroit. I would argue that this can be
partly attributable to the fact that wages in Detroit are extremely
high. The analysis in the previous section showed that Detroit had
the highest wages in the country in most occupations. A Wall Street
Journal article stated that wages in Detroit were $3.00-$4.00 an hour
higher than wages in other Burroughs plants in 1981. Burroughs still
had several plants in Detroit at this time but was planning to close
them unless wages went down.8 Wages did not decrease and the plants
were closed when the products made there were discontinued. Burroughs
didn't move plants, but let them close by attrition.
Many new plants opened by the companies in my sample during the
late 1960s and early 1970s were in areas with relatively low wage
rates. DEC and Sperry both sought areas with large labor pools for
new plants during the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, as discussed
in the previous section. DEC opened a number of new facilities in
Massachusetts and Sperry expanded in areas outside Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and Minneapolis, Minnesota. IBM opened plants in
Minnesota and Colorado. These areas all paid manufacturing labor low
to average wages as Tables 5.3-5.6 showed.
Burroughs computers are made in the Los Angeles-San Diego area of
California and just outisde Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Burroughs has
been in Los Angeles since the 1950s when it bought a computer company
located there. Burroughs added 4 new plants in the area during the
1960s and 1970s. One advantage to expanding here was that wages for
manufacturing labor in Los Angeles were quite low. The Philadelphia
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area is also a low to average wage area.
Representatives of Honeywell didn't mention wages as being an
important location factor, but one of the company's centers of
computer activity is in Boston, a relatively low wage area.
DEC, NCR, Honeywell, Hewlett Packard, and IBM all have
manufacturing facilities in Colorado. Wages in the state are
relatively low, though no company cited this as an important factor
influencing their decision to locate there.
The one significant counter example to all the above examples, is
Silicon Valley, a relatively high wage area. High wage rates have
clearly not stifled growth. Hewlett Packard has at least 7 plants in
the San Francisco-San Jose area. The company was founded in the area
and has been expanding there ever since. Hewlett Packard added a
number of new plants outside California during the 1970s, in Idaho,
Washington, and Oregon. They did not, however, simply expand in these
areas to pay low wages. Manufacturing labor in Portland, Oregon
receives some of the highest wages in the country (Tables 5.3-5.6).
Engineers, as opposed to manufacturing labor, became the crucial
component in computer manufacturing around the mid-1970s. Six of the
companies in my sample built new facilities in the South and Mountain
states in the late 1970s. Four of IBM's new plants in the 1970s were
in the southern United States. DEC also built 4 new plants in the
Southwest and South. Honeywell, Burroughs, NCR, and DEC all expanded
in Colorado. Several companies also expanded in Texas.
Engineers in the South and West received low to average salaries
as Tables 5.7 and 5.8 showed. However, I would argue that the
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companies did not choose these locations simply to get low-cost
engineers. Several facts support this conclusion. First, engineers
must possess the skills necessary to do the job, and unless there are
qualified engineers in an area, a company won't locate there, no
matter how low the wage rate. Second, the analysis in Tables 5.7 and
5.8 showed that there is not substantial variation in engineering
salaries among areas, except at the ends of the distribution. A
$1,000 annual difference in earnings doesn't make enough difference in
costs to significantly affect location decisions. Third, even though
engineering salaries are lower in the South than the North, the wages
paid clerical and technical workers who provide support services, are
not particularly low in the South. Wages paid these workers, who
comprise 25 percent of the industry's workforce, are average to
substantially above average in the South. Therefore, locating plants
in the South and West will not necessarily save on labor costs. I
would also argue that it is not just the somewhat lower engineering
salaries that attract companies to the South and West, but the fact
that these are areas with little history of organized labor and areas
in which engineers like to live. These points are discussed in detail
in the next two sections.
The conclusion from this analysis is that wage rates, by
themselves don't determine plant locations. If wage rates were the
sole criterion, Silicon Valley with its high wages would not be an
attractive location. This implies that wage rates work with other
factors to reinforce positve or negative aspects of an area. What are
the other factors that make labor of different areas attractive or
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unattractive?
Unions and Organized Labor
The computer industry has few unionized plants. Attempts by
various unions to organize workers in the electronics industry have by
and large failed. One article argued that many workers in Silicon
Valley refuse to organize because they think that unions are basically
ineffective, weak, and a waste of time. 9 Computer companies contend
that workers are not interested in joining unions because they are
satisfied with the compensation and conditions in manufacturing
plants.10
Computer companies certainly don't want unions. The issue is not
only wages, but companies also feel that unions restrict their
flexibility in organizing production. Jobs change quickly in the
industry as the technology changes. Companies don't want to be locked
into a set of positions that will soon become outdated. In some
companies, assembly workers may do any one of a number of jobs,
depending on what has to be done that day and what workers are absent.
Companies argue that unions would restrict their ability to assign
workers to different jobs. Some companies also argue that they will
be more profitable if they can promote workers on the basis of merit,
and not seniority, as union contracts generally require.
Whether or not companies' fears of unionizaton are justified, they
do make location decisions partly based on a desire to avoid union
organizing. The evidence for this contention is mostly inferential as
companies won't admit to locating in order to avoid unions.
A representative of Data General argued that computer companies
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don't expand in the Northeast or California due to the existence of
various types of work laws. Companies are currently expanding in
areas such as New Mexico, Arizona, North Carolina, and South Carolina
where there is not a large union threat and there are few laws
regulating work. Work laws primarily refer to right-to-work laws that
ban compulsory union membership even in plants where a majority of
workers want the union. These laws mainly affect blue-collar workers.
However, many Southern and Southwestern states also have fewer
regulations that protect both white collar and blue collar workers,
and are often less diligent in enforcing exising laws than some
Northern states. For example, anti-discrimination suits are more
difficult to prosecute and win in the South than the Northeast.
Legislation like the "right to know" law recently passed in
Massachusetts, that gives all workers the right to demand information
on the safety of the chemicals and equipment they work with would not
be passed in most Southern states.
Data General has made decisions based on union concerns. The
company began in Massachusetts in 1969 and for its first 8 years, the
only U.S. locations were in New England. In 1977, Data General opened
a research and development center in North Carolina and has since
established a complete set of facilities in North Carolina,
duplicating those in New England. The primarly reason for expanding
in North Carolina was that the state does not have a history of union
organization and is also less restrictive for white collar activities
than New England. The company says it will never expand in the
Mid-West because of the presence of unions.
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DEC expanded its facilities primarily in Massachusetts at least
until the mid-1970s. The company was, however, sensitive to union
issues. The areas in which they located plants were always "out of
the way," rural areas. These areas are less subject to pressures from
union organizers than are urban areas. In addition, when DEC
established a new facility, it grew very slowly. At the end of 2 or 3
years, a new plant would only employ about 200 people. One reason for
the slow growth was to acculturate DEC so that they realized they
really didn't need unions as DEC provided for them as well as any
union would.
NCR is one of the few computer companies with union plants. About
half their plants are unionized, those in Dayton, Ohio; Ithaca, New
York; Witchita, Kansas; and Florida. The latter two states have
right-to-work laws, which didn't prevent the unionization.
Unionization is not a recent occurrence at NCR. The plants that have
unions have had them since the days of mechanical products.
One of the changes that occurred at NCR during its transition from
mechanical to electronic products in the early 1970s was a
decentralization of employment out of Dayton. There were 13,600
manufacturing workers employed in Dayton in 1972 and only 500 by 1977.
NCR argued that this change was necessary, if the company was going to
compete in the electronic era. However, it does seem that union
problems contributed to the timing of the company's decision to move
and the extent to which they shifted production out of Dayton.
Approximately 8500 production and maintenance workers had been on
strike in Dayton from October 1971 to around February 1972. The
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strike had disasterous effects on business. It held up computer
production because even though the CPUs were made in California,
printers were made in Dayton. Cash registers manufactured overseas
were held up because they couldn't get parts from Dayton.11 Changes
would have occurred at NCR, but union problems surely hastened them.
Today, NCR's new manufacturing plants have to be in states with
right-to-work laws and the company wants to locate in areas in which
there will be little pressure for unionization. These considerations
played a key role when NCR relocated a plant from Delaware to South
Carolina in 1980.
Plant location decisions at Sperry have taken advantages of
differences in states' work laws. Sperry closed a tape drive facility
in New York and moved the operations to a Tennesee plant. The company
argued that the New York plant was antiquated and that the workforce
in Tennessee was more skilled than in New York. These differences are
probably valid, but the fact that Tennessee has right-to-work laws and
New York doesn't undoubtedly made the move more attractive. One of
the satellite plants Sperry established in the mid-1970s was just over
the border from Minnesota, in Iowa, a state with right-to-work laws.
Sperry's other cluster of manufacturing plants is in Utah, also a
state with right-to-work laws.
I would also argue that it was partly the perception that
Philadelphia was an area with organized labor that made Sperry choose
to expand their manufacturing facilities in Minnesota and not
Philadelphia. The company chose to expand headquarters and
engineering functions in Philadelphia and to discontinue manufacturing
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in the area. The company argued that the Philadelphia area was
particularly well suited for headquarters functions, which is
undoubtedly true. The company chose to expand manufacturing in
Minnesota because they felt they could get the "right kind of people"
in Minnesota, people that were motivated, dedicated, and with "good
work ethics." I would argue that Sperry perceived the workers in
Minnesota would be less likely to organize than those in Philadelphia.
This was not the sole reason Sperry expanded in Minneapolis, but it
partly explains why when faced with the choice of expanding in either
Philadelphia or Minnesota, they chose the latter.
The plants that IBM established in the 1970s were all in the South
and all in states with right-to-work laws. IBM would probably argue
that this is just regional diversification of plants to tap new labor
marekts. Nonetheless, the plants will have more flexibility than if
they had located in states with stricter labor regulations. IBM also
sold a site in Oklahoma that was in its landbank for future
development when GM build a plant nearby. A fear that the GM plant
would attract union organizers was undoubtedly one reason for IBM's
sale of the land.
NCR, Burroughs, Sperry, and IBM all have at least one plant in
Florida, a state not known for its universities or skilled workforce.
However, Florida is always among the top 5 location choices,
undoubtedly in part because of its right-to-work laws (and
attractiveness to engineers due to its climate).
Union issues also appear to influence location decisions within a
state. An article in the Wall Street Journal contrasted Colorado
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Springs and Pueblo, Colorade, two towns only 40 miles apart. Colorado
Springs is extremely attractive to electronics firsm and has over 20
high tech companies and 100 related research firms and vendors.
Pueblo, in contrast, has been trying, unsuccessfully to lure high
tech. Pueblo is not attractive because it is an old steel town and a
union stronghold. There have never been union problems at the plant
but the fact that the labor is organized with union negotiated wages
makes the town unattractive. Colorado Springs, in contrast, has very
low rates of union activism.12
When Atari moved all its production to Asia early in 1983, some
people suggested that this was tied to an effort to undercut union
organization. One month before Atari announced its decision, the
Glaziers and Glassworkers union reported that 30 percent of the
company's hourly employees had signed cards in favor of a union
election.13
Avoiding potential union activity is by no means the sole
criterion in determining location of manufacturing plants. However,
there are many areas that have the manufacturing and professional
labor needed by computer companies. If a company has to choose
between two otherwise equal areas, it is likely to choose the area
with less union activity. The southern states are particularly
attractive today because of their right-to-work laws and all the
ramifications of this in terms of labor and government attitudes.
Union pressures can be the impetus for a move that is also justified
on other grounds, as evidenced by NCR's move out of Dayton and Atari's
move to Asia.
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Quality of Life
The quality of life in an area is becoming an increasingly
important factor in plant location decisions. What this means for
computer companies is that an area has to have qualities that make it
attractive for professionals, especially engineers. Previous sections
discussed the increasing importance of engineers in the production of
computers. I suggested that the absence of organized labor and the
somewhat lower than average wages were two factors that made the
southern U.S. an attractive area for plants. The quality of life in
an area is at least as important as these other factors.
Quality of life is not a rigorously defined term. The qualities
that make an area one in which engineers desire to live include the
presence of cultural activities, such as museums, theatres, and music.
An area must have or be close to various recreational activities.
Many professional employees are interested in obtaining advanced
degress, so the area must have a university offering graduate level
courses. The presence of a university also provides an intellectually
stimulating atmosphere that professionals find attractive.
The areas that professionals find attractive by a quality of life
definition are generally cities, though not the largest cities,
located in the Northeast, Mountain, Pacific, and South. Examples of
attractive cities are Boston, Massachusetts; Austin, Texas; Denver,
Colorado; Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; and Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Seven of the 10 companies I studied cited the quality of life in
an area as an important factor in current location decisions. The
three companies that didn't emphasize quality of life as a factor are
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in slightly different positions from the other companies. Honeywell
has not added any plants in the U.S. since 1974 and thus hasn't made
location decisions based on the need to attract engineers. Amdahl is
a small company with only one U.S. location. Data General's location
in North Carolina provided an attractive quality of life for
employees, though the company cited the absence of organized labor as
being the important reason for the location.
The quality of life in an area is the most important criteria in
NCR's location decisions today. The company needs to attract
professionals and engineers who can and do demand to live in what they
consider pleasant places. NCR closed a plant in Delaware and moved
the operations to South Carolina because it couldn't attract enough
engineers to Delaware. The quality of life in Delaware was mixed.
There were numerous recreational opportunities, but no cultural
opportunities and no universities in the area.
The quality of life in an area is also of primary importance for
IBM. The company is different from others in my sample because IBM
generally transfers approximately 1,000 employees when it builds a new
major facility (other companies generally transfer less than 100).
Thus, the area IBM chooses must be attractive to currently employed
professionals.
Prime and Sperry cited amenities as an important factor in their
locations in Massachusetts and Minnesota, respectively.
DEC now also chooses locations based on the attractiveness of the
area, or where engineers currently live or are willing to live. It
was not until the late 1970s that an area's ability to attract
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professionals became important. Prior to this time, DEC located in
areas to attract manufacturing labor, as discussed in the first
section of the chapter. The changing requirements of the
manufacturing process combined with the fact that DEC began making new
products in relatively autonomous facilities altered the type of
locations DEC selected. For example, DEC opened a plant to
manufacture storage products in Colorado in the late 1970s. DEC
wanted to attract the best disk engineers, and had to locate their
plant in an area that attracted these engineers.
There is some evidence certain that areas in California are
becoming less attractive than they used to be because the quality of
life in the area is changing. Burroughs is having some difficulty
attracting good professional people to their computer operations in
the Los Angeles area. The smog, congestion, and hassle contribute to
making the city an unattractive place to live. Professionals would
rather live somewhere else, and the opportunities exist so that they
can choose where to locate. The problems Burroughs is having are not
severe enough to make them relocate their plants. However, Burroughs
recently built a research center in Austin, Texas and a company
representative said that engineers would much rather live in Austin
than Los Angeles.
Silicon Valley has also developed problems that are partly related
to quality of life issues. Increased pollution and congestion, and
all the problems that these bring are making the area less attractive
than it used to be (Saxenian 1980). Amdahl, whose only U.S. plant is
located in Silicon Valley is planning to build another facility. The
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plant will not be in the San Jose area, but will either be in Arizona,
Oregon, or Washington. Hewlett Packard is firmly established in the
Bay Area. However, they built a number of new plants during the 1970s
in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. Silicon Valley is certainly not
declining, but many companies are choosing to expand elsewhere, partly
because the quality of life in the area is declining. (Other reasons
for expanding elsewhere include high land costs and the high turnover
rate among professionals. These issues are discussed in later
sections.)
Future U.S. location decisions will be based on where professional
engineers want to live. The trend to hiring relatively more engineers
is expected to continue, and if companies want to attract the best
engineers, they are going to have to locate in areas that are
attractive to professionals.
Educational Institutions
Universities and technical schools have played an important role
in plant location decisions in the computer industry. These
institutions have been important in different ways during the various
stages in the history of the industry.
The early computers were developed in university laboratories
during the 1940s. All the early companies that produced computers
were located near universities and many companies were started by
researchers working in the university who left to form their own
companies.
The Sperry Corporation became involved in computers when it merged
with the Remington Rand Corporation in 1955. Remington Rand, a
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manufacturer of business machines, had become involved in computers in
the early 1950s when it purchased two small computer companies. One
company, Engineering Research Associates, was located in Minneapolis,
Minnesota near the University of Minnesota, a superior state
university. The other company was the Eckert-Mauchly Computer
Corporation which had developed the ENIAC and UNIVAC computers, two of
the earliest machines. Mauchly and Eckert developed their machine
while at the Moore School of Electrical Engineering at the University
of Pennsylvania (Brock 1975).
Burroughs also began some of its computer work in the Philadelphia
area where it had established a research center in the 1950s. The
presence of the University of Pennsylvania undoubtedly played a role
in this decision.
IBM began its computer development outside New York City where it
had access to a number of universities. IBM funded research at
Columbia University in New York. It also funded Aiken at Harvard who
developed one of the early computers (Sobel 1981).
The Boston area with MIT and Harvard has been at the forefront of
computer development, and four of the companies I studied were founded
in the area. Honeywell, a Minneapolis company got into the computer
business when it formed a joint venture with Raytheon in 1955. The
new company, called Datamatic was located outside Boston near
Raytheon's headquarters. DEC was founded by an MIT engineer. Data
General was started by former DEC employees and Prime was organized by
former Honeywell engineers.
Hewlett Packard and Amdahl were formed in Palo Alto, California
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where Stanford University is located. The university's electrical
engineering school is well known and the university has a history of
working closely with the business community to encourage and develop
new ideas and products. Hewlett Packard was founded by a student of
the engineering school.
The California Institute of Technology and UCLA, two schools with
well known electrical engineering departments are located in Los
Angeles. NCR entered the computer business in 1953 by purchasing the
Computer Research Corporation, a small firm located in Los Angeles.
Burroughs purchased the Electrodata company, also located in Los
Angeles, in the mid-1950s and began producing computers for commercial
use there. The small companies would not have been started in Los
Angeles if it hadn't been for the presence of the universities.
The presence of universities has also been a factor in affecting
where companies expanded their facilities. Some companies and some
plants were located near universities prior to the 1970s. However,
the role that universities played depends on what the manufacturing
plant was established to do, particularly on whether it operated
autonomously or as a satellite facility. The importance of having a
university in the area increased for most companies after the
mid-1970s as the demand for engineers increased.
IBM has always located in areas with major universities or good
state universities. The company needed additional sites in the 1950s
and the existence of a major university was at the top of their
criteria for selecting an area. The four areas they chose were
Lexington, Kentucky; Boulder, Colorado; Burlingon, Vermont; and
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Rochester, Minnesota. The first three towns had major universities.
Rochester was near Minneapolis and had a relatively educated community
due to the presence of the Mayo Clinic. The presence of universities
has always been important for IBM because their manufacturing plants
were generally autonomous units and thus the company had to be able to
attract engineers as well as assemblers. IBM is even more university
oriented today than it was in the past, as manufacturing personnel
have become less important relative to engineers, managers, and
programmers.
There are some expamples of other companies that expanded near
universities during the 1960s. Plants that were established to be
responsible for the manufacture of a complete product needed to be in
an area to attract engineering talent. Sperry opened a facility in
Salt Lake City, Utah in the mid-1960s to manufacture peripheral
products. Hewlett Packard established a plant in Colorado in 1959 to
do complete products. The universities in both areas were one of the
attractive features.
Most of the companies in my sample that added new plants during
the 1960s did not look for university towns. However, beginning in
the mid-1970s companies often chose locations near major universities.
The increasing importance of engineers in manufacturing was one reason
for this change.14 In addition, many companies had changed the
functions of their manufacturing plants, making plants more autonomous
than they had been in the past. Both these changes meant companies
had to be in areas to attract engineers. Locating in the towns where
the engineers were educated was important in attracting them.
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The most important factor driving DEC's plant location decisions
during the late 1970s was a need to be near centers of higher
education in order to attract engineers. DEC's new plants in the late
1970s were in Colorado Springs, Colorado; Albequerque, New Mexico; and
Phoenix, Arizona. This contrasts dramatically to its locations in the
early 1970s, which were in rural areas with large pools of
manufacturing labor.
Colorado, besides being a nice place to live, has a superior local
university.15 Many of the companies I studied have expanded here,
including NCR, Burroughs, DEC, Hewlett Packard, and Honeywell. The
presence of the university has been one important factor in attracting
these plants.
The presence of the University of Texas in Austin and Texas A & M,
and their committment to building their computer science and
electrical engineering departments was a strong drawing card in the
Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation's (MCC) decision
to locate in Austin. The MCC is an industry-financed consortium that
will be engaged solely in computer technology research and
development. The center will eventually employ 400 engineers and
computer scientists, so the existence of a superior university was
essential to the site location. It was not only the presence of the
two universities that was important. Of equal importance was the fact
that the University of Texas promised to accelerate the development of
its engineering and computer science departments by committing $20
million in endowments and about $2 million a year in graduate
fellowships and related expenses.16 IBM has had a plant in Austin
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since the early 1970s and Data General and Burroughs built facilities
in Austin in the late 1970s.
The Raleigh-Durham area of North Carolina has become known as
Research Triangle because of the presence of three universities in the
area, Duke University, the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, and North Carolina State in Raleigh. The schools developed and
continue to strengthen their engineering and computer science
departments. IBM and Data General both chose to build extensive
facilities here in the late 1970s.
Universities play a second role in site location decisions,
besides providing scientific and engineering talent for the company.
Universities are also an amenity for workers who want to continue
their educational training. NCR reports that 75 percent of the
professionals they hire with BAs want the option to pursue an advanced
degree, though only 18 percent ever do so. Hewlett Packard also
reported that it is important that an area have at least a community
college or junior collge available to its employees. The colleges and
universities don't have to be top-notch to serve as an amenity for the
workers.
Technical schools are another type of educational facility whose
presence in an area has been important for some companies,
particularly during the 1960s and early 1970s. Companies that
established satellite manufacturing facilities primarily employed
unskilled workers, though they also needed skilled technicians. DEC's
plants build in the late 1960s and early 1970s were located as close
to Maynard and Boston as possible. DEC wanted to still be able to
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attract technicians from Boston's trade schools. The satellite plants
that Sperry established during the same time also had to be in areas
with trade schools, so the company could be assured of getting a
sufficient quantity of technicians.
The printed circuit board plant that DEC built in 1980 was located
in Greenville, South Carolina in part because of the technical schools
in the area. The fabrication and assembly of circuit boards does not
require the skills that designing computers requires, so the plant did
not have to be in an area with a first rate university.
Computer manufacturing companies were generally started around
universities with first-rate electrical engineering departments.
Manufacturing plants located in areas with trade schools during the
1960s and early 1970s. Plant expansion, particularly since the
mid-1970s has been in areas with superior universities. Locations
near universities will become more important in the future as
engineers become an increasingly important component of production.
U.S. universities and the surrounding university community provide
a talent base not found elsewhere in the world. Even if the actual
manufacturing is done off-shore (see Chapter 6 for this discussion),
the design and development of high end products, requiring the most
skill and talent, will always be done in the U.S. University areas
provide the talent necessary to design the most complex products.
History
Past location decisions have had an important effect on where
computer companies are located today. By past decisions I mean
locations originally chosen to manufacture products other than
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computers and location decisions made by the companies that originally
owned the businesses currently owned by the companies in my sample.
This is an important factor primarily for the older companies in my
sample who were in business prior to the development of computers.
IBM, NCR, Burroughs, and Sperry have all been around since the late
1800s or early 1900s manufacturing tabulating, adding, and other
office machines. Honeywell was formed to manufacture electrical
products in the early 1900s.
Burroughs, NCR, and Sperry all got into the computer business, in
part, by acquiring existing small computer companies. Burroughs
purchased the Electrodata company in Los Angeles, and this is one
center of Burrough's computer manufacturing today. NCR acquired the
Computer Research Corporation, also located in Los Angeles. Although
NCR later sold this site, the company's computer operations are in San
Diego, an area into which NCR expanded when it needed more space than
was available in Los Angeles. Sperry began in the computer business
by purchasing two small companies located in Philadelphia and
Minneapolis, which are still development and manufacturing centers for
the company.
Honeywell got into the computer business by forming a joint
venture with Raytheon. The new company was located in the Boston area
and Honeywell's computer operations grew around this site. Honeywell
acquired General Electic's computer operations in 1970 when GE went
out of the computer business. General Electric had one set of
facilities in Phoenix, Arizona, where it had been since 1956.
Honeywell remains in Phoenix today and manufactures large systems
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there.
Some computer manufacturing plants are in locations that were
originally chosen to manufacture another product. The locations were
selected to fit the needs of the old product, but did not necessarily
fit the needs of the current one. Sometimes these locations worked
out, but somtimes the problems were severe enough to force the company
to relocate the operations.
Sperry found that it is often easiest to expand operations in
existing facilities. The Remington Rand side of the business, which
made typewriters and adding machines, was shrinking during the 1960s
due to the obsolesence of some products. Computer operations were
growing at the same time. It was relatively easy for the computer
operations to move into an old Remington Rand facility. The building
was there, some of the management team was left in the area, and there
was a ready labor force. This is the reason that Sperry manufactured
tape drives in New York during the 1960s. However, this is an example
where the match was not good enough and Sperry moved these operations
to Tennessee around 1970. The Tennessee location had previously been
an old Sperry plant that had done some electronics work. Sperry
argues that the New York plant was antiquated and the labor less
skilled than in Tennessee. (I also argued that the labor in Tennessee
was less organized than that in New York.)
IBM's headquarters and some major manufacturing plants are located
in the New York City area. IBM evolved from the old
Computing-Tabulating-Recording Corporation which Charles Flint put
together in 1910 from three small companies. The recording part of
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the company was the International Time Recording Company and it was
headquartered in Endicott, New York. This was the site of one of the
original IBM plants. The tabulating part of the business was
Hollerith tabulating machines, which was also a New York company.
Thus, when IBM moved into tabulating machines and then computers it
already had existing manufacturing plants in the area. The locations
were satisfactory according to other criteria and so the company has
grown in the New York area.
Previous location decisions also explain some of Burroughs current
locations. Burroughs had a research center in Philadelphia for some
time prior to its entry into the computer market. Burroughs began
developing a computer for the military during the late 1950s at this
research center. The Philadelphia area is now one of two centers
where Burroughs manufactures computers.
Burrough did some small computer manufacturing in Detroit, the
home of its old adding machine business. This is another example of a
match that didn't work out, because of the high wages and presence of
organized labor.
NCR currently manufactures printers and CRTs in Ithaca, New York.
NCR acquired the Ellis Adding Typewriter Company in 1928 which had a
manufacturing plant in Ithaca. The site evolved over the years to
where it currently manufactures peripheral equipment.
Past location decisions are one of the most important factors
accounting for the current locations of the older computer companies.
The centers of the computer operations of Burroughs, NCR, Honeywell,
and Sperry are all in the areas where the computer companies they
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acquired were located. Some of the current operations of these
companies and of IBM are located in plants that were built to
manufacture other products. Since companies often expand in areas in
which they have existing facilities, as discussed in the next section,
the past location decisions have a strong influence on current
locations.
Location Near Other Company Plants
There are both advantages and disadvantages to locating a new
manufacturing plant near an existing one. The advantages of closeness
outweighed the disadvantages prior to the mid-1970s. Since then the
advantages to dispersing plants have grown, particularly in order to
attract a broader base of engineering talent.
The largest advantage to clustering plants is that it is easier to
maintain management control and to maintain communication than it
would be if manufacturing plants were scattered all over the country.
Meetings are more easily arranged and undoubtedly occur more
frequently when plants are close than when they are far apart. Even
in this age of "electronic communication," physical proximity makes
communication easier and as a result increases the amount of
discussion. Physical proximity is particularly important when the
company is structured with one central plant and numerous satellite
manufacturing facilities because by definition all the administrative
and control functions are vested in the central plant. There is
evidence in practically all the computer companies I studied that many
new sites chosen in the 1960s and early 1970s were constrained to be
near existing sites. Some companies acknowledged the importance of
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clustering plants more explicitly that did others.
DEC's plant expansions during the late 1960s and early 1970s were
motivated by a need to hire more assembly labor. The new plants were
satellite facilities and DEC chose new locations to be as close to
headquarters in Maynard as possible. DEC stressed that it was
important to maintain good communication between the headquarters and
satellite plants because as new products were introduced the
manufacturing plants had to work closely with the engineering and
development staff.
Sperry established satellite manufacturing facilities outside its
research centers in Philadelpahia and Minneapolis between the late
1960s and mid-1970s. The new plants were within 1 to 3 hours driving
time of the central facility. Sperry also stressed that the satellite
plants had to be close enough for the central plants to maintain
management control.
By the mid-1970s other companies had also established clusters of
manufacturing plants. Burroughs manufactured its medium and large
commercial systems in southern California. At one time, Burroughs had
5 manufacturing plants within the 200 miles between San Diego and
Santa Barbara. The company closed 3 of these plants in the 1980s, so
that only 2 plants in the area still manufacture computers.
Burroughs' very large systems are engineered and manufactured in a
cluster of facilities outside Philadelphia.
NCR bought a computer company in Los Angeles and established
additional manufacturing capacity in San Diego. Honeywell
manufactures its computers in two clusters of plants, in Boston and
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Phoenix. Data General has a group of plants in New England and one in
North Carolina. Prime is a small company, though it has several sites
west of Boston. Hewlett Packard has expanded around its headquarters
in Palo Alto, California, and currently has 7 plants in the Bay Area.
I would argue based on the above evidence than an important factor
driving or constraining many location decisions prior to the mid-1970s
was the need for the company to maintain control and communication
with its different facilities. This lead to a clustering of plants in
the areas with existing facilities. Thus, already established areas
had an advantage over new areas from the very beginning. The benefits
of clustering would partly explain why Hewlett Packard chose to expand
its facilities in the extremely high wage San Francisco area. The
advantage of having plants located together and near headquarters
compensated for some other disadvantages of the area.
There are still advantages today to locating plants near each
other, even when they aren't satellite facilties. Physical proximity
still makes communication easier. The plant's function in part
determines how important this consideration is. For example, Amdahl
is planning to build a semiconductor manufacturing facility and will
build the plant within 1 1/2 hours driving time of its existing
Sunnyvale, California facility. The company felt it was important to
have the facility relatively close by to maintain better communication
since semiconductor manufacture and the basic research and development
of the computer system are closely related. On the other hand, Amdahl
is also planning to build another computer manufacturing facility.
This plant does not need to be close to the existing one. In fact,
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Amdahl is planning to build it in another state.
DEC's decision to build a second administrative facility in
southern New Hampshire is another example of how the function of the
facility dictated that it be close to headquarters. DEC needed more
space and more people for engineering, marketing, and administrative
functions in the late 1970s. The company chose to expand in southern
New Hampshire. One reason for this decision was that the facility was
close to headquarters and easy communication between the sites was
particularly important given the functions the new facility performed.
IBM, in contrast to the other companies, does not have clusters of
manufacturing plants. There are two reasons for this. One is that
IBM plants have generally operated as autonomous facilities. The
other reason is that IBM plants are much larger than other companies'
plants. The average size of IBM's plants is 6,000 people. Most other
companies employ a maximum of 2,000-3,000 in their plants, and thus
having one IBM plant in an area is like having 2 or 3 plants of
another compnay, in terms of impact on the local area.
There is one final advantage to clustering plants besides the ease
of control and communication. It is less costly and requires less
time to expand in an area with an existing site than in a new area.
The site selection process is costly and takes about a year.
Expanding in an existing area saves this expense. In addition, an
existing plant has already established a working relationship with the
local area and labor base. Operating several plants in the same area
can also be less costly during production as workers can be shifted
between plants if necessary. Data General, for example, shifts
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assembly workers between the final systems assembly plant in Southboro
and the product development lab just down the road in Westboro,
depending on production needs.
There are two disadvantages to having several plants in the same
area. The first is that companies don't want their presence to have
too much of an effect on the local economy if the company experiences
a decrease in demand. Hewlett Packard used this explanation as one
reason that it expanded outside the Bay Area. The company is still
relatively concentrated in the area, with half its U.S. capacity
there. Most companies say they don't want to be responsible for the
economic health of an area and thus limit their presence in any
location.
The second disadvantage to clustering plants is that it limits the
labor market a company can tap. This has become a more important
issue for companies since the mid-1970s as they have needed to attract
more engineers. If, for example, a company wants to attract a
significant quantity of southern educated engineers, it must locate in
the South. Many people prefer to live where they grew up or were
educated and companies began to respond to this in the latter 1970s.
DEC opened its first U.S. plants outside Massachusetts in the
mid-1970s in Arizona and New Mexico. The company explicitly stated
that it wanted a new labor source, and some of its executives were
from the West and preferred to live there. IBM had no southern
locations until the 1970s when it opened 4 major manufacturing plants,
all in the South. The need to attract a new supply of engineers
undoubtedly contributed to Burroughs' expansion in Austin, Texas and
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Hewlett Packard's expansions in Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.
The desire of computer companies to cluster manufacturing
facilities was an important factor affecting location decisions up to
the mid-1970s. The manufacturing plants of most of my sample
companies were satellite facilities and physical proximity made
communication and shipping of components among plants easier than if
plants were far apart. In the late 1970s it became important for
companies to attract engineering talent and they located in different
areas of the country to tap different labor markets. At this time,
companies also tended to establish autonomous plants and physical
proximity was not necessary to maintain the necessary degree of
communication.
State and Local Taxes and Incentives
There is a great deal of talk about how the actions of state and
local governments influence business locations. Corporations argue
that they need reduced taxes and more incentives. State governments,
by and large, attempt to do what the corporations want. However,
there is little evidence, either in the literature or in the actions
of the companies I studied, that taxes and incentives have much effect
on location decisions. Corporations complain about government actions
because they are an easy target, and if the companies can get some
benefit from complaining, all the better. In the rest of this
section, I will discuss the effects of business taxes, business
incentives, and personal taxes on location decisions.
State and Local Business Taxes. The main state and local taxes
paid by business are the state corporate income tax, local property
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tax, and state unemployment payroll tax. Most studies have concluded
that state and local taxes have little effect on location decisions,
primarily because these taxes only represent 2-3 percent of the
companies' total expenses.17 Carlton (1979), in an analysis of the
determinants of new firm location decisions, found that neither state
corporate taxes nor local property taxes had a significant effect on
decisions.
Wheaton (1982), in a recent study aruges that previous studies on
the effect of taxes didn't use the proper measures and thus drew
erroneous conclusions. He argues that state and local taxes actually
average about 8 percent of costs and that the range across states is
between 3 and 12 percent.18 However, Wheaton's study examines only
the initial impact of business taxes and thus only looks at part of
the problem. The real issue concerns the net tax burden. Businesses
can shift some of the tax burden to the consumer in the form of higher
prices and to labor in the form of lower wages. The stronger the
market power of a firm, the more it can shift the tax burden. In
addition, state and local taxes are used, in part, to provide services
to businesses, which they would otherwise have to pay themselves.
Finally, state and local tax payments can be deducted from income when
calculating federal corporate income tax. This decreases the net
burden and also decreases the size of interstate tax differentials.
Rechovsky et. al. (1983) concluded from their research that the net
business tax burden of state and local corporate taxes was quite small
and thus did not significantly influence business location decisions.
None of the companies I interviewed cited state and local taxes as
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being an important factor in decisions. An executive from Prime
stated flatly that state corporate income taxes did not affect their
decisions. DEC's representative commented that even though taxes
might be higher in Massachusetts than elswehere, the advantages of the
state far outweighed tax disadvantages. A low local tax rate actually
discourages IBM from locating in an area. The level of local taxes is
related to the level of local services. IBM wants to build in an area
with good services, particularly good schools. The company relocates
approximately 1,000 people when it builds a new large facility and
wants its personnel to be encouraged to move.
There is potentially one exception to the above statements. There
has recently been a great deal of discussion concerning how states
should tax multistate and multinational corporations that have plants
within their borders. The issue is how to define the corporation's
income for the purposes of taxation. All states that impose a state
corporate income tax, include as a minimum, the corporation's income
from all branch plants in the U.S. As of the end of 1983, 15 states
employed a broader definition of the corporation's income, including
income from branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates located out of the
state and some states include operations outside the U.S. (Tannenwald
1984). This remains a hotly contested topic and some states are
moving to narrow the base the income base for state corporate income
taxes.
IBM cited the worldwide unitary tax issue as having a large
potential impact on locations within the U.S. The chairman of IBM
declared IBM would not expand in states with worldwide unitary
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taxation (which uses the most inclusive definition of corporate
income). He wanted to sell some landbanked property in Florida and
cut expansion of the Boca Raton, Florida PC manufacturing facility
because Florida had adopted the most stringent method of taxing
corporations. IBM as well as other companies lobbied intensly in
Florida for a repeal of the tax, and at the end of 1984, the
legislature repealed it.19
Corporations fear they will have to pay higher state corporate
income taxes under a worldwide unitary tax system. The question is
whether this perception is correct.
Tannenwald (1984) calculated how different industries would fare
under two tax plans. One, the total worldwide unitary tax is the most
stringent plan and taxes a corporation based on its total income from
branches, subsidiaries, and affiliates both in the U.S. and abroad.
Foreign parent corporations are included in the base if they have a
branch or subsidiary in the state. The second plan, known as the
water's edge plan, taxes a company based on its income from branches
and affiliates located only in the U.S. Tannenwald found that
overall, companies would have paid 13.5 percent more in taxes under
the worldwide unitary tax plan than under the water's edge plan in
1977. However, industries fared very differently. Machinery
manufacturing (SIC 35), which included computer manufacturing firms
and electrical and electronic equipment (SIC 36) which included
semiconductor manufacture would both be taxed less under the worldwide
unitary tax than under the water's edge tax. The differences are 1.4
percent and 6.0 percent, respectively.20
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These figures are industry wide averages, and thus individual
firms may have different experiences. However, the data imply that it
is inaccurate to conclude that a worldwide unitary tax system will
cost all companies more than the water's edge system. Therefore, it
is unclear the effect that instituting a worldwide unitary tax would
have on individual companies and on plant location decisions. 2 1
State and Local Incentives. State and local governments have
numerous programs to attract high tech firms, including tax breaks,
revenue bond financing, low-cost loans, developing research parks,
retraining workers, and connecting companies with local venture
capital companies.22 By and large, these incentives have little
effect on today's location decisions, primarily because all areas
offer virtually the same incentives.
The incentive has to be exceptional to have an effect on location
decisions. I think there are several recent examples of exceptional
incentives. The Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation
(MCC), an industry financed research consortium chose to lcoate its
research center in Austin, Texas. Some people argue, and I would tend
to agree, that Austin literally bought the center, by offering much
more than any other area. The city of Austin is putting up $43.5
million, including free space for the center, equipment, and reduced
mortgage rates for the center's personnel. The University of Texas at
Austin is expanding its computer science and engineering departments
with $20 million in new endowments and $2 million a year in graduate
fellowships and other expenses. Many areas competed to get MCC, but
none offered as much as Austin and the University of Texas.
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The state of North Carolina has also worked hard to build its
electronics industry, particularly in the Raleigh-Durham area, now
known as Research Triangle. The state has a long history of
cooperation between the state and the three universities in the area.
Duke University, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and
North Carolina State in Raleigh have worked to build their engineering
and computer science departments. The universities were the movers
behind the new state funded Microelectronics Center recently opened to
do training and research in semiconductors. 2 4
In the past, at least for NCR, some location decisions were
influenced by government incentives. During the era of mechanical
products, production was very labor intensive and NCR's primary
requirement was an area with a large labor pool. Many areas were
suitable, and so NCR was responsive to government incentives. The
company's locations in both Cambridge, Ohio and Millsboro, Delaware
were the result of deals with the state or local governments.
Undoubtedly one reason incentives played a role in the past is that
they were less prevelant then than they are today. State or local
incentives play no role in current location decisions at NCR.
State and Local Taxes on Individuals. There is little evidence
that differences in state and local personal income taxes and sales
taxes affect location decisions. Carlton (1979), in the study
mentioned above, found that state income taxes did not significantly
affect new plant locations. Companies threaten to move because they
say they can't attract professionals to states with high personal
income taxes, but there isn't much evidence to suggest they carry out
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their threats. Prime says that the company's executives could save
money if they lived in New Hampshire rather than Massachusetts, but
Prime is not planning to expand in New Hampshire.
A DEC representative did say that one of the reasons the company
expanded its headquarters and administrative functions in New
Hampshire was because their employees wanted to live there. New
Hampshire was not a cheaper location for the company, but it was
cheaper for individuals, primarily because of lower taxes. DEC's New
Hampshire and Massachusetts locations are within a couple of hours of
each other which is close enough to maintain good communication. It
makes no difference to DEC that the two plants are in different
states. DEC would not, however, have located in New Hampshire if
there had been disadvantages to the company.
Publicly, Data General said it was expanding in North Carolina in
the mid-1970s in part because taxes were too high in Massachusetts. I
think the evidence suggests that this was not the most important
factor, and that the lack of unionized labor in the state was more
important.
There is little evidence among the firms I studied that ordinary
state and local taxes and incentives have much effect on current
location decisions.
Location Near Other Computer Companies
There are advantages and disadvantages to locating near other
computer companies. The advantages relate to the agglomeration
economies created by the existence of a number of different companies.
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These advantages are most important during the research and
development stage and have become more important since the mid-1970s
as actual manufacturing has become relatively less important than
engineering the product. The disadvantages of locating near other
companies are particularly prevelant when plants are engaged strictly
in manufacturing, and need a large labor pool.
Agglomeration economies refer to a wide range of benefits that
occur when a number of different companies locate in the same area.
When this occurs, vendors that provide necessary products and services
to the companies, research groups, and software houses grow in the
area, providing the infrastructure necessary for efficient production.
The presence of numerous companies also serves to attract labor to the
area, particularly professional labor looking for the best job
opportunities.
The benefits created by agglomeration economies are most important
in the research and development stage when companies work closely with
vendors to get the proper specifications on parts and when innovations
in technology are crucial. Today, the research and development stage
is becoming more important than the actual manufacturing. Software
and programming are also becoming more important, services that
flourish in areas with other companies. Agglomeration economies help
to explain the clustering of companies along Route 128 in Boston and
in Silicon Valley.
There are, however, disadvantages to the clustering of different
companies. Not all aspects of production require the presence of
other companies. In fact, most companies prefer to do the actual
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manufacturing in areas without other competitors. This consideration
was particularly important prior to the mid-1970s when the manufacture
of computers required a large labor pool. Companies wanted easy
access to labor and they wanted reasonable wages. The presence of a
competitor in the area would lead to competition for labor and could
drive up wages. NCR, for example, doesn't want to locate
manufacturing plants in areas where IBM is located. IBM pays higher
than average wages and NCR would be forced to compete with them.
Hewlett Packard also explicitly avoids locating near major
competitors. DEC and Sperry located manufacturing plants in rural
areas and were thus able to avoid competiting with other computer
companies for manufacturing labor.
Agglomeration economies can turn into diseconomies if too many
firms locate in an area, causing congestion and related problems.
Silicon Valley is an example of an area that is beginning to suffer
from having too many firms in the area. Firms are having a difficult
time attracting and retaining both manufacturing and engineering
labor. Turnover rates in the area are extraordinarily high. Land
costs have also become extremely high and cause severe problems for
companies and their employees (Saxenian 1980). Amdahl, a small
company located in the Valley is planning to build an additional
plant, outside California. The high turnover rates and high land
costs create too many problems. Most of Hewlett Packard's expansion
in recent years hs also been outside the Valley. The disadvantages of
agglomertion are now beginning to outweigh the advantages, at least
for some companies.
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Other Factors
There are several factors that either played a role in past
location decisions or that influence the specific site chosen in a
given area. Location near final markets or near materials suppliers
and locations with good transportation and communication networks have
influenced some past location decisions. The availability of certain
natural resources has some influence on current site decisions.
Final Markets and Materials Suppliers. Computers today are
relatively light and have high value to weight ratios. The materials
and components that are used to manufacture computers are also
relatively light. This implies that companies don't have to be
located near their final markets or near their materials suppliers.
Products were much heavier during the 1950s and 1960s and locating
near the final market was a consideration. The largest markets were
in the East and West, which is where most firms were located. IBM was
a large producer of computer punch cards during the 1950s and 1960s.
The cards were relatively heavy and IBM had a number of plants all
over the country to serve different markets. IBM built one plant in
Greencastle, Indiana to serve the Midwest, and the plant still exists
today. Honeywell cited the proximity to suppliers as one reason for
locating in Massachusetts. These considerations are not at all
important today.
Transportation and Communication Networks. Locating in areas with
good transportation and communication networks was a factor in the
1960s and early 1970s, but is not crucial today mainly because most
areas of the U.S. are now fairly accessible. Sites only have to be
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within one or two plane rides of each other, and this is true of most
areas today.
Natural Resources. The presence of certain natural resources,
water, power, and land can influence the specific site that is chosen
within a given area. The level of natural resources that computer
companies need is available in every state so that the desire to be
close to a reliable supply of water or power does not influence which
state the company chooses.
Semiconductor fabrication and printed circuit board fabrication
are both chemical processes which require substantial quantities of
water in production. These plants must be located in areas with
abundent supplies of water, a consideration that was not important in
the past.
Computer companies need reliable sources of power for testing
components and the final systems. Data General cited this as a reason
for not locating such plants in rural areas.
Printed circuit board fabrication creates vapors which need to be
constantly cleared out. DEC opened a new circuit board plant in 1980
in South Carolina where there are not extremes in climate, so
controlling the environment in the plant would be done as cheaply as
possible. The plant was planned at a time when energy prices were
rising and thus power costs were a factor in the site decision. Power
costs were not the reason DEC located the plant in the South. DEC
wanted a plant there to tap southern labor markets.
IBM manufacturing sites are all on at least 1,000 acres of land
(with the exception of some early plants). Thus, one specific
263
criteria that is important to IBM in selecting the actual site within
a given area is the availability of a large parcel of land. IBM has
large sites for several reasons. The plants and laboratories
themselves are quite large, employing 6,000 people on average. IBM,
for security reasons also likes to be separated from other companies
to prevent, for example, inadvertant information leaks in restaurants.
No other companies require nearly as much land as IBM and the
availability of land is not an issue for these companies.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have examined, in detail, the factors that
affect the plant location decisions of computer companies and how the
relative importance of factors has changed over time. Using this
information, what can we conclude about why the computer industry has
grown in some states and not in others?
California, Minnesota, and Massachusetts have always been the
largest states in the computer industry, as discussed in Chapter 3.
These three states had about 50 percent of the industry's total
employment in all periods between 1967 and 1982. Employment has grown
at average to above average rates in these states, indicating that the
states will continue to be important in the industry. Why have these
states experienced so much growth?
These states have superior universities with well known
engineering and computer science departments. The early computers
were developed in the universities in these areas. The industry has
continued to grow in these states partly because of the universities.
Computer companies often expanded in areas where they already had
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plants, particularly during the 1960s and early 1970s, contributing to
the growth of these four states. Agglomeration economies developed
due to the presence of numerous companies. The quality of life in
these areas is generally high and is attractive to professionals.
Manufacturing wages are relatively low in all states except
California. Engineering salaries are relatively high in all states
except Minnesota, but this is not a significant disadvantage given all
the advantages of the areas.
The relative importance of New York in the computer industry has
declined over time, though it still retains a significant share of
activity. For example, New York's share of employment declined from
about 20 percent in 1967 to 7 percent in 1982. Growth in New York has
been dominated by IBM. New York's share of employment has declined
because other companies are not expanding in the state. (Schmenner's
data presented in Chapter 3 showed that IBM's employment represented
75 percent of total employment in the Mid-Atlantic.) Some of the
early computer development occurred in and around Columbia University
in New York City. This made New York an attractive location in the
early days of the industry. However, the universities in the area did
not continue to play an important role in computer development. IBM
is the only major computer company headquartered in New York. Other
companies report that they tend to locate away from IBM in part so as
not to compete with IBM for labor. In addition, the quality of life
is not as attractive as in other areas of the country.
The computer industry in Pennsylvania and New Jersey is
significant, though not as large as that in California, Minnesota,
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Massachusetts, and New York. The reasons that the industry has grown
in all these states are similar. One of the first computers was
developed at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia and the
presence of the university had continued to attract growth. New
Jersey is in close proximity to both New York and Pennsylvania and
grew as a result of growth in these neighboring states.
The computer industry in Florida is similar in size to that in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and has grown over time. Florida
currently ranks high among areas in being attractive to computer
manufacturing plants. Wages in the state are average to below
average.25 Unions are not strong and the state has a right-to-work
law. The state also has a pleasant quality of life. Because of the
presence of a significant number of plants, the state has developed
agglomeration economies. Florida is a reasonable location for
manufacturing all but the most complex products. There are no
superior universities in the state, so it is not an area in which
sophisticated research and development occurs. Florida will never be
another Silicon Valley.
Texas is a growing state in the computer industry, particularly
since 1977. It is currently the 4th largest state in terms of
employment, with 7.5 percent of the total. The state is growing in
large part because it has good universities. Texas is spending
substantial amounts to improve its engineering and computer science
departments. The quality of life in the Southwest is pleasant and it
is an area that engineers find attractive. Wage rates in the area
vary across occupations. Engineers receive average to relatively low
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salaries, but some manufacturing and clerical occupations pay
relatively high salaries while others pay relatively low wages.
I would argue that Colorado is also increasing in importance in
the industry. The Census employment data are incomplete and 1982
figures are not available. However, the number of firms increased at
a faster than average rate and the state ranked 8th in size in 1982.
In addition, several industry analysts argued that employment grew
substantially beginning in 1978. The interview data support the
conclusion that Colorado is an attractive state in which to locate
plants. The attractiveness is based on a number of factors. Colorado
has a good university, relatively low wages, an attractive quality of
life, and a significant number of companies in the areas, thus
generating agglomeration economies.
Michigan is a declining state in the computer manufacturing
industry. It has become relatively unattractive to the industry for a
number of reasons. Wages in all occupations are generally the highest
in the country and unions are strong in the state. The quality of
life in the state is not particularly attractive.
North Carolina is gaining a reputation in the industry, though its
share of activity is still relatively small. There are several
universities in the area, providing a base for future development.
The computer industry is becoming more dependent on professionals,
especially engineers. Thus, areas with superior universities are
attractive locations and North Carolina is in a strong position for
further growth.
Arizona, with a good university and a very attractive quality of
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life is also a relatively small, though growing state in the computer
industry.
The areas that will be attractive to computer firms in coming
years will be university areas with superior electrical engineering
and computer science departments. The quality of life in an area is
also important to attracting and retaining professionals.
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Chapter 6
FACTORS AFFECTING FOREIGN LOCATION DECISIONS
United States computer companies have manufacturing plants in many
areas of the world today, including Europe, Asia, Latin American, and
the Caribbean. European locations were the first foreign plants and
companies began manufacturing computers there beginning in the late
1950s and early 1960s. Some of the older companies had established.
plants in Europe to manufacture mechanical business machine products
as early as 1900. During the late 1960s and the 1970s companies
expanded into other areas of the world, notably Asia.
What makes foreign countries attractive to computer companies?
One factor that applies to all foreign locations is that there are
potential tax advantages to locating plants outside the U.S. The
first section of the chapter discusses how tax savings occur and which
areas are particularly advantageous from this standpoint.
There are other, often more important reasons for building foreign
manufacturing plants. These reasons fall into the categories of
reducing production costs and marketing considerations. The
advantages of Europe, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Canada
are all different and some factors have changed over time. Each
section of this chapter discusses the factors that caused computer
companies to build manufacturing plants in each of these five areas of
the world.
Tax Advantages
Saving money on corporate income taxes is one reason computer
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companies locate manufacturing and marketing subsidiaries in foreign
countries. Some countries are particularly advantageous from a tax
savings viewpoint, while other countries provide little benefit.
How do these tax savings occur? The foreign operation must be
structured as a subsidiary of the U.S. company. Foreign branch plants
do not yield tax advantages. The tax advantages work in the same way
whether the foreign operations are marketing, manufacturing, or both.
The foreign subsidiary pays U.S. corporate income tax only on
money remitted back to the U.S. parent corporation. Thus, if the
subsidiary pays the parent dividends, interest on loans, royalties, or
fees, the foreign earned income is subject to U.S. taxes. However,
the subsidiary does not pay U.S. taxes on earnings retained and
reinvested in the subsidiary. This means that as long as the
subsidiary is growing and reinvesting its earnings back into new
plant, equipment, and personnel, and does not return money to the
U.S., it pays no U.S. corporate income tax. Most manufacturing
subsidiaries of U.S. computer companies are in this position. Markets
are expanding abroad, so the foreign subsidiaries are growing to serve
the markets.
Foreign subsidiaries do pay income taxes in the country in which
they are located. Thus, there is an advantage for computer companies
to locate their subsidiaries in countries with relatively low
corporate income taxes. Ireland and Scotland are countries with
particularly low taxes. The rest of Europe generally has over a 50
percent tax on profits. This compares to the U.S. rate of 46 percent.
Thus, there are no tax advantages to most European locations. In
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Asia, Singapore and Malyasia have particularly low taxes. Puerto Rico
also levies low taxes on corporations.
Nine of the ten companies in my sample had manufacturing
subsidiaries in Scotland or Ireland. Only Data General did not.
Three companies, DEC, Hewlett Packard, and Honeywell, had plants in
Singapore or Malyasia and Data General plans to build a plant in one
of these two countries. Four companies, DEC, Hewlett Packard,
Honeywell, and Prime, manufactured in Puerto Rico. Tax advantages
were often cited as one reason for choosing to locate in Singapore or
Malyasia once the company had decided to establish a plant in Asia.
There are, however, more significant advantages to locating in Asia,
as discussed in a later section. Tax advantages were also listed as
reasons for choosing Irleand and Puerto Rico. Companies did not cite
taxes as a reason for locating in any other foreign countries.
Tax advantages were the sole reason, according to one executive,
that Prime located in both Ireland and Puerto Rico and they were the
main reason Amdahl build a plant in Ireland. These small companies
had no other foreign manufacturing subsidiaries. They don't need as
much manufacturing capacity as larger companies and thus cannot
efficiently use as many foreign locations as can the large companies.
Prime provides a good example of the magnitude of the tax savings
of locating in countries with low tax rates. Prime opened its plants
in Puerto Rico and Ireland in 1979 and 1980. The company pays no
income tax in Puerto Rico on unremitted income until 1990 and then the
tax rate is relatively low. Prime also pays no income tax in Ireland
until 1994 after which time it will pay 10 percent. Prime's effective
274
tax rate on earnings was 50 percent in 1978 and only 31 percsent in
1981. Much of this decline was due to tax savings in Ireland and
Puerto Rico.2
Tax advantages also accrue to sales and service subsidiaries.
Therefore, companies don't have to have manufacturing facilities in
foreign countries to save money. However, the savings can be
increased with foreign manufacturing plants because more profits can
be reinvested in a manufacturing subsidiary than a sales subsidiary.
The advantages of foreign manufacturing plants can be increased by
manipulating the prices of goods transferred between the parent and
the subsidiary or among subsidiaries. The goal is to make these
transfer prices such that the subsidiaries in the low tax countries
earn the highest profit. As an example of how this can be done,
consider a situation where the U.S. company manufactures
semiconductors and fabricates circuit boards. It ships these
components to Ireland where they are assembled into computers and then
sold in European markets. In order to get the greatest tax benefit
the U.S. parent will charge its Irish subsidiary a relatively low
price for the components. Thus, the Irish subsidiary earns a high
profit because it paid little for the parts and sold expensive
machines. The U.S. company has little profit because it didn't make
much money selling the components to Ireland. The corporation's total
tax bill is minimized as taxes in Ireland are low and those in the
U.S. are high.
There are not strict regulations for pricing goods transferred
among subsidiaries. Companies can operate to minimize taxes though it
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is illegal to price goods to avoid taxes. In practice, this concept
is hard to define and even harder to monitor.
Companies can also save money on duties and tariffs by having
plants in foreign ocuntries. However, these advantages are not as
significant as corporate income tax savings. One reason that this is
true is that tariffs can be negotiable items. Companies can make
deals with foreign countries to lower or eliminate tariff payments.
Foreign governments want U.S. computer companies located in their
countries and are thus willing to make certain concessions to attract
the companies.
Europe
The history of European locations can be divided into two periods,
with the transition between the two periods occurring during the
1960s. U.S. business machine and computer companies built
manufacturing plants in Europe for two reasons during and before the
early 1960s. First, European locations provided companies with an
easy entry into the European market. It was easier and quicker to
serve foreign customers if the plant where the machines were
manufactured was relatively nearby. In addition, foreign countries
always regarded a company more favorably if it had a manufacturing
plant in Europe, providing jobs and income in the area. The second
reason for European locations was that they were cheaper than U.S.
locations. Labor costs were less than in the U.S. and shipping costs
were reduced. Duties and tariffs were also reduced by having European
plants.
By the late 1960s it was no longer less costly to manufacture
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products in Europe than in the U.S. according to many of the computer
company executives I interviewed. Today, essentially the only reason
for European plants is to have a presence in the market. Some
countries are now demanding that a company have a plant in the country
in order to market products. There are two exceptions to this
statement. Ireland and Scotland, as discussed above, have very low
tax rates, making the countries less costly than other locations.
These are the only European locations that still retain a cost
advantage over the U.S.
Burroughs, NCR, Honeywell, and IBM all had manufacturing plants in
Europe prior to the 1960s. Burroughs' first foreign plant was in
England, and it has had a plant in Scotland since the days it
manufactured electro-mechanical products. The company used to have 7
or 8 plants in the British Isles, but has closed a number of these
plants. The company no longer needs as much manufacturing space as in
the past because computers can be manufactured in less space than the
older products. For example, Burroughs' large facility in
Cumbernauld, Scotland now uses one-fifth the space that was used to
manufacture electro-mechanical products. When Burroughs started
manufacturing in Europe the cost advantages were more important than
having a manufacturing presence in the country. The British Isles was
their largest sales subsidiary and the savings in shipping and duties,
and the considerably lower labor costs, saved the company substantial
amounts of money.
Today, according to Burroughs representatives, the only reason for
manufacturing in Europe is for marketing advantages. There are no
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longer cost advantages. Burroughs opened a plant in France around the
mid-1960s solely because in order to sell in some French markets you
have to'produce in France. The Belgium plant opened in the late 1960s
was never a low cost plant as labor received high wages and benefits.
However, Belgium was a good distribution point within the European
Economic Community (EEC).
NCR has been manufacturing in Europe since 1900 when it opened a
plant in Berlin, Germany. Mechanical products were very
labor-intensive and the lower European labor costs yielded a
considerable savings as did the savings in tariffs. Today, however,
the German plant is one of NCR's highest cost plants and no Euopean
plants are lower cost than U.S. plants. NCR has closed 80 percent of
its European plants because the company doesn't need the capacity and
because the cost advantages no longer exist.
The only reason to manufacture in Europe is to have the physical
presence. NCR expects the pressures for a presence in different
countries will increase in the future. France, Spain, Turkey, and
Norway are beginning to make demands on NCR to have a certain percent
of "local content" in the products sold in their countries. "Local
content" means that some part of the final goods must be made in the
country, which can mean that the company buys components from local
companies or that the computer company locates a manufacturing plant
in the country.
Honeywell has been manufacturing in Europe for many years and has
a number of plants. Their plant in Scotland was built 50 years ago
and has been making computer products since the 1960s. Honeywell's
278
plants in France and Italy were General Electric plants that Honeywell
acquired when it bought GE's computer operations. The French plants
belong to Cii Honeywell Bull, a company in which Honeywell now owns a
minority share. (Honeywell used to own a larger share, but the
company was nationalized by the French government in 1982.) According
to Honeywell, it is particularly important to Britain and France to
have "local content" in products sold in their countries, particularly
when it is the government who buys the products. Honeywell also
reports that manufacturing costs in Europe today are higher than they
are in the United States. Honeywell established a joint venture in
Yugoslavia in 1979 solely to gain entry into the markets of eastern
bloc countries.
IBM has a large manufacturing presence in Europe. The company
began locating plants in Europe after WWI in part to avoid paying
tariffs on products sold in Europe. The company had 2 plants in
Germany and one each in France, Italy, and England in 1940. Business
expanded substantially after WWII and issues of national pride became
important in many European countries. They wanted production
facilities in their countries to generate jobs and income. IBM
responded to these pressures and expanded its production overseas.
There were 10 plants manufacturing machines and 20 plants producing
computer cards in Europe in 1950. Expansion continued at a rapid rate
during the 1960s. IBM located its major research and development
plants in stable pro-American or neutralist countries, primarily in
Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Today, IBM operates 15
manufacturing plants and 9 research and development facilities in
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Europe, employing approximately 100,000 people.
Sperry, DEC, and Hewlett Packard all built their first plants in
Europe after the period in which there was a cost advantage in doing
so. Marketing considerations were the only reasons these companies
built European plants.
Sperry currently has manufacturing plants in Scotland and West
Germany. According to one executive there are several factors that
actually make European locations unattractive. Some countries have
strict regulations, particularly labor rules, that restrict
activities. Dollar and currency fluctuations also create problems.
As a result, there must be a compelling reason for Sperry to locate in
Europe. Local content restrictions are the most important reason for
manufacturing there.
DEC noted that when a company is small no one cares where you
locate plants. However, when the company gets larger it becomes more
important to have manufacturing plants in large markets. Foreign
governments want a manufacturing presence in their countries to create
a favorable balance of payments, and to generate jobs and income.
European locations were never cheaper for DEC than U.S. ones. DEC
established its first foreign plants in Canada and England in the late
1960s and early 1970s. They expanded into Ireland, Scotland, and
Germany in the mid to late 1970s. Marketing considerations were the
main reason for these expansions. Ireland did also offer significant
tax incentives, as discussed in the previous section.
Hewlett Packard built its first Eurpoean plant in West Germany
around 1960. It has since built another plant in Germany and one each
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in Scotland, France, and England. The latter two plants were built
during the 1970s. According to one executive, the sole reason Hewlett
Packard built these plants was as a means of gaining entry into the
European market.
Amdahl and Prime are the two smallest companies in my sample.
Prime has plants in three locations and Amdahl has two plants. Both
companies have a manufacturing plant in Ireland, their only European
location. Tax advantages were the primary reason for the expansions,
as discussed in detail in the preceeding section. Manufacturing costs
are more expensive for Prime in Ireland. The advantages of being in
the Common Market are neglibigle relative to the tax advantages.
For Amdahl, a second fairly important reason for locating in
Ireland was that the government lent Amdahl capital at low rates. A
third consideration for Amdahl, though much less important than the
other two, were marketing and political reasons. Amdahl sells 30-40
percent of its machines in foreign countries, much of this to
governments. As mentioned above, Eurpoean countries are becoming
increasingly concerned with having "local content" in products they
buy.
Data General is the only company in my sample that does not have a
manufacturing plant in Europe. European locations were the first
foreign locations for most of the companies I interviewed. Data
General, in contrast, expanded in Asia within a few years of the
company's founding. According to a Data General representative, the
company was too late to expand in Europe because the European market
stopped expanding when the company was ready to consider a European
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plant. European sales are currently 30 percent of total sales and
Data General does expect that it will eventually build a plant in
Europe to respond to the demands of European governments.
Asia
When discussing Asia's role in the computer industry, it is
important to distinguish Japan from the rest of Asia. Japan is
technically much more advanced than the rest of Asia. Japanese
products are among the best in terms of hardware. The architecture of
Japanese systems is also rapidly becoming quite sophisticated and
while probably not yet equal to the U.S., it is getting close.
Japan's weakness, however, is in terms of software. Currently their
software is not as sophisticated as U.S. software. This means that
Japan is not a strong contender in the integrated systems market, but
does do well in the markets for standard products like personal
computers, printers, terminals, and disk drives.
Seven of the 10 companies in my sample have facilities in Japan or
joint ventures with Japanese companies. One attraction is the
sophistication of the Japanese workforce. Another is that
manufacturing in Japan, like the rest of Asia, is much less costly
than in the United States. Land, labor, and capital is all less
expensive in Japan than the United States. Engineers, for example, in
Japan earn about half what U.S. engineers earn.5
Data General has been in Japan since 1971. Data General liscensed
a Japanese company to manufacture and sell its products in Japan.
Data General acquired 50 percent of the company in the late 1970s and
it now owns 85 percent. The Japanese manage and operate the plant and
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Data General supplies the technology and capital. The company makes
most of the Data General systems sold in Japan. 6
NCR's only Asian plant is in Japan where it manufactures a low-end
cash register. The cash register is not as complex as those made in
the U.S. Sperry and Hewlett Packard both have joint ventures with
Japanese companies that manufacture for the Japanese market. Sperry's
only Asian plant is in Japan and the company feels it is necessary to
have a presence in Japan in order to do work in the country.
The Asian facilities of IBM, Burroughs, and Amdahl are also
located in Japan. IBM has a number of facilities to supply its Far
East market. Burroughs has engineering facilities in Japan.
Amdahl has had a continuing and very close relationship with
Fujitsu, a Japanese company, since the early 1970s. Amdahl needed
money to get its production going, and Fujitsu supplied it. Fujitsu
now owns 49.5 percent of Amdahl. (This increased in March 1984 from
32 percent.) The two companies also have cross liscensing agreements
that allow them to trade technologies. Fujitsu manufactures the high
performance logic chips for Amdahl's machines. Amdahl also buys some
peripherals from Fujitsu.
U.S. computer companies began expanding in parts of Asia, other
than Japan during the early 1970s to take advantage of the cheap,
unskilled labor force that existed there. Low wage rates were the
sole reason for locating in Asia. This changed, however, during the
1970s. Certain areas, notably Hong Kong and Taiwan, have developed
respectable skill bases. Companies located in these areas can now
make an entire product there. Costs of everyting, including unskilled
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labor, engineers, buildings, and land are cheaper in Asia than in the
U.S.
However, products manufactured in Asia and the U.S. are quite
different. The U.S. designs and manufactues the high-end products, or
the most complex products. Asian countries tend to manufacture
low-end products. These products have a lower profit margin than
high-end products and are thus more price sensitive. In addition, the
skills of the Asian workforce to do not enable them to design the most
complex products.7
Asia is also becoming an important market for computer products,
and the market is expected to expand in the future. Having a
manufacturing presence in Asia makes it easier to sell products. Few
Asian governments, unlike European governments, have "local content"
restrictions today.
Data General, DEC, and Hewlett Packard all have substantial
manufacturing operations in Asia. All these companies opened plants
in the early 1970s and the transition that occurred during the 1970s
is striking.
Data General expanded in Asia relatively early in its history,
only 4 years after its founding. The company opened a plant in Hong
Kong in 1973 to string core memory, a very labor intensive operation.
The low wage rate was the sole reason for locating the plant in Hong
Kong. The plant was also packaging integrated circuits by 1977 and in
1980 it began assembling terminals. Data General has trained their
workforce and the overall skill level in the country has increased, so
that much of its new line of desktop computers, introduced in July
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1983, will be manufactured in Hong Kong. Data General considers this
computer a low-end product and it consists, essentially, of circuit
boards in a box. It is a modular product and assembly consists of
snapping modules together and putting on plastic ends. The computer
comes in a standard configuration which means the machines can be mass
produced, and don't have to be tailored for individual customers.
According to Data General, Hong Kong is a good location for the
complete manufacture of low-end products. However, Hong Kong will
never replace the U.S. in manufacturing high-end products.
Data General opened plants in Thailand in 1974 and the Philippines
in 1978. These plants still do mostly labor-intensive, unskilled
assembly work. The plant in Thailand began stringing core memory.
Today it manufactures cables, assembles displays, and assembles
integrated circuits. These are very labor-intensive and delicate
operations, requiring skilled, though not educated labor. The skills
are acquired on the job. Data General located in Thailand because
wages were low and the people possessed a good work ethic. The
company would like to do more technical work in Thailand, and is
planning to establish a test facility there. However, the workforce
must become more technically skilled. Thailand is a very class
segmented society and Data General has had difficulty in building the
necessary skill base.
The Philippines plant assembles and tests circuit boards and power
supplies. All manufacture is done by hand. Data General plans to
automate the operation to some degree, but manufacture will never be
fully automated. Data General located in the Philippines primarily
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because wages were $.95 an hour, though the country does have a
respectable technical base.
Data General is planning to build a circuit board fabrication
facility in either Singapore or Malyasia. The labor base and the tax
incentives offered by the governments make both areas attractive for
an Asian plant. Data General wants to develop the Far East into a
complete area for manufacturing.
Marketing reasons and tax advantages are two other reasons Data
General manufactures in Asia. Having a manufacturing plant in the
area gives them access to markets, leads to less delay in deliveries,
and is evidence of good faith. The Far East currently accounts for 5
percent of Data General's total sales. The company expects Asian
sales to be 20 percent of the total by the late 1980s. Tax savings,
as discussed in a previous section, are significant, especially given
Data General's projections of the expansion in Asian marekts.
DEC's Asian manufacturing plants began as core memory stringing
operations. The core was made in the U.S. The stringing, a very
labor-intensive process, was always done in the Far East because the
labor received extremely low wages. DEC first began operating in Asia
in the early 1970s. When RCA went out of the computer business, DEC
bought its memory operation in Taiwan. Since then, DEC has also built
two plants in Hong Kong, and one in Singapore. The work done in Asia
today is no longer just assembly work. The plants now manufacture
some complete products. Several of DEC's latest terminal products
were designed and manufactured in the Far East.
DEC manufactures in Asia because costs are lower than in the U.S.
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Manufacturing labor costs are low, but since these direct labor costs
are longer a large part of product costs, this is not the reason DEC
has remained and expanded in Asia. Essentially, everything costs less
in Asia than in the U.S., including land, and buildings. Engineers
also receive relatively low salaries. Engineers with one year of
experience receive $2,000-$2,800 per month in the U.S. The same
engineer receives $1,100 per month in Japan and about $500 per month
in Taiwan and Korea.8
The infrastructure needed to manufacture computers is as good in
Southeast Asia as in the U.S. For example, the shops that produce
prototype products exist in Asia and are capable of making what is
required.
According to DEC, the difference between products manufactured
today in Southeast Asia and in the U.S. lies in the architecture and
software, not the hardware. Physically, products produced in Asia are
no different from products produced in the U.S. The making and
testing of modules is done the same way all over. The reason for the
difference between the U.S. and Asia lies in differences in
engineering talent. Engineers in Asia have the skills to design
products such as video displays, floppy disk drives, and other
products that are similar to the consumer electronics products that
have traditionally been done there. Asian engineers do not have the
skills, however, to design large computer systems.
Hewlett Packard has been manufacturing in Singapore since 1970.
Initially, they manufactured labor-intensive products that required
predominantly unskilled labor. They chose Asia because wages were low
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and Singapore because it had particularly low taxes.
Part of Hewlett Packard's philosophy of overseas expansion is to
eventually establish a complete facility in the country, that engages
in research and development, manufacturing, and marketing. In this
way, the company hopes to take advantage of different countries'
approaches to problem solving. Hewlett Packard worked with the
Singapore government and trained workers for their facility. Today,
the occupational and skill distribution in the Singapore plant is
similar to that in other Hewlett Packard plants. Approximately 1/3
are professionals and engineers, 1/3 are skilled technicians, and 1/3
are unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Hewlett Packard also has a
plant in Penang, Malyasia, which it opened in 1970. The company plans
to expand into China when it is realistic. The country must be past
the subsistence stage and have some degree of industrial development
to make locating a plant there feasible.
Hewlett Packard does not expand into foreign countries solely to
take advantage of cheap, unskilled labor. This may be the drawing
card, but the company does want to eventually establish a complete
facility. If they only wanted cheap labor, they wouldn't stay in
their current Asian locations. For example, labor in Japan is no
longer cheap and the workforce has become relatively skilled. Hewlett
Packard would expand into areas like Sri Lanka if it was only
concerned about labor costs.
Honeywell has several manufacturing plants in Asia. Synertek, the
semiconductor manufacturer Honeywell acquired in 1978, does its
engineering and wafer fabrication, which is highly skilled work, in
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the U.S. The assembly and testing of integrated circuits is very
labor-intensive and highly automated. Synertek has plants in
Singapore and Thailand, where labor is cheap, to do this work. 9
Honeywell has had a joint venture in Korea since 1981 to
manufacture products for the Far East market. Korea, unlike most
other Asian countries has erected trade barriers that make it
difficult to sell in Korea unless the company manufacturers there.
Honeywell does not have a plant in Taiwan, though it does buy
products there. Honeywell has found a significant change in the type
of products available in Taiwan. Taiwan was primarily a source of
cheap labor during most of the 1970s. Today, the engineering skills
found in Taiwan are relatively high. Honeywell can have a complete
low-end product made to specifications in Taiwan. This saves quite a
bit of money as Honeywell doesn't pay the design costs and actually
producing the product is cheaper than it would be in the U.S.
Honeywell currently buys display terminals in Taiwan and expects to
expand the number of low-end products it buys in Asia. However,
high-end products will continue to be made in the U.S.
Many plants were opened in Asia in the early 1970s to take
advantage of a large pool of unskilled, cheap assembly labor. Cheap
labor is no longer the sole reason for locating a plant in Asia. The
fact that NCR and Sperry have both closed Asian plants that they
opened when they manufactured products that required very
labor-intensive assembly work is evidence for this contention.
NCR had a plant in Hong Kong that manufactured harnesses or wiring
for computers. This was a very labor-intensive operation and when NCR
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opened the plant, wages were $.21 an hour. NCR closed the plant in
1981 when it no longer needed the product. Sperry had a small
operation in Singapore at one time when it needed a supply of cheap
labor. The plant was closed when the product was no longer needed.
Prime is the only company in my sample that does not have a
manufacturing plant in Asia. Prime has never needed a large supply of
cheap labor. The company has never been very vertically integrated,
manufacturing has always been a small part of costs, and the company
has a high capital usage. As a result, Prime needs to locate where
the intellecutal and engineering talent are.
What will be Asia's future role in computer manufacturing? There
are several on-going debates concerning this issue. One debate
concerns the role of Japan and whether Japan will become an active
participant in the U.S. systems market. Japan's current strength is
in low-cost, mass produced products such as personal computers. Their
weakness is in software and thus they don't supply complete data
processing and communications products. The question is whether they
will be able to do this, and if so, when.
A second debate concerns the use of automation versus inexpensive
Asian labor. One side argues that the use of cheap Asian labor is
only a short term phenomena due to increased automation in production.
Automated manufacture eliminates the need for cheap labor and thus
plants can be located in the U.S. A Burroughs executive agreed with
this analysis and cited the Ford Motor Company's recent relocation of
its integrated circuit facility back to the Midwest from offshore.
The Burroughs executive argued that this was a precursor to what will
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happen in the computer business.
The other side argues that there will continue to be advantages to
locating in Asia. All types of labor as well as other costs are
cheaper in Asia than the U.S. Even though the need for direct
manufacturing labor declines, Asia will still be a good source for
engineering and programmeing talent.
It seems likely that as the skills of Asian labor increase, the
advantages of locating in Asia will change, but will not decrease.
Cheap manufacturing labor will not be the primarly drawing card.
However, all products made in Asia will be cheaper than U.S. products
simply because everything costs less in Asia.
One industry analyst argued that in the future we will see more
U.S. companies buying complete products from Asian companies. The
U.S. companies may have less of a manufacturing presence than today,
but Asia will continue to supply products. Honeywell, for example,
intends to increase its purchasing of components and complete products
from Asian companies. These trends suggest that the advantages of
Asian locations will change in the future, but will continue to exist.
It also seems clear that the U.S. will remain the source of
high-end, complex products. Asian products, with the exception of
some Japanese products, will be low-end products that are simpler to
design.
Latin America
Brazil and Mexico are the two major Latin American countries in
which computer manufacturing firms are located. Marketing
considerations are the primary reason companies locate here. The
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governments demand that a certain amount of manufacturing be done in
the country in order to sell in some markets. The developing
countries demand "local content" because they want a positive balance
of payments and they want to create jobs and income.
The rising nationalism in Brazil has severely affected computer
companies. The government has been squeezing foreign multinational
companies out of the computer and telecommunications markets and
legislating national companies as the only producers. Initially, the
minicomputer and microcomputer markets were reserved for national
companies. Later, peripherals, modems, software, and digital chips
10
were also reserved.
Burroughs has manufactured peripherals in Brazil for a number of
years. Since the mid-1970s the plant has also served as a second
source for manufacturing medium and large computer systems. In order
to operate in this market, Burroughs had to submit a proposal to the
government detailing its plans. The entire system does not have to be
made in Brazil, but the government did have to approve the plans.
Brazil allows only three interational companies to manufacture
medium-sized systems, Burroughs, IBM, and a Japanese company.
Burroughs established its Brazilian plant solely for marketing
considerations. The Brazilian subsidiary was Burroughs' second
largest in the mid-1970s, selling over $100 million in products
annually. In order to sell in Brazil, Burroughs was forced to
participate on the government's terms.
NCR also has a manufacturing plant in Brazil, that it
characterizes as a "strategic international plant." It would be
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cheaper and easier for NCR to close this plant and manufacture the
product in the U.S. because the product is designed around components
made by U.S. vendors, which are not necessarily available elsewhere.
However, because the government requires some part of the product to
be made in Brazil in order to bring goods into the country, NCR
maintains its plant there.
IBM manufactures in Brazil, being one of the three international
companies the government liscensed to make medium and large computer
systems. Hewlett Packard also has a plant in Brazil that it
established during the 1970s.
Computer companies have manufacturing plants in Mexico for
marketing reasons and because labor is relatively cheap. For many of
my sample companies, marketing considerations are the more important
reason. The Mexican government, like the Brazilian government and the
governments of some European countries, require that computer
companies manufacture some of their product in Mexico to sell in the
country.
Labor in Mexico is certainly cheaper than in the U.S. Products
made in Mexico are generally those which require a high proportion of
low cost assembly labor. Some companies (not just electronics firms)
take advantage of the low cost assembly labor by locating plants along
the Mexican-Texas border. They have two plants, one on either side of
the border. The labor intensive work is done in Mexico. The products
are then shipped back to Texas, paying low or no duty, for final
11
assembly.
Marketing and cost considerations have to be significant because
293
the Mexican government restricts the manner in which companies can do
business in the country. The Mexican government generally only allows
foreign computer companies to operate if the majority of the company
is owned by Mexican partners. Most U.S. microcomputer manufactures
operating in Mexico do so under these terms. However, in February
1984, the government announced that in certain industries, including
computers and related equipment, it would allow foreign companies to
maintain majority or total control as long as they generated a
significant number of jobs, brought in new technologies, and created
substantial quantities of goods for export.12
The Mexican government is also attempting to encourage the
creation of jobs other than just unskilled assembly jobs. Currently,
many computer companies ship parts to Mexico and use the low cost
labor solely to assemble products. The government required a number
of microcomputer manufactureres to use 50 percent Mexican-made
products by the end of their first year of operations, as a condition
of entry into the market.13
IBM has had a plant in Mexico for over 50 yeaars and is currently
manufacturing computers and typewriters just outside Guadalajara. The
company recently announced it's intention to expand these facilities
to manufacture its personal computer.14
Sperry has a small subassembly operation in Guadalajara, Mexico.
According to Sperry representatives, the plant was opened solely
because the Mexican government required a certain degree of "Mexican
content" in order for Sperry to get certain contracts. Sperry located
specifically in Guadalajara because the government encouraged it.
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Mexico City has become quite congested and the government doesn't want
more development in that area.
NCR has a manufacturing plant in Pueblo, Mexico that is also what
it considers a "strategic international plant." Like NCR's Brazilian
plant, it was established solely for marketing considerations.
Burroughs manufactures peripheral products and components in a
plant in Guadalajara. Hewlett Packard recently opened operations,
also in Guadalajara, to manufacture microcomputers. The majority of
the Mexican company, however, is owned by the Mexican partners.15
DEC currently does not have any plants in Latin America. It does,
however, make an effort to buy products and components in Mexico and
Brazil, which it ships back to the U.S. for assembly.
One reason DEC doesn't have a plant in Latin America is because
the skill level is not high, and thus the only work that can be done
in the area is assembly work. DEC doesn't consider it a good idea to
locate a plant in a country if all the parts and materials are
imported. The country receives very little benefit from the plant if
the manufacture only involves hiring some assembly labor.
DEC does expect that it will feel more pessure in the future to
have a manufacturing presence in Latin America. However, the amount a
company responds depends on how important are the sales in that
particular country. Sometimes it makes more sense to go after other
markets than to open an unnecessary plant.
Computer companies have located plants in Latin America primarily
for marketing considerations. Governments in several countries
currently require some degree of "local content" in products sold in
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their countries. These pressures are expected to increase in the
future.
Caribbean
Puerto Rico is an attractive location for some of the companies I
interviewed, and is the primary site chosen in the Caribbean. Puerto
Rico is an area with an extremely low corporate tax rate, and
companies can save significant amounts of money by establishing a
plant here. In the past, labor was somewhat cheaper than in the
United States, but this advantage had practically disappeared today.
Haiti is chosen as a site because of the low wage rates prevailing in
the country.
DEC has been manufacturing in Puerto Rico since the late 1960s.
At that time, DEC was having difficulty getting enough assembly labor
around its headquarters in Massachusetts. One of the several plants
DEC built was in Puerto Rico. The area had a sufficient supply of
assembly labor and wages were relatively low. The initial work done
in the plant was printed circuit board assembly. DEC has expanded
production and now has two plants in Puerto Rico. The plants are now
involved in fabricating circuit boards, making power supplies and
assembling some computers, as well as circuit board assembly.
The Puerto Rican government offered DEC financial incentives to
build its plant in a rural area of the island. DEC intended to do
this anyway, and thus the incentives, which were beneficial, didn't
influence their decision.
Prime, Hewlett Packard and Honeywell all built plants in Puerto
Rico during the late 1970s. According to company representatives, tax
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advantages were the most important reason for these expansions.
Hewlett Packard has assembled terminals in Puerto Rico since about
1980. The components are shipped to the island where they are
assembled into complete terminals. Hewlett Packard currently does not
do any research and development here, though it would like to do so
eventually. The skill level is relatively low today and Hewlett
Packard is encouraging the universities to train people. The company
built the Puerto Rican plant solely because of the tax advantages.
Tax advantages were the only reason Prime built its assembly plant
in Puerto Rico. Prime pays no taxes on earnings until 1994, as long
as the earnings are not remitted to the U.S. The plant assembles
printed circuit boards, producing about 50 percent of the boards Prime
uses. Automated equipment, like that used in Prime's Massachusetts
plant, is also used in Puerto Rico. Prime finds the skills of the
workers limited, though sufficient for circuit board assembly.
According to one executive, the company pays wages similar to those
paid U.S. assembly workers.
Honeywell has made display terminals in Puerto Rico since the late
1970s. The tax incentives are great as Honeywell pays a low tax rate
to the Puerto Rican government. Honeywell finds that labor costs are
somewhat lower than the U.S. but not low enough, by themselves, to
account for the decision to build there. Honeywell also found that
the skill level was actually higher than in some parts of the southern
U.S., and much higher than other Caribbean countries.
Honeywell also has a plant in Haiti, which it built around the
same time as the Puerto Rican plant. Low labor costs were the sole
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reason Honeywell established a manufacturing plant in Haiti. The
company found that Haiti was the best Caribbean country in terms of
the availability and cost of labor. The plant manufactures cables for
computers, which involves primarily unskilled assembly work.
Honeywell also manufactures some cables in Massachusetts. However,
production in Massachusetts is automated while goods made in Haiti are
done entirely by hand. Honeywell wants to keep a stable workforce in
Massachusetts, so the Haitian plant is forced to absord both the peaks
and depressions in production.
Puerto Rico will continue to be an attractive location for
computer firms because of the tax advantages. There is no evidence
that any other Caribbean countries will become particularly attractive
to computer companies. These countries have abundent supplies of low
cost, unskilled assembly workers. However, this is not the kind of
labor the industry needs today. Companies no longer locate plants
just to get low wage labor.
Canada
Most computer companies have built manufacturing plants in Canada
as a result of marketing considerations. Seven of the companies in my
sample have or have had Canadian plants.
IBM has been manufacturing in Canada since 1940. Today, their
Toronto plant manufactures terminals and other products as part of
their communications division. NCR has also been in Canada for quite
some time. The company had a plant in Toronto since the days of
mechanical products. NCR replaced this plant with a new electronics
facility in the mid-1970s that manufactures financial products.
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DEC built a manufacturing plant in Canada around the late 1960s or
early 1970s. This was during the period when DEC was experiencing a
shortage of assembly labor and it opened several new facilities to tap
additional sources of labor. One of the plants DEC built was in
Canada. The company chose Canada primarily to have a market presence
there. In addition, a DEC executive who was from Canada wanted to do
manufacturing in Canada. The plant initially assembled modules which
was very labor-intensive work. The facility has expanded a number of
times and it now manufactures a complete product.
Burroughs began manufacturing disks in Canada in the late 1960s.
The company recognized that it was important to have a physical
presence in Canada to do much marketing.16
Sperry opened its first computer manufacturing facility in Canada
during the mid-1970s. The plant manufactures defense system products
and is a satellite plant of the Minneapolis facility. The plant,
which is only one hours flying time from Minneapolis does
manufacturing only. No research and development is done in Canada.
Pressures to have a market presence in Canada had increased by the
mid-1970s. Sperry found that there were restrictions on obtaining
Canadian government defense contracts. The government required that
some part of the products had to be manufactured in Canada.
Data General and Honeywell have had manufacturing facilities in
Canada, though Honeywell closed its plant in 1974 when the plant was
no longer needed. The Data General site does marketing, but no
manufacturing today.
Incentives by the Canadian government appear to have played a role
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in selecting specific sites in Canada. Sperry located its plant in
Winnipeg, a less developed area of Canada. The government encouraged
this location by offering to train workers and by offering some
financial incentives. Burroughs also located its plant in Winnipeg.
During the late 1960s the Canadian Minister of Labor was from Winnipeg
and encouraged Burroughs' location there. At the same time Burroughs
was getting involved in a large Canadian government contract and so
acceding to the preferences of the government was advantageous for
Burroughs.
Marketing considerations have been responsible for past Canadian
locations. No company has build a new manufacturing plant in Canada
since the mid-1970s and there is no evidence to suggest that future
plants will be located in Canada.
Conclusions
Computer companies have located manufacturing plants in different
areas of the world for quite different reasons. The specific features
that make foreign countries attractive have also changed over time.
Manufacturing plants located in Europe during the 1950s and early
1960s were cheaper to operate than their U.S. counterparts. The
plants also provided an easy entry into European markets and were
viewed as an act of good faith on the part of the computer company.
The company created jobs and income in Europe, which was important.
Since the late 1960s, marketing considerations have essentially been
the only reason for locating plants in Europe. Countries are
demanding that computer companies have some manufacturing presence in
the country in order to gain access to certain markets. Ireland and
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Scotland also offer significant tax advantages to companies locating
there, but these are the only European countries to do so.
Asia in the early 1970s was solely a source of cheap assembly
labor. Since the late 1970s, certain Asian countries, notably Hong
Kong, Thailand, and Japan have developed respectable skill bases.
(Japan has always been more advanced than the other areas.) Plants
located in these countries are now capable of designing and
manufacturing complete low-end products.
Companies have built plants in Latin American generally for
marketing considerations. Some countries, notably Brazil and Mexico,
are demanding companies manufacture in their country in order to
market. Mexican assembly labor is cheaper than U.S. labor. However,
since direct manufacturing labor is a relatively small component of
production costs today, companies don't locate in an area just because
assembly wages are low. The general skill level in Mexico is low, and
thus the area is not suited for the manufacture of complete products.
Puerto Rico is the most popular Caribbean location. The tax
advantages are the primary attraction here. Canadian locations are
generally chosen for marketing considerations.
What will drive foreign location decisions in the future? At
least for the large computer companies, most foreign location
decisions will be driven by a need to have a manufacturing presence in
the country in order to market products. Today, some foreign
governments, notably France, Britain, Brazil, and Mexico, are
demanding that computer companies manufacture in their countries.
Most of the computer companies I interviewed expect that these
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pressures will increase in the future and will be the most important
determinant of foreign locations. One executive noted that they will
be capable of producing computer systems in just a couple of plants in
the near future. The future challenge will be to manufacture in a
number of foreign countries as well as the U.S. and remain
competitive.
Asian locations will be somewhat different than described above.
Marketing considerations will be important particularly as the Asian
market expands. However, Asia will also remain as a low cost source
for certain products. Designing and manufacturing products costs less
in Asia than the U.S. because all costs are lower in Asia. The skill
level in the area is increasing dramatically, particularly among
engineers. Most companies project that the high-end, complex products
will continue to be developed and manufactured in the U.S. Asia will
continue to grow as a source for complete low-end products, including
terminals, disk drives, and personal computers.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter pulls together various threads from the analysis of
the previous chapters. The thesis began by setting out the three
theoretical perspectives that addressed the issues of industrial
location and regional growth. The analysis of the development of the
computer industry provides data to allow us to test the different
theoretical perspectives. The first section of the chapter discusses
the theories and how well the different perspectives describe the
development of the computer industry.
The second section of the chapter highlights some of the important
findings and trends in the industry and draws some implications about
the future of the industry.
This study provided insights into some aspects of the development
of the industry, though it also raised issues that need further
research. The third section of the chapter describes some future
research topics.
The final section of the chapter turns to a brief analysis of the
public policy implications of this thesis.
Theoretical Implications
The evidence from the computer industry can be used to test the
predictions of the different theoretical perspectives on plant
location discussed in Chapter 2. In that chapter I discussed three
theoretical perspectives, neoclassical, product cycle theory, and
structural theory.
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Neoclassical Theory. According to neoclassical location theory,
firms locate their production facilities in a way to maximize profits
or minimize costs. This means the company will compare the costs of
production and the costs of selling its product in different
geographic locations and will choose a location to minimize these
costs.
Regional growth or decline is driven by exogenous changes in the
supply of the region's factors of production and in the demand for the
region's output. These changes affect wages paid to labor and the
prices of the region's outputs, and thus affect the relative
attractiveness of different areas.
Many of the assumptions of neoclassical theory are violated in
reality, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Empirically, many of
the predictions of the model don't hold up when analyzing the computer
manufacturing industry.
Labor is the most crucial component for the computer industry, in
terms of location factors. Computer manufacturing plants, unlike
steel mills, for example, don't need to be located near suppliers or
near final markets. Computer components and products are relatively
light weight and thus transportation costs are not an important factor
in location decisions.
However, wage differentials actually play less of a role in
determining location than one might expect based on neoclassical
theory. I showed in the analysis in chapter 5 that computer companies
don't locate solely to minimize wage costs. Today, for example,
computer companies need to locate in areas where they can attract
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engineers. Engineers prefer to live in university areas and places
that have what these professionals consider a good quality of life.
As a result, companies have to locate plants in this type of area to
attract the labor they need and cost issues are of minimal importance.
There are also numerous factors that have affected the location
patterns of computer companies that neoclassical theory does not deal
with explicitly, such as the importance of technological change, past
location decisions, and political pressures.
The analysis in the previous chapters showed that there have been
substantial changes in the manufacturing process and that production
functions have not been fixed over time. These changes altered the
occupational distribution in the computer industry which in turn
affected location patterns.
History, or past location decisions, have affected current
location patterns. Individual companies' prior location decisions
constrain later choices. Past decisions also created agglomeration
economies in certain areas, due for example, to the existence of a
trained workforce, and the existence of the many small companies that
provide the infrastructure necessary to computer companies. These
agglomeration economies constrain future location decisions.
Political pressures from foreign governments have been quite
important in U.S. companies' locations in Europe and Latin America.
Few neoclassical economists would argue that these factors are not
important. However, the factors do not form an integral part of
neoclassical theory. Another, related criticism of neoclassical
location and regional growth theories is that long run changes are
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driven by exogenous changes, in technology, demand, and supply. This
is not a satisfactory explanation. Factors, such as those described
above are partly what move the system over time.
Neoclassical location theory is a bit elusive. By this I mean
that if you compare the costs of doing business in two areas, and find
that actual location decisions don't follow the predictions, a
neoclassical economist would argue that you haven't included all the
relevant factors in the cost comparison. This is a reasonable
argument, though it does make it difficult to use the theory to
predict location decisions. In addition, there is a point where other
theories that explicitly incorporate factors such as technological
changes and the political-economic environment, become more
compelling. Product cycle theory and structural economic theory both
consider the roles of these factors.
Product Cycle Theory. Product cycle theory is a long-run, dynamic
model that effectively deals with some of the problems of the
neoclassical explanation. Product cycle theory does explain some of
the observed changes in the manufacturing process and location of
plants in the computer industry. However, I argued in Chapter 2 that
the theory was too technologically deterministic. Regular and
predictable technological changes drive the model. From a theoretical
perspective, this is an unsatisfactory explanation. Evidence from the
computer industry also suggests that in reality this explanation is
not completely accurate because it doesn't include all aspects of
technological change.
How well do the predictions of product cycle theory describe the
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observed changes in the computer industry? To briefly summarize
product cycle theory, the theory predicts that all manufactured
products go through a regular pattern of development beginning with
the initial introduction of a new product. There are three stages in
a product's life, each stage characterized by differences in
technology, production processes, demand, and plant location.
The first or new product stage is when the product is initially
being manufactured. There are rapid technological changes as the
product is first built and tested. Manufacturing and research and
development are intimately related. Production is not very
capital-intensive and requires a highly skilled workforce. Demand is
low and relatively price inelastic which implies that production cost
differentials are not important. Production takes place in the U.S.
Foreign demand is satisfied by exports.
The second stage is the growth phase. The pace of technological
change has slowed and production is more standardized than in the
first stage. Some mass production methods are employed. Demand has
increased and keeping production costs low is more important than
before. Companies will locate manufacturing plants in low cost areas
of the U.S. Some foreign subsidiaries will be established.
The final stage occurs when production techniques have become
standardized and stable. Production is very capital-intensive and
often highly automated. The largest and most crucial type of labor
employed is low skilled. Product demand is high and price elastic and
companies strive to keep production costs low. One way of doing this
is to locate plants in the less developed parts of the world.
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My model of the history of the computer industry divides the
growth and development of the industry into three periods,
characterized by differences in the manufacturing process, labor
demand, and plant locations.
The first period covers the 1950s and early 1960s, which saw the
birth of the computer industry. The demand for computers was limited,
with the government and other specialized users being the only
purchasers. The research and development and the manufacturing were
intimately related. Scientists and engineers represented a high
proportion of the industry's employment. Companies were located
primarily in the U.S. near universities with superior electical
engineering departments.
The mid-1960s to mid-1970s constitutes a second stage in the
development of the computer industry. Integrated circuit technology,
which was a large and very significant development, was introduced in
the mid-1960s. The use of integrated circuits revolutionized the
computer industry. The industry began to grow in the mid-1960s and
computers began to be used in commercial applications. Companies
employed large quantities of manufacturing labor. Unskilled labor was
needed for the basic assembly. Technicians were also an important
component, involved primarily in testing products. Companies employed
assembly line techniques, though production was not particularly
automated. U.S. plant expansions were in areas with large supplies of
manufacturing labor. European manufacturing subsidiaries were
established to supply European customers. Some companies built plants
in Asia in the early 1970s in order to take advantage of the cheap,
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unskilled labor that existed there.
The third stage, beginning in the mid-1970s has been an explosive
growth stage. Demand skyrocketed as the uses for computers expanded.
There have been very significant technological changes in the nature
of computers, particularly the increasing importance and complexity of
semiconductors. In addition, computer companies began to incorporate
into the computer, through the use of software, various functions that
had previously been progammed by the end users. Thus, the computer
has become much more than just a piece of hardware. These changes
have had profound impacts on the manufacturing process and location of
plants. Actual manufacturing has become a relatively unimportant part
of producing computers. This fact combined with the increasing
automation of production has resulted in a dramatic decline in the
amount of labor involved in manufacturing. The labor that remains
directly involved in manufacturing is predominantly unskilled.
Engineering talent has become the most crucial component in the
production of computers today. The result is an occupational
distribution that is distinctly bimodal, with high skilled engineers
at one end, unskilled assembly workers at the other end, and little in
between. New manufacturing plants are now being located in areas with
engineering talent, which are primarily near cities with respected
universities. During this third stage, Asia developed its technical
base so that it is no longer just a source of cheap assembly labor.
Asian plants are now capable of designing and manufacturing complete
low-end products.
Product cycle theory describes quite well the situation in the
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computer industry prior to the mid-1960s during what the theory calls
the new product stage. Many, but not all the predictions of product
cycle theory hold as well for the growth period from the mid-1960s to
the mid-1970s. Manufacturing labor was the most crucial component for
the computer industry during this period. Many companies found they
needed more assembly labor than was available near their existing
plants and they constructed new plants in areas with large labor
pools. Some companies established subsidiaries in Asia solely to
attract cheap unskilled labor. Product cycle theory does not predict
that companies would locate solely to find cheap unskilled labor until
the third stage of the cycle.
The experiences of the computer industry since the mid-1970s
diverge dramatically from the predictions of product cycle theory.
The theory predicts that in the final stage of the cycle, the
technology of the product will stabilize and there will be no new
innovations of great importance. The situation in the computer
industry is quite the opposite. There have been very significant
technological advances that have substantially changed the nature of
the product since the mid-1970s.
The manufacture of computers is highly automated today, which is a
characteristic of the third product cycle stage. However, the use of
automated equipment along with the technological changes that occurred
in the nature of the product have changed the manufacturing process so
that the amount of what is considered actual manufacturing (putting
computers together) has declined considerably. Product cycle theory
predicted that in the third stage, with the advent of automated
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equipment, unskilled labor would become the most crucial component in
production. This has not happened in the computer industry.
Engineers are the most crucial component in the industry today.
Product cycle theory, in contrast, predicts relatively few engineers
would be needed.
The major reason the predictions of product cycle theory don't
hold up in the computer industry stems from the fact that the product
cycle view of technology and technological change is too simplistic.
The theory views technological change as essentially the
standardization of a manufactured product, which according to the
theory occurs in a regular and predictable manner. A product is
invented and then development for manufacture begins. Once the kinks
are out of the design and consumers make known what they want in the
product, it can be standardized and designed to be mass produced and
manufactured using automated equipment.
This kind of standardization has occurred to some degree in the
computer manufacturing industry. However, the technological changes
that have occurred in the development of computers are greater and
more complex than just a product standardization. Technological
changes, notably the increasing importance of semiconductors, have
completely changed the design of computers. Computers have also
become more than just pieces of hardware. Through the use of
software, computers are now designed to perform many functions that in
the past were programmed by the consumer. Thus, the functions and
capabilities of computers have increased over the past 20 years.
Technological change, which I have argued is simply product
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standardization in product cycle theory, drives the model through its
different stages. If one allows a broader view of technological
change than does product cycle theory, then it is likely that the
actual changes a product experiences will diverge from that predicted
by the theory. This is part of the reason that the observed changes
in the computer industry, and particularly the recent changes, haven't
conformed to the predictions of product cycle theory.
Structural Theory. There is no single body of structural theory
comparable to that of orthodox theory. However, structural analyses
proceed along similar lines. Structural theorists studying industrial
location consider how industrial characteristics, social factors, and
historical events affect where companies choose to locate facilities.
My analysis of the computer industry supports the importance of
structural factors in affecting location decisions. The nature of
competitive pressures in the industry affected both the manufacturing
process and location patterns of computer firms. Other structural
factors that influenced location decisions were the presence and
pressures of unions and organized labor, the role of universities,
skill and agglomeration economies, the role of history, and political
pressures.
Competitive pressures are more of an independent force and more of
a force actually driving the observed changes in the computer industry
than product cycle theory acknowledges. According to structural
theory the competitive pressures are specific to an industry and a
point in time. This contrasts to the neoclassical view of competition
where it is a constant and ahistorical pressure.
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Competition in the computer industry increased during the 1970s
and particularly after the mid-1970s. The mainframe companies were
forced to reduce prices and production costs in order to remain
competitive. The minicomputer manufacturers had to keep production
costs down to keep prices low enough to attract customers in small
companies.
These pressures to reduce costs led companies to increase their
use of automated equipment. This had profound effects on the
composition of the industry's labor force, greatly reducing the need
for manufacturing labor and particularly the need for skilled
manufacturing labor. Changes in the labor required also affected the
locations in which computer companies chose to expand.
The technology of computers made the use of automated equipment
feasible. It was a necessary, though not sufficient condition.
Competitive pressures were also needed to force the introduction of
automated equipment.
Structural models of plant location include the existence of
unions and organized labor as an explanatory variable. Neither
product cycle nor neoclassical theory include this in their
explanations. According to both neoclassical and product cycle
theories, the characteristics of labor that are important are the
quantity or supply of various types of labor and their price. To the
degree that labor is an important factor in production, companies will
locate to attract a certain mix of labor and to minimize labor costs.
The conclusions from Chapter 5 were that computer companies did
often locate plants in order to attract a certain type of labor. But
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companies don't always locate in the areas with the lowest wages.
High wages can make an already unattractive area more so. Conversely,
low wages can make an attractive area more appealing. However, high
wages don't necessarily stifle growth and low wages don't guarantee
it.
Computer companies are by and large not unionized. The evidence
presented in Chapter 5 does suggest that a desire to avoid potential
union activity influences location decisions. It is not just blue
collar unions that companies want to avoid, but labor activism in
general, including rules and work laws (e.g. health and safety
regulations) that protect all workers. Workers in the South are less
organized than in the North, which is one reason much expansion
occurred in the South during the 1970s.
Avoiding union activity is certainly not the sole criterion on
which location decisions are based. However, when given a choice
between two otherwise equal areas, companies prefer the area with less
potential union or organized work activity.
Universities played an important role in the initial location of
computer companies and continue to be a factor in locating facilities
today. Computer technology was developed in the electrical
engineering departments of major universities, including MIT, Harvard,
University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, and Stanford. Many of the early
computer companies were started by the individuals who had been
responsible or involved in the initial development of the computers.
These companies were located near the universities to maintain contact
with, and recruit from the university community.
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During the 1960s and early 1970s the presence of a major
university was not a factor in locating new manufacturing facilities.
Instead, companies located in areas with large pools of manufacturing
labor.
However, beginning around the mid-1970s, when engineers became
increasingly important in producing computers, locating near a major
university became important once again. The universities provided a
source of engineering labor.
History, or past location decisions are also an important
determinant of location patterns. Investments in plant, equipment,
and personnel are large and it is too costly to close and relocate
facilities in the face of marginal changes in production functions.
Some of the companies I studied had been in business prior to the
development of computers. These companies had thus located plants
based on the needs of their previous product line. Generally the
existing plants evolved to produce the new computer products. Some
plants were eventually closed if the new needs could not be met in the
old plants. However, the adjustment process was always slow.
Many of the companies I studied have acquired other smaller
companies over time. With these acquisitions, they inherited existing
manufacturing facilities. Again, because investments are large, the
acquired plants generally remained in operation. Thus, past decisions
of other companies, influenced the current location patterns of
computer companies.
Important skill and agglomeration economies have been created in
areas by the clustering of several companies' manufacturing plants.
317
Boston's Route 128 and Silicon Valley are obvious examples. Denver
became a center for disk technology once several companies located
their disk facilities there. As a result, other companies found
Denver a most attractive location for disk research and manufacturing
facilities. The advantages created by clustering include the presence
of a relatively large labor pool, the growth of small companies that
provide products and services needed by computer manufacturing
companies, and a more stimulating environment that fosters innovation.
Individual companies also found it advantageous to cluster their
manufacturing plants, particularly in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Expanding in an existing area meant that the company already had an
established relationship with the local government and had worked out
relationships with labor, including training the type of workers
needed in manufacturing.
Political pressures have influenced location decisions,
particularly in Europe and Latin America. Many foreign countries are
demanding that some part of the computer be manufactured in their
country as a condition of access to selling in certain markets,
notably to government agencies. Foreign governments want to generate
employment and income for their countries and to maintain a more
positive balance of paymetns than would occur if money simply flowed
out of the country for purchase of U.S. computer products.
These pressures for local content began in the early 1970s.
France and Britain are two European countries that are particularly
strict about local content. The Latin American countries of Brazil
and Mexico have regulations that limit the number of companies that
318
can sell in their markets and impose local content restrictions on
those companies that it does allow to operate. In the future, more
foreign governments will be pressing U.S. computer companies to locate
manufacturing plants in their countries.
Industry Trends
There have been a number of important changes in the computer
industry, in the manufacturing process, plant location, and industry
structure, since the 1960s. If these trends continue, the future will
be very different from the present.
Manufacturing Process. The trends in the way computers are
manufactured have been fairly clear, as Chapter 4 discussed. There
has been a shift from the use of technical to unskilled labor in the
actual manufacturing work and the overall occupational distribution is
becoming dichotomized, with high skilled engineers at one end and low
skilled assemblers at the other end.
Actual "hands on" manufacturing is now only a small part of
computer production. Automation and changes in the design of
computers have worked together to reduce the amount of direct
manufacturing labor involved in manufacturing computers. Direct
manufacturing labor represented around 25 percent of the costs of
producing the business machine products of the 1950s. Today, direct
manufacturing labor is only around 5 percent of the costs of
manufacturing computers.
The type of work involved in actually manufacturing computers
today is predominantly unskilled assembly work. This contrasts to the
situation in the 1950s when it was skilled technicians who essentially
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built the machines. Even during the 1960s, skilled technicians were
heavily involved in manufacturing, especially testing. It is clear
that there has been a deskilling of the labor used to manufacture
computers.
The role and importance of engineers has changed over time. In
the early days of computers, engineers played a large role in design,
development, and production. The importance of engineers declined
between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s when mass production methods were
employed. However, since the mid-1970s, the role of engineers has
increased due to changes in the design of computers, notably the use
of semiconductors and software.
The importance of sales and service workers relative to other
workers in the industry has also increased. This is due partly to the
fact that the importance of the manufacturing activity has declined.
In addition, new customers are purchasing computers and they are small
companies who are relatively uninformed about computers. This
requires proportionatly more sales and service personnel than in the
past.
As a result of all these changes, the computer industry today is
very different than it was 10 or 20 years ago. There is every reason
to think these trends will continue in the future. The extent and use
of automated equipment will increase. Semiconductors will do more and
more of the computer's work. Thus, we would expect a continuing
decline in the relative amount and in the skill of the labor involved
in the actual manufacture of computers. There are no indications that
the importance of either engineers or sales and service workers will
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decline.
Plant Location. As the technology of computers and of
manufacturing computers has changed, the number of manufacturing
plants needed has declined. Automation has meant that more computers
could be produced in less space than in the past. None of the
companies I studied had plans to expand into other locations within
the U.S. Their current manufacturing capacity is sufficient for their
current and projected production needs.
The issue of foreign plant locations is more complicated than U.S.
locations. Many governments are putting pressure on the large
computer companies to incorporate foreign labor into their products
and are particularly interested in having manufacturing plants located
in their countries. Most companies expect these pressures to increase
in the future and they will have to respond in some way. However,
this presents a dilemma. Computer companies don't need additional
manufacturing capacity. Foreign locations, except for Asian locations
are either not cheaper than U.S. locations or the skills in the
country are not high enough to manufacture complete products.
The situation in Asia is different from that in other foreign
countries. The costs of manufacturing products are much lower in Asia
than elsewhere. Engineers, as well as manufacturing workers receive
much lower wages than their U.S. counterparts. The technical
sophistication of the Japanese workforce is high. Japanese companies
are manufacturing hardware that is as sophisticated as U.S. hardware.
The skill level in the rest of Asia ia also increasing, so that today
companies in these countries are capable of designing and producing
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complete low-end products. Even if U.S. companies don't expand
manufacturing facilities in Asia, they will buy increasingly more
products from Asian companies.
Structure of the Industry. The structure of the computer industry
has changed considerably over time. These changes are particularly
evident in the mainframe end of the industry.
During the 1960s and early 1970s several large and highly
vertically integrated companies dominated the industry. IBM was by
far the largest company. The other large firms, which included
Burroughs, Sperry, NCR, and Honeywell, sold in specialized segments of
the market. All these companies manufactured in-house most of what
they sold.
This situation began to change in the early 1970s. IBM continued
to be a large, vertically integrated producer. The other, smaller
companies, in the face of pressures to reduce costs, became less
vertically integrated. These companies began buying components and
complete products from outside vendors, and integrated them into
complete systems.
If these trends continue, which seems likely, the industry will
clearly evolve into three sectors. One sector will consist of one or
more gigantic, highly vertically integrated firms, including IBM (and
maybe AT&T). The second sector will be the companies that assemble
systems, but buy many of the pieces. Burroughs, NCR, Sperry, and
Honeywell have begun to operate in this way, and the companies that
remain in business will undoubtedly continue to do so. The third
sector of the industry will consist of many small, specialized
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suppliers, providing components and products to firms in the second
sector.
Trends in the minicomputer segment of the market are less clear
than in the mainframe segment. Of the companies I studied, DEC, Data
General, and Hewlett Packard are highly vertically integrated and
appear to remain committed to this strategy. Prime was the only
minicomputer maker I studied that was not vertically integrated. This
segment of the industry may evolve like the mainframe segment into
three distict sectors as competitive pressures increase.
Future Research
The analysis of industry trends discussed above suggests a number
of areas where future research is needed.
Changing Occupational Distribution. A further exploration of the
changing occupational distribution in the industry and its
implications for the workforce is needed. This thesis examined the
changes in the manufacturing segment of the industry. One finding was
the decline in the proportion of manufacturing workers. We need
further study on the type of jobs that have replaced and are
continuing to replace the manufacturing work.
The aggregate trends showed a proportional increase in the number
of engineers, programmers, and sales and service personnel. But we
know little about the nature of these jobs, particularly the latter
two categories. For example, what is the skill distribution among
programmers employed in the industry? Do these jobs require
independent, creative work? Has any routinization occurred in these
occupations to reduce the skill level necessary?
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The number of service technicians has also been increasing. What
training or skills are required in this occupation? How have the
changes in the design of computers affected these jobs? Computers are
evolving to be a collection of circuit boards in boxes, which is
likely to make repairs simpler than in the past. The existence of
machines capable of remote problem diagnostics is also likely to
reduce the skills needed by the service technicians. A study of the
skills and training needed in the "non-manufacturing" part of the
industry would examine whether similar types of deskilling are
occurring in these occupations as was evident in the manufacturing
occupations.
There is also a larger, related question to pursue. Given the
shift toward high skill and low skill employment in the computer
industry, with little employment opportunity between these extremes,
it would be both useful and interesting to examine whether this trend
can be observed in other high tech industries, both electronics and
non-electronics sectors. Specifically, is this high skill-low skill
dichotomy true in other high technology industries, such as the
manufacture of communications equipment, engineering and scientific
measuring devices, and pharmacuticals? This analysis would be
important as it would provide data on the employment opportunities
associated with high technology growth.
Specialized Vendors. Another area of research would be to study
the small companies that sell components and products to companies
like the large computer firms I studied. There are a number of topics
to explore, including the manufacturing process, wages, and working
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conditions in these companies.
For what kinds of companies or products is the manufacturing
process labor-intensive and for what kinds is it capital-intensive?
Evidence suggests both types of companies exist.
There are clearly firms engaged in very labor-intensive
manufacturing. For example, there are a number of companies in
Boston's Chinatown that do mostly assembly work. The work done by one
company, Advanced Electronics, involves assembling integrated circuits
onto printed circuit boards. In Chinatown, the work is done entirely
by hand, which contrasts to the automated assembly in the large
computer companies I studied. 1
We would certainly expect some of the specialized vendors to have
fairly capital-intensive manufacturing processes. One of the reasons
that it is cheaper for a computer company to buy rather than
manufacture a product is that the specialty company can realize
economies of scale that the computer company cannot. The specialty
company, producing large volumes will be able to efficiently use
automated equipment.
Little is known about the wages and working conditions in the
small, specialized companies. The wages and benefits paid by the
computer companies I studied are, I suspect, higher than those in the
smaller companies. There is some evidence to support this contention.
Advanced Electronics, mentioned above, pays its workforce, which is
mostly women, $4.60 an hour. Teradyne pays $6.00 an hour, which is
relatively high for Chinatown.2 SCI Systems in Huntsville, Alabama
does the printed circuit board assembly for IBM's PC. One article
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suggested that wages in Alabama are minimal, which enabled SCI Systems
to bid low on the contract and win it.3 Clearly SCI Systems must be
able to do the assembly cheaper than IBM could or IBM wouldn't have
subcontracted the work.
A final issue concerning the small specialized vendors is the
degree of stability in production and thus employment that they
experience given fluctuations in demand. Most of the large computer
companies that I studied prided themselves on their full employment
policies and most had not laid off many workers. This suggests the
small companies will be forced to bear the effects of swings in the
business cycle, and the effects of errors in demand forecasts. IBM
acknowledged that they used their vendors to buffer the effects of
swings in the business cycle. Data General and Honeywell also
mentioned that they used their foreign plants as buffers. Further
study is needed on the amount of fluctuation in demand experienced by
the specialized vendors.
Personal Computer Manufacturers. This study examined firms that
manufactured mainframe and minicomputers, though most of these
companies also market, though don't necessarily manufacture, desktop
and/or personal computers. Personal computers as a product are quite
different from mainframe and minicomputers, the small computers
essentially being less complex. It would be useful to study companies
that only manufacture personal computers, to analyze how their
structure, manufacturing process, and location patterns differ from
companies that make a range of computers. The small computer
companies are young, founded since the late 1970s. Thus they have no
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history or past investments to influence their decisions about how and
where to manufacture their personal computers.
One issue that needs to be examined is the process by which
personal computers are manufactured. The small machines are less
complex than the large ones and consist essentially of printed circuit
boards in boxes. In addition, many personal computer companies use
the same microprocessor, which is the heart of the computer. This
suggests that there is less variation among different personal
computers than among different mainframe computers. The issue is then
how different the research and development and the manufacturing
process is in companies making small versus large computers. For
example, are personal computer makers more automated? Apple's new
factory that produces MacIntosh computers is highly automated, more so
than the plants of the companies I studied. However, can smaller
companies afford to be as highly automated? How does the occupational
distribution differ in the different segments of the industry? Are
the skill levels different?
Secondly, the implications for the location of personal computer
manufacturing plants needs to be studied. Personal computer
manufacture will be a good case to use in studying the tradeoff
between off-shore manufacturing using cheap labor and manufacturing in
the U.S. using automated equipment. For example, Data General
manufactures most of its desktop computer in Hong Kong because it is
less costly than manufacturing in the U.S. and the skills of the Asian
workforce are sufficient to manufacture this low end product. Atari
moved all its production facilities to Asia and IBM is opening a large
327
personal computer manufacturing plant in Mexico. Apple, on the other
hand, manufactures in California, with highly automated equipment.
There are many companies that manufacture personal computers
today. No one expects all of them to survive, and many have come and
gone already. It will be interesting to see what strategy of
manufacturing and location will be the most successful in this segment
of the market.
Public Policy Implications
This analysis of the growth and development of the computer
manufacturing industry has important implications for a number of
public policies, including state and local programs that provide
incentives for businesses to locate in their areas, wage subsidy
programs, inner-city development programs, and training programs.
States and cities in the United States are all attempting to
attract various types of "high tech" industry. Local areas are hoping
that new high tech jobs will replace those lost in traditional
manufacturing sectors. There has been an on-going debate concerning
the potential significance of high tech work, the kinds of jobs it
creates and what local areas can actually do to attract high tech
industries. Some argue that local areas should do all they can to
attract high tech companies, including offering a wide range of
financial incentives. Others argue that there is little local areas
can do to attract high tech industries. In addition, they argue that
there are not enough high tech jobs to replace lost jobs, and that the
jobs in the high tech and the traditional manufacturing sectors are
very different.
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Local areas attempt to attract computer companies and other high
tech industries by offering a variety of financial incentives,
including tax breaks, low cost financing, and site development
assistance. However, one problem is that all local areas offer
essentially the same type of incentives. Therefore an area is not
unique if it offers some package of incentives, but it does stand out
if it doesn't offer any. This forces local areas to compete with each
other and the end result is that all areas offer similar incentives.
A second problem with local incentives is that they don't
significantly affect a company's total production costs and thus they
have little, if any effect on location decisions. The one exception
to this is the state unitary corporate income tax, which is a
deterrent to plant location. The conclusion from this analysis is
that the incentives are essentially simply lost revenues to the local
areas and don't do anything to attract firms.
Companies do, however, appear to prefer areas in which there are
few laws or activities that might constrain their behavior. For
example, companies do not want to locate in areas that have a history
of organized labor. States with laws and regulations designed to
protect workers or consumers are also unattractive to computer
companies. This is not to say that companies don't locate in states
with work laws. However, such a state must be attractive in other
ways, by having, for example, a university with superior engineering
and computer science departments. This presents a dilema for those
states that have a history of legislation designed to protect and
benefit workers and consumers. Businesses demand improvements to the
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"business climate," meaning fewer regulations, and threaten to move or
curb expansion plans if the state'doesn't comply. States then have to
decide how much the threat is real, and how much to comply with
businesses demands. The conclusion from this analysis is that the
perceived business climate does affect location decisions, but it is
only one factor, and not as important as some companies would like
states to think.
Even if state and local incentives were an important factor in
location decisions, there are limits to the number of plants that will
be built in the future and thus limits to the number of jobs to be
created. Computer manufacturing companies (at least the large
companies) are not building new manufacturing plants today, and
haven't done so essentially since the late 1970s. Increased use of
automated equipment and changes in the design of computers have
reduced the amount of space and the number of employees needed to
manufacture computers. There is every indication that this trend will
continue into the future.
Local governments should also be aware that the occupational
distribution of jobs in the computer manufacturing industry is
changing and that the new jobs are not like the traditional
manufacturing jobs that are being lost in other sectors. The crucial
component in computer manufacturing is now engineers. Actual
manufacturing mainly employs unskilled or semi-skilled assembly
workers today. The increasing importance of software also means that
programmers are becoming relatively more important. The sales and
service component of the industry is also growing in relative
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importance. These are clearly not the traditional manufacturing jobs
of older industries which employed substantial quantities of skilled
blue collar crafts workers. Unemployed blue collar workers are not
qualified to be engineers and are over-qualified for assemblers. The
conclusion is that high tech work can't reemploy all those laid off
from more traditional manfuacturing jobs.
The analysis of the changing occupational distribution in the
computer manufacturing industry has implications for several policy
programs. Wage subsidy programs have traditionally been used to
attempt to generate blue-collar manufacturing jobs. In the computer
manufacturing industry, direct labor costs are now only a small
fraction of total production costs. Automated equipment and changes
in the design of computers have been responsible for this change.
This suggests that programs designed to stimulate manufacturing jobs
in the computer industry will have little success. In addition, the
manufacturing jobs in the industry today are primarily unskilled
assembly jobs, which are relatively low paying and do not lead to
better paying, high skilled jobs.
There is much interest in attracting high tech companies to inner
city locations. This analysis makes it clear that policy makers need
to consider the type of jobs that these companies will bring to an
area. At least in the computer industry, it seems fairly clear that
most manufacturing jobs that are created will be unskilled assembly
jobs.
The changing occupational distribution in the computer
manufacturing industry also has implications for occupational training
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programs designed to train unemployed workers for new jobs. Policy
makers need to be certain that people are being trained for
occupations for which demand is high. Most of the projections used to
estimate future occupational needs assume that the occupational
distribution within an industry remains constant over the projection
period. Changes in the projected demand for different occupations
occur due to changes in the industrial structure. If the experience
in the computer industry is typical of other high tech industries,
these projections are likely to be wrong and thus programs will train
workers for non-existent jobs.
It seems clear from the above discussion of the policy
implications of the changing occupational distribution in the computer
industry, that more research is needed on changes in other high tech
industries. It is unclear whether other industries have experienced
changes similar to those in the computer industry. This discussion
makes it clear that policy makers need this type of information, as
numerous public policies are affected.
This thesis provided some insights into the location decisions of
computer companies and how this has affected and will affect the
growth of different areas of the U.S. and of foreign countries. The
study provided some answers but also raised other issues in which more
research is needed.
The computer manufacturing industry and other high tech industries
have been growing dramatically and will continue to do so in the
future. Developments in these sectors also affect other sectors. The
public's perception of the importance of high tech industries and the
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nature of the jobs they generate is somewhat inaccurate. For all
these reasons, it is crucial that research on high tech industries
continue.
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Appendix
SOURCES OF DATA
Census of Manufacturers
The Census of Manufacturers data, presented in Chapter 3 come from
a survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census as part of the economic
censuses. The Bureau collects information from manufacturing
establishments on the amount and cost of labor, materials, and capital
used in the production process, the value of output, the location of
the establishment and its form of owenership. The first survey was
done in 1810. Initially, surveys were conducted every 10 years, with
the dicennial Census. The Census of Manufacturers is now conducted
every 5 years. I included 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982 (preliminary
figures) data in my analysis. It would have been difficult to use
earlier years due to changes in the industrial classification scheme
that affected comparability (see below for more detail).
The Census collected information from all manufacturing
establishments that had at least one employee. An establishment is
defined as a plant at a single physical location. Companies that
operated more than one plant supplied separate information on each
plant. Establishments performing what the Census termed subsidiary
activities were not reported separately by industry, but were summed
over the entire state. These activities include research and
development, management, and accounting. The activities are excluded
from the separate industry counts if they are carried out in a
separate location from the manufacturing plant or are performed for
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more than one plant. This means, for example, that the central
office of a multi-plant corporation will not be reported by industry,
but the total of all central office facilities is reported for the
entire state.
Methodology
The basic universe used by the Census consists of company (not
establishment) lists provided by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
and the Social Security Administration (SSA). Also included are the
approximately 60,000 establishments surveyed in the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers (also conducted by the Census Bureau). Coverage of
companies is assumed to be fairly complete given the sources of the
lists.
Questionnaires were mailed to the companies early in the year
following the survey year and were returned within 6 months. The
Census collected information on approximately 120,000 small,
single-unit companies (generally with less than 10 employees) from the
administrative records of the IRS and SSA. This was done in order to
save very small companies the time and trouble of reporting data. As
a result of this procedure, the Census Bureau concluded that the
information on establishments with 20 or more employees was more
reliable than information on small establishments.
Definitions
The Census Bureau uses the industry classification of the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) manual. The industry I examined was
SIC 3573, electronic computing equipment. This industry group
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includes firms manufacturing electronic computers, peripheral
equipment, and major logical components of computers. The industry
definition did not change between 1967 and 1982. One reason I didn't
analyze data prior to 1967 is that the industry definition was quite
different. Prior to 1967, the industry classification included
calculating and accounting machines as well as computers. The former
was an important part of the category, particularly in the 1950s, when
computers production was very small. Thus, location patterns would be
confounded and possibly confused examining data before 1967. Since
the computer industry was relatively small in the 1950s and early
1960s, little is lost by beginning the analysis in 1967.
Production workers include workers up through the working foreman
level engaged in various activities involved in manufacturing the
product. The number of production workers is the average of the
March, May, August, and November payroll periods ending nearest the
12th of the month during the survey year.
All other employees include nonproduction personnel of the
manufacturing establishment. Factory supervisors above the working
foreman level are included. Workers engaged in "subsidiary
activities" in separate establishemnts are excluded from the separate
industry figures, as described above. The number of other employees
is the number employed during the mid-March payroll period.
Payroll is the gross earnings paid to employees during the survey
year. It includes all forms of compensation.
Production worker hours are total hours worked at the plant,
including overtime. Vacation, holidays and sick days are excluded.
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Confidentiality Issues
The Census Bureau is required to protect the confidentiality of
individual companies. This can cause problems when looking at
individual states at the 4-digit SIC level. The Census can always
report the number of establishments, and the number of establishments
with 20 or more workers. However, employment information and other
variables may have to be surpressed in order to protect
confidentiality.
The Census deals with the confidentiality problem in two ways.
First, at the state level, it will only report information separately
for an industry or industry group if employment in the industry is at
least 150. If employment is less than 150, no information, not even
the number of establishments, is available. (The 1982 data are
preliminary figures and states are reported only if employment exceeds
500.) Second, when employment in the state is greater than 150 (500
in 1982), but reporting actual employment would reveal information
about an individual company, most data are surpressed. The Census
reports the number of establishments, the number with 20 or more
employees and an employment range. Suppressing one figure means that
a second must also be supressed so that one cannot simply subtract to
get the missing information.
The Census has established priorities on the information it wants
to present, and conversely that which it is willing to supress. The
Census Bureau gives precedence to the 2-digit industry data over the
3-digit. The 3-digit information is given precedence over the
4-digit. The Census' treatment of precedence given to geographic
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areas was slightly different in 1967 and 1972 than in 1977 and 1982.
In 1967 and 1972, the Census gave preference to information on broad
geographic regions. Thus, region totals received precedence over
individual state information. This meant that if the data on one
state in a region was supressed, then the data on a second state also
had to be supressed. The second suppression was usually the least
significant state. Due to the increasing interest in state data,
states were given precedence over regions beginning in 1977. This
lead to the supression of fewer states. However, no region totals
were given. Therefore, I had to create region totals by summing
across states. Table A.3 and the discussion below describes how much
of a problem this is.
I needed to have complete information and therefore needed to do
something about the missing data. When no separate state information
was given, I assumed that the establishment and employment were zero.
This assignment has little effect on employment in 1967-1977, given
that the maximum it could be was 149. In 1982 states with less than
500 workers were excluded. When the Census only reported an
employment rage, I generally assigned the mean. The ranges and
assignments were:
Range Mean
AA: 150-249 200
BB: 250-499 375
CC: 500-999 750
EE: 1000-2499 1750
FF: 2500 + --
I used two kinds of information to assign values to the top,
open-ended category in 1967-1977. (It was not possible to make any
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estimates in 1982.) When it was possible, I used employment
information from other industries within the state. I assigned the
mean to any ranges given and could then subtract from a broader
industry group to get an estimate for the computer industry. In other
instances I used information from other states (and occasionally other
regions) to arrive at an estimate.2
I did two checks on the reasonableness of my estimates. First, I
examined the incidence of the different types of assignments. Second,
I compared the sum of the states to the actual region totals given,
and the sum of the states and regions to the actual U.S. figures.
The mean assignments made to the three lowest ranges, AA, BB, and
CC have a relatively small potential error and won't significantly
affect the analysis. Range AA can be + 50 employees, BB is + 125 and
CC is + 250. I assigned an error flag of 1 to these estimates. The
mean assigned to the range EE, 1000-2499 can be off by + 750 or 43
percent (of the mean assigned). The potential for error is more
substantial here, and I assigned an error flag of 2. Estimates of the
open-ended category received an error flag of 2 if the potential error
was over 20 percent of the estimate or if the error was 16-20 percent
and involved over 750 people. I coded the error flag as 1 for all
other estimates.
Table A.1 shows the frequency of various potential error types.
The number of states for which actual employment figures were reported
increased over time. The number of states for which no separate state
record was given decreased. In all years, over 50 percent of the
states either had the actual employment reported or had no state
Table A.1
INCIDENCE OF POTENTIAL ERRORS IN EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATES
IN CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS: 1967-1977
1977a 1972 1967
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
States
Actual Reported 16 32.0 5 10.0 2 4.0
No State Table Given 13 26.0 21 42.0 31 62.0
Error Class 1 (less severe)c 15 30.0 16 32.0 11 22.0
Error Class 2 (more severe)c 6 12.0 7b 14.0 4b 8.0
Assignment not Possible/ 1 2.0 2 4.0
Error Uncertain
Total 50 100.0 50 100.0 50 100.0
Regions
Actual Reported 1 11.1 5 55.6 5 55.6
No Region Table Given 0 0.0 1 11.1
Error Class 1 (less severe)c 3 33.3 2 22.2 0 0.0
Error Class 2 (more severe)c 5 55.6 2 22.2 3 33.3
Total 9 100.0 9 99.9 9 100.0
Notes: a. No region totals given in 1977. Regions estimated from summing states, and errors
reported here reflect errors in state estimates. For 1977, error class 1 means all
states had either an error class 1 or the state was not reported. Error class 2 covers
all others.
b. The two states in 1967 were Arizona and California. I could figure out the minimum and
maximum values for the states. California was clearly the larger state, so in tabula-
tions I assigned the minimum to Arizona and the maximum to California. In 1972, the
error for Michigan could not be computed.
c. See text for definitions.
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record (a small error with respect to employment). About one-third of
the states had employment estimates assigned an error class of 1.
These don't affect estimates substantially. Between 8 and 14 percent
of the estimates were more problematic, having an error class of 2.
The second test of the reasonableness of the employment estimates
involved summing the state estimates and comparing them to known
region and U.S. totals and summing the regions to compare to the
actual U.S. Tables A.2 through A.4 present the results of this
analysis. My conclusion is that the estimates are on the whole good.
Table A.2 compares the actual region employment figures (which may
be estimates themselves) to those obtained by summing across the
states for 1967 and 1972. (Note that the Census did not give region
totals for 1977.) The two estimates of the number of establishments
and the number of establishemnts employing 20 or more can be different
because there was no separate state record presented if the state did
not employ at least 150 workers. The largest difference occurred in
the South Atlantic where the two estimates differed by 6
establishments in 1972. However, most 1972 estimates differed by no
more than 3 establishments. The 1967 estimates also differed by a
maximum of 3 establishments.
The two employment estimates generally differed by no more than
5-6 percent in 1972. Estimates in the East South Central, a small
region, differed by 25 percent as both the region's and one state's
estimates involved estimating a value for the range 1000-2499.
State figures were calculated from region figures for several
regions in 1967, thus constraining the two estimates to be equal in 5
Table A.2
COMPARING ACTUAL REGION FIGURES TO SUM OF STATES: 1967 AND 1972
1972 1967
Actual Sum of Ratio Actual Actual Sum of Ratio Actual
Regions States to Sum Regions States to Sum
New England
Establishments 81 80 1.01 25 23 1.09
Establishments with 20+ 47 46 1.02 19 18 1.06
Employment 17,500 17,225 1.02 8,350 8,350 1.00a
Mid-Atlantic
Establishments 120 120 1.00 42 42 1.00
Establishments with 20+ 71 71 1.00 38 38 1.00
Employment 27,000 27,000 1.00 25,800 25,800 1.00a
East North Central
Establishments 45 42 1.07 16 13 1.23
Establishments with 20+ 20 21 .95 11 10 1.10
Employment 6,600 5,925 1.11 4,300 4,150 1.03
West North Central
Establishments 42 40 1.05 12 11 1.09
Establishments with 20+ 30 30 1.00 11 11 1.00
Employment 20,300 20,280 1.00 18,800 18,800 1.00a
South Atlantic
Establishments 57 51 1.12 15 14 1.07
Establishments with 20+ 29 27 1.07 11 11 1.00
Employment 9,700 9,375 1.04 8,500 7,515 1.13
Table A.2 (continued)
COMPARING ACTUAL REGION FIGURES TO SUM OF STATES: 1967 AND 1972
1972 1967
Actual Sum of Ratio Actual Actual Sum of Ratio Actual
Regions States to Sum Regions States to Sum
East South Central
Establishments 8 8 1.00 0 0
Establishments with 20+ 5 5 1.00 0 0
Employment 1,750 2,325 .75 0 0
West South Central
Establishments 34 32 1.06 7 7 1.00
Establishments with 20+ 11 11 1.00 6 6 1.00
Employment 7,320 7,725 .95 1,750 2,500 .70
Mountain
Establishments 37 36 1.03 11 10 1.10
Establishments with 20+ 25 25 1.00 9 8 1.13
Employment 12,485 11,700 1.07 b b a
Pacific
Establishments 178 176 1.01 49 48 1.02
Establishments with 20+ 117 117 1.00 34 34 1.00
Employment 41,600 41,650 .99 b b a
Notes: a. Constrained to be equal; one state calculated by
b. Total of Mountain and Pacific is 31,400.
subtracting from region total.
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regions. Employment figures in the South Atlantic differed by 13
percent and in the West South Central by 30 percent. The latter
difference arose as a result of estimates for the 1000-2499 range.
Tables A.3 and A.4 compare the sum of state and the sum of region
estimates to the known U.S. figures. Differences between the two sets
of figures are not large.
Schmenner's Fortune 500 Firms
The data on Fortune 500 firms presented in Chapter 3 come from a
survey conducted by Roger Schmenner. Schmenner's sample covered 410
manufacturing companies, most of whom were in the Fortune 500 in 1978.
These companies had a total of 17,759 manufacturing plants (sales and
service, and research and development sites are excluded from the
sample). The base, or raw material for Schmenner's data come from Dun
and Bradstreet files. The Duns Marketing Service Division has what is
known as the Corporate Family Tree, which lists all the facilities of
a corporation of which Dun and Bradstreet is aware. The list is
related to their credit checking operations, though it is not the same
thing. The Dun and Bradstreet data are the most comprehensive, public
source of individual plant data. The data are unique in that a plant
is assigned an identification code that is presumably invariant over
time, even if the plant relocates and changes regions.
Schmenner purchased the Corporate Family Tree for 1978 for the 475
Fortune 500 companies for which information was available, and for an
additional 25 companies. For each company, Schmenner went back to
1972 and extracted all plants that existed at that point. This picked
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Table A.3
COMPARING ACTUAL U.S. FIGURES TO SUM
OF STATE FIGURES: 1967, 1972, 1977
Ratio of
Actual Sum of Actual
U.S. States to Sum
1977
Establishments 931 909 1.02
Establishments with 20+ Employees 434 428 1.01
Employment 192,600 193,626 .99
1972
Establishments 601 585 1.03
Establishments with 20+ Employees 354 353 1.00
Employment 144,600 143,205 1.01
1967
Establishments 178 168 1.06
Establishments with 20+ Employees 140 136a 1.03a
Employment 98,900 98,515 1.00
Note: a. Some of the states calculated by subtracting from U.S.
total.
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Table A.4
COMPARING ACTUAL U.S. FIGURES
TO SUM OF REGIONS: 1967 AND 1972
Ratio
Actual Sum of Actual
U.S. Regions to Sum
1972
Establishments 601 602 .99
Establishments with 20+ Employees 354 355 .99
Employment 144,600 144,255 1.00
1967
Establishments 178 177 1.01
Establishments with 20+ Employees 140 139 1.01
Employment Constrained to be same
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up plants that closed during the decade and plants that the company
divested before 1978. The Dun and Bradstreet data contain numerous
errors and Schmenner's research group spent 4 1/2 person-years
correcting and collecting additional information. Most information
was verified by the company, and thus is presumably fairly accurate.
The base years for the data are 1972 and 1978, but due to ways
that Dun and Bradstreet and Schmenner collected the data, the two
periods are actually the early 1970s (1970-1972) and the late 1970s
(1978-1980). Dun and Bradstreet does not necessarily update its files
every year. The plants in the 1972 sample were all in existence in
1972, but employment and status changes could pertain to any time
between 1970 and 1972. Schmenner began his study in 1978. Most data
collection occurred in 1979, though some stretched into 1980.
Employment and changes in plant status can thus refer to any point
between 1978 and 1980.
The sample I used in my analysis was plants whose main
manufacturing activity was electronic computing equipment (SIC 3573).
The file contained 167 individual plants from 37 companies. A list of
the sample companies is in Table A.5.
BLS Industry-Occupation Matrix3
The data on the occupational distribution by industry, presented
in Chapter 4, are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as part
of their work on employment projections. The 1970 and 1980 data used
here come from two different sources, which has implications for their
comparability.
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Table A.5
COMPANIES IN SCHMENNERS SAMPLE
Ampex Incorporated
Ball Corporation
Becton Dickinson
Burroughs Corporation
Digital Equipment Corp.
Exxon Corp.
Ford Motor Co.
General Dynamics Corp.
General Electric Co.
General Signal Corp.
GTE
Greyhound Corp.
Harris Corporation
Hewlett-Packard
Honeywell Inc.
Houdaille Industries
IBM Corp.
Litton Industries
Mead Corporation
Memorex Corporation
Three M Corp.
Motorola Inc.
National Semiconductor
NCR Corporation
Perkin Elmer Corp.
Ralston Purina Co.
Raytheon Co.
RCA Corp.
Reliance Electric Co.
Rohm & Haas Company
The Singer Company
Sperry Rand Corp.
Teledyne
Texas Instruments Inc.
TRW Inc.
Varian Associates Inc.
Xerox Corp.
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The 1970 data are based on the 1970 Census Bureau report titled
Occupation by Industry.4 The BLS used these data as a base and made
various adjustments based on other information that it had, to make
the data more accurate.
The BLS shifted the base for the matrix beginning in 1980. The
data are now based on a survey conducted by the BLS, the Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) survey. What I refer to as the 1980
matrix, the BLS calls a 1982 matrix. The occupational distribution
comes from the 1980 OES survey and the BLS adjusted the actual numbers
by using 1982 employment totals for the industry. This does not
change the percentage distribution. Since I am just using the
percentages, it is more accurate to refer to the data as pertaining to
1980.
The Census surveys individuals and asks them to report the
occupation of their primary job. The OES surveys establishmetns and
thus the unit of analysis is a job, not an individual.
The largest difference between the Census and OES is that because
the OES surveys establishments, it enumerates multiple jobs held by
one individual. The Census only gets one job per individual. As a
result, on average, there are 10 percent more jobs in the OES survey
than the Census survey. This will have some effect on the
occupational distribution, in those occupations that are likely to be
second jobs for people. Professional and managerial occupations won't
be affected very much.
There are also likely to be reporting differences, particularly in
certain occupations between the two surveys. The Census asks people
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to report their occupations. It is often asserted that people tend to
exaggerate their occupational titles. Carelessness is also likely to
cause some reporting errors. These problems do not arise when
employers do the reporting.
There are changes in two occupations, other that those reported in
Chapter 4 that appear to be due to differences in occupational coding
in the two surveys. Table 4.1 showed a decrease in the percent of
secretaries and typists. Secretary is a "generic" term and many
people report themselves as secretaries, when their job is more
accurately somewhat different. Some people classified as secretaries
in 1970 are classified as general office clerks in 1980. In sum, the
observed decline in the percentage of secretaries is most likely
spurious.
The observed increase in the percent of Managers is probably
exaggerated. The OES collects less detailed information on managers
than does the Census. In manufacturing industries, the OES generally
has only 2 or 3 categories for managers, such as General Executive and
All Others. One BLS representative suggested that as a result of this
classification system, some blue collar supervisors are misclassified
as managers when they should be reported as crafts workers. The
magnitude of this error is not known. However, as noted above, people
tend to exaggerate their occupational titles in Census reports. Thus,
both BLS and Census reports probably over-represent managers, though
it is unclear if one source has more error than the other.
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Occupational Wage Data
The occupational wage data used in the analysis in Chapter 5 come
from a number of different sources, as no one source provided all the
information that I needed. The Area Wage Surveys provided data on
white collar and skilled maintenance occupations. They do not survey
any occupations that could be called direct manufacturing labor. The
Industry Wage Surveys, on the other hand, only provided wage data on
occupations classified as direct manufacturing labor. Engineers are
an important group in the computer manufacturing industry, but not
included in either of the surveys mentioned above. The dicennial
Census does collect information on the wages of engineers, which I
have used. The following describes these data sources in more detail.
(Table 5.2 summarized the basic differences in the surveys.)
Industry Wage Survey5
The Industry Wage Survey program is conducted by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) as part of its occupational wage survey
program. (The Area Wage Surveys, discussed below, are also part of
this program.) The BLS surveys manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
industries to collect information on employment, wages, benefits and
various employment practices in a number of SMSAs. Surveys are
conducted approximately every five years. The survey that I used
covers the machinery manufacturing industry (SIC 35) which includes
the office and computing equipment sector.
The BLS surveys establishments with 20 or more workers (and
establishments in SIC 3544 and 3545 with 8 or more workers). An
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establishment is defined as a single physical location where
industrial operations occur. Only a sample of firms in the industry
are surveyed. The sample contains a higher percentage of large
relative to small firms, though final results are weighted to
approximate the actual universe. The 1970-1971 survey covered 17
percent of the establishments and 59 percent of the employment in
machinery manufacturing industries in the SMSAs studied. In 1981,
these figures were 21 percent and 56 percent, respectively. Data on
employment, wages, and working conditions were obtained during
personal visits by BLS staff.
The 1970-1971 survey was conducted between November 1970 and April
1971. Philadelphia was surveyed in April 1971, Chicago, Detroit, and
Milwaukee in January 1971, and the rest of the SMSAs in November 1970.
The BLS interviewed all establishments in the 1981 survey in January
of that year.
Wages are defined by the BLS to include striaght-time hourly
earnings. They exclude premium pay for overtime, weekends, holidays,
and late shifts. Wages include incentive payments and bonuses if they
are related to production, but exclude nonproduction bonuses such as
year-end bonuses.
Four occupations that the BLS surveyed are important in the office
and computing machines industry. They are assemblers, inspectors,
machinists, and machine tool operators. The BLS definitions of these
occupations are in Table A.6. The occupations were defined similarly
in the 1970-1971 and the 1981 surveys.
The BLS surveyed 22 SMSAs in 1970-1971 and 23 SMSAs in 1981
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Table A.6
INDUSTRY WAGE SURVEY: OCCUPATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Occupation
Assembler
Inspector
Machine-Tool
Operator
Machinist
Definition
Assembles and/or fits together parts to form
complete units or subassemblies at a bench,
conveyor line, or on the floor, depending upon the
size of the units and the organization of the
production process. Work may include processing
operations requiring the use of handtools in
scraping, chipping, and filling of parts to obtain
a desired fit as well as power tools and special
equipment when punching, riveting, soldering, or
welding of parts is necessary. Workers who perform
any of these processing operations exclusively as
part of specialized assembling operations are
excluded.
Inspects parts, products and/or processes of the
establishment. Performs such operations as
examining parts or products for flaws and defects,
checking their dimensions and appearance to
determine whether they meet the required standards
and specifications. Does not include inspectors in
toolrooms or inspectors of purchased parts.
Operates or tends one or more nonportable,
power-driven machine tools (including numerically
controlled machine tools) in order to shape metal
by progressively removing portions of the stock in
the form of chips or shavings, or by abrasion.
Category includes operators classified as either
production or toolroom.
Fabricates, by a series of progressive machining
operations, complete metal parts, mechanisms, or
machines, ot be used as, or as part of, the end
product of the establishment. Category includes
maintenance and production machinists.
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(Atlanta, Georgia was included in the later survey). Employment of
production and related workers in the SMSAs studied was 36 percent of
total U.S. employment in SIC 35 in 1970-1971 and about 25 percent of
the total in 1981.
6
Area Wage Surveys
The Bureau of Labor Statistics annually collects information on
wages and related benefits within six broad industry classifications,
including manufacturing, in selected SMSAs.
The BLS selects a sample of establishments, which like the
Industry Wage Survey, includes a higher percentage of large relative
to small firms. Final results are weighted to accurately represent
the firms in the area. Small establishments, those with generally
less than 50 (in some cases 100) employees are excluded. Data are
collected by personal visits by BLS staff every third year. In the
intervening years information is obtained by mail, telephone and
personal visits. The sample is only revised every three years, so
that the sample size decreases as firms go out of business, but new
firms only appear when the sample is revised.
The occupations studied by the BLS are selected office clerical,
professional, technical, maintenance, toolroom, power plant, material
movement, and custodial positions common to a variety of manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing industries. The occupations I examined were
those that were relatively important in the computer manufacturing
industry and included secretaries, stenographers and typists,
accounting clerks, key entry operators, computer systems analysts
(business), computer programmers (business), computer equipment
355
operators, drafters, and electronics technicians. Table A.7 gives the
1980 BLS definitions of these occupations. Most definitions were
similar in 1970 and 1980. However, accounting clerks were less
skilled in 1970 than 1980. In 1970, they were specifically not
required to have any knowledge of bookkeeping and accounting
procedures. The computer analysts and programmers surveyed by the BLS
only include those involved in business applications. Thus, the
groups exclude those involved in scientific and engineering
applications, undoubtedly a significant number in the computer
manufacturing industry. I assume that the relative wages in business
and scientific and engineering applications are similar.
Earnings pertain to full-time workers, defined as those who work a
regular weekly schedule. Earnings exclude premium pay for overtime
and for work on weekends, holidays and late shifts. Nonproduction
bonuses are excluded but cost of living and incentive bonuses are
included. When earnings information is not shown it means that there
are insufficient data to give reliable results or that the data would
disclose information on an individual company.
Census7
I used the 1970 and 1980 Censuses to obtain data on the earnings
of mechanical engineers and electrical and electronics engineers, as
neither of the BLS studies described above surveyed these occupations.
The tables I used covered men in the "experienced civilian labor
force" who had some earnings. It was not possible to include women.
Men and women were reported in separate tables, and in 1970 only data
on median earnings were reported and it is not possible to compute a
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Table A.7
AREA WAGE SURVEY: OCCUPATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Occupation
Secretary
Stenographer
Typist
Accounting Clerk
Definition
Assigned as personal secretary, normally to one
individual. Maintains a close and highly
responsive relationship to the day-to-day
activities of the supervisor. Works fairly
independently recieving a minimum of detailed
supervision and guidance. Performs varied clerical
and secretarial duties requiring a knowledge of
office routine and understanding of the
organization, programs, and procedures related to
the work of the supervisor.
Primary duty is to take dictation using shorthand,
and to transcribe the dictation. May also type
from written copy. May operate from a stenographic
pool. May occasionally transcribe from voice
recordings (if primary duty is transcribing from
recordings, see Transcribing-Machine Typist). This
job is distinguished from that of a secretary in
that a secretary normally works in a confidential
relationship with only one manager or executive and
performs more responsible and discretionary tasks
as described in the secretary job definition.
Uses a typewriter to make copies of various
materials or to make out bills after calculations
have been made by another person. May include
typing of stencils, mats, or similar materials for
use in duplicating processes. May do clerical work
involving little special training, such as keeping
simple records, filing records and reports, or
sorting and distributing incoming mail.
Performs one or more accounting clerical tasks such
as posting to registers and ledgers; reconciling
bank accounts; verifying the internal consistency,
completeness, and mathematical accuracy of
accounting documents; assigning prescribed
accounting distribution codes; examining and
verifying the clerical accuracy of various types of
reports, lists, calculations, postings, etc.;
preparing journal vouchers; or making entries or
adjustments to accounts. Levels A and B require a
knowledge and understanding of the established and
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Table A.7 (Continued)
AREA WAGE SURVEY:
Occupation
Key Entry
Operator
Computer Systems
Analysts,
Business
Computer
Programmer,
Business
Computer
Operator
OCCUPATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Definition
standardized bookkeeping and accounting
procedures and techniques used in an accounting
system, or a segment of an accounting system, where
there are few variations in the types of
transactions handled.
Operates keyboard-controlled data entry device such
as keypunch machine or key-operated magnetic tape
or disk encoder to transcribe data into a form
suitable for comptuer processing. Work requires
skill in operating an alphanumeric keyboard and an
understanding of transcribing procedures and
relevant data entry equipment.
Analyzes business problems to formulate procedures
for solving them by use of electronic data
processing equipment. Develops a complete
description of all specifications needed to enable
programmers to prepare required digital computer
programs. Does not include employees primarly
responsible for the management or supervision of
other electronic data processing employees or
systems analysts primarily concerned with
scientific or engineering problems.
Converts statements of business problems, typically
prepared by a systems analyst, into a sequence of
detailed instructions which are required to solve
the problems by automatic data processing
equipment. Working from charts or diagrams, the
programmer develops the precise instructions which,
when entered into the comptuer system in coded
language, cause the manipulation of data to achieve
desired results. Does not include employees
primarily responsible for the management or
supervision of other electronic data processing
employees, or programmers primarily concrned with
scientific and/or engineering problems.
In accordance with operating instructions, monitors
and operates the control console of a digital
computer to process data. Executes runs by either
serial processing (processes one program at a
time) or multiprocessing (processes two or more
programs simultaneously).
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Table A.7 (Continued)
AREA WAGE SURVEY: OCCUPATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Occupation
Drafter
Electronics
Technician
Definition
Performs drafting work requiring knowledge and
skill in drafting methods, procedures, and
techniques. Prepares drawings of structures,
mechanical and electrical equipment, piping and
duct systems and other similar equipment, systems,
and assemblies. Uses recognized systems of symbols,
legends, shadings, and lines having specific
meanings in drawings. Drawings are used to
communicate engineering ideas, designs, and
information in support of engineering functions.
Works on various types of electronic equipment and
related devices by performing one or a combination
of the following: installing, maintaining,
repairing, overhauling, troubleshooting, modifying,
constructing, and testing. Work requires practical
application of technical knowledge of electronics
principles, ability to determine malfunctions, and
skill to put eqipment in required oerating
condition.
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weighted average of male and female earnings from this information.
The experienced civilian labor force includes the employed as well as
the experienced unemployed if they had some earnings in the year prior
to the survey.
The Census defines earnings to include wage and walary income and
self-employment income. If an individual holds more than one job,
earnings will be for all jobs and thus will confound the analysis of
occupational earnings. This is probably not a significant problem
when looking only at engineers, as most of these professionals have
only one job.
The occupations I examined were mechanical engineers and
electrical and electronic engineers. The occupational classification
system in the 1980 census differs substanially from the 1970 system.
However, for the engineers I examined, the differences are not great.
Between 95 and 99 percent are classified the same way in both years.
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Notes
1. Sources of data and technical information:
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1967, Volume
III, Area Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1967, Volume
II, Industry Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1972, Volume
III, Area Statistics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1976.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1972, Volume
II, Industry Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1976.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1977, Volume
III, Geographic Area Series. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1981.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufacturers, 1977, Volume
II, Industry Statistics. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1981.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Census of Manufacturers, 1982,
Preliminary Report Industry Series (MC82-I-35F-1(P))," Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1984.
2. I had problems estimating the employment in a few states. In
1967, the Census suppressed California, in the Pacific region and
Arizona, in the Mountain region and assigned them FF. Both region
totals were also suppressed. However, the Census did report the
employment total for the Pacific and Mountain regions combined.
Using this information, I assigned Arizona the minimum possible
employment (2,500) and assigned California the remaining
employment. Thus, Arizona's value in 1967 is a minimum estimate
and California's is a maximum. These are not unreasonable
assumptions looking at the time trends in the states (Table 3.8).
Massachusetts and New England employment were not reported in
1967. I estimated New England by subtracting from other regions.
Then I estimated Massachusetts by subtracting from the New England
estimate. Both estimates have potential errors of around 30
percent.
Information presented by the Census for Michigan in 1972 was
conflicting. The industry report showed that minimum employment
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in Michigan was 4,600. The state table showed the maximum to be
3,500. I used the 4,600 figure as it was consistent with
employment total in the East North Central region.
3. Sources of data and technical information:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The National Industry-Occupation
Employment Matrix, 1970, 1978, and Projected 1990, Bulletin 2086.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1981.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment by Industry and
Occupation, 1982 and Projected 1995 Alternatives," unpublished
data.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Handbook of Methods, Volume
I, Bulletin 2134-1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, December 1982. Chapter 3.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Occupational Employment
Projections," Monthly Labor Review, August 1981.
I had numerous conversations with Daryl Delano of the BLS Boston
office concerning the data and the differences between the data
sources.
4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, Occupation by
Industry, PC(2)-7C. Washington, D.C.: U.S.Government Printing
Office, 1972.
5. Sources of data and technical information:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Industry Wage Survey: Machinery
Manufacturing, Winter 1970-1971, Bulletin 1754. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. Data from Table 1, pp.
10-12 for men and from Tables 4-25, pp. 17-63 for women.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Industry Wage Survey: Machinery
Manufacturing, January 1981, Bulletin 2124. Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Pringing Office, April 1982. Data from Table 1,
pp. 4-9.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Handbook of Methods, Volume
I, Bulletin 2134-1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
DTfice, December 1982.
6. Sources of data and technical information:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Area Wage Surveys, Bulletin 1685.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Surveys were
conducted between August 1970 and June 1971. Data from Table A-3.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Area Wage Surveys, Bulletin 3000.
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Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Surveys were
conducted between January and December 1980. Data from Tables A-1
and A-2.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Handbook of Methods, Volume
I, Bulletin 2134-1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, December 1982.
7. Sources of data and technical information:
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, Volume 1,
Characteristics of the Population, Chapter D: Detailed
Characteristics (PC80-1-D). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office. Table 222 and Appendix A.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Volume 1,
Characteristics of the Population, Chapter D: Detailed
Characteristics. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office. Table 175 and Appendix A.
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